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The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if finance and accounting personnel could 
distinguish between random and non-random time-series strings and to determine what types of 
errors they would make.  These individuals averaging 13 years of experience were unable to 
distinguish non-random patterns from random strings in an assessment composed of statistical 
process control (SPC) charts.  Respondents scored no better than guessing which was also 
assessed with a series of true-false questions.  Neither over-alternation (oscillation) nor under-
alternation (trend) strategies were able to predict type I or type II error rates, i.e. illusion of 
control or illusion of chaos.  Latent class analysis methods within partial least squares structural 
equation modeling (PLS-SEM) were successful in uncovering segments or groups of respondents 
with large explained variance and significant path models.  Relationships between desirability of 
control, personal fear of invalidity, and error rates were more varied than expected.  Yet, some 
segments tended to illusion of control while others to illusion of chaos.  Similar effects were also 
observed when substituting a true-false guessing assessment for the SPC assessment with some 
loss of explained variance and weaker path coefficients.  Respondents also provided their 
perceptions and thoughts of randomness for both SPC and true-false assessments. 
 Keywords: random sequence perception, time series, statistical process control charts, 
randomness, patterns, guessing strategies, behavioral finance, Nelson’s rules, finance, 
accounting, quality improvement process, partial least squares structural equation modeling, 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The study of randomness is not a recent undertaking.  The ideas of determinism and free 
will have been chronicled throughout human history.  Randomizers from antiquity have been 
replaced by random number generators of today.  The various studies of games of chance have 
led to modern probability theory.  Science has also explored tacit human expertise and the folly 
of our faulty heuristics and biases.  Randomness has yielded to the self-similar fractals of 
Mandelbrot (1977, 2004), chaos theory of Lorenz (1963), or even the adaption of Bose-Einstein 
dynamics to cinema outcomes by De Vany (2004).  Similarly, randomness and the error types, 
generated from human interpretation, cross many diverse domains: clinical trials and diagnostics 
in medicine; law enforcement and judiciary processes in the legal domain; climate change 
analytics; artificial intelligence such as IBM’s Big Blue; or the CEO effect, to name a few.   
A recent google scholar search of “heuristics and biases” returned over 172,000 results, 
excluding citations and patents, while “behavioral economics” returned almost 2.6M instances 
using the same criteria.  Likewise, the 2019 results of the former were 7,200 and of the latter 
were 27,200, which indicates a continued and robust interest in many scientific fields.  Costa, de 
Melo Carvalho, and de Melo Moreira (2019) have documented this exponential growth in 
behavioral economics/finance/accounting research between 1967 and 2016, which included 




accounting. The authors concluded that this field of study was important, and in a graph, they 
showed the exponential growth of published articles over almost 50 years. 
In this literature search, Ackert and Deaves (2011) were the only authors to put forth this 
effort in a book format to summarize and synthesize the vast number of studies in various 
domains of behavioral economics and finance.  Similarly, it was discovered that within the 
psychological research studies and experiments, many of the subject pools were composed of 
university-level students or, in minor cases, investors at large.  Experiments or surveys, whose 
participants worked in the finance and accounting industry, were rare.  Examples of this research 
are Biggs and Wild (1985), who studied bias in accountants’ perception of unaudited results, and 
Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman (2003) who examined traders’ behavior, 
illusion of control, and performance.  Additional accounting examples include Uecker and 
Kinney (1977) and Johnson (1994). 
Additionally, within this literature, two studies offered specific challenges for 
randomness and error study.  First, Nickerson (2002) challenged future researchers to allow 
individuals to show their knowledge or intuitions about randomness directly.  Moreover, Fenton-
O’Creevy et al. (2003) again requested a better method to identify and manage the illusion of 
control among stock market traders generally.  They suggested that an assessment technique was 
needed to better understand candidates who might be subject to this behavior. 
Furthermore, the literature examining type II error rates is sparse.  Two examples 
included Harris and Osman (2012), who reviewed decisions from a Bayesian perspective and 
discussed the illusion of control, a type I error, and the illusion of chaos, a type II error.  Also, 




This study proposes a remedy for these sparse findings and researcher requests through 
the following contributions.  First, statistical process control (SPC) charts are, by design, 
separating random and non-random sequences.  So, a diagnostic test has been constructed to 
assess knowledge and error rates among a time-series or strings of events based on a scenario of 
stock returns as a response to Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003), who showed that illusion of control 
was a maladaptive behavior.  Second, this instrument equally assesses type I and type II error 
rates, addressing the large research imbalance.  Third, to evaluate respondent knowledge and 
strategies, open-ended questions allowed individuals to detail their thought processes in response 
to the request by Nickerson (2002), who proposed that subjects should not only be evaluated by 
psychological experiments but also have the opportunity to explain their conceptions of 
randomness.  Fourth, to address the shortage of participants within the accounting and finance 
field, industry professionals were selected.  Fifth, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used 
to link this assessment tool to two previously validated psychological scales and other behavioral 
characteristics.  It is believed, neither SPC charts have been used in random perception 
assessments nor has SEM modeling been utilized in behavioral finance studies.  Sixth, given that 
SPC charts follow a set of non-random rules that have been determined probabilistically, this 
insight facilitates a transition from a heuristic and biases framework towards a naturalistic 
decision-making process through the application of those rules.  And lastly, knowing these rules 
for non-randomness also applies to many time-series events, and therefore, contributes to an 
increasingly universal viewpoint even though these tools have only been used extensively in 
manufacturing and to a lesser extent in a hospital or other service settings. 
This dissertation follows a thematic organization where studies are grouped into topics 




and Deaves (2011).  The literature review in chapter 2 begins with a history of randomness and 
its use in antiquity.  In an attempt to understand his/her environment, humanity has attempted to 
identify repetitions.  The desire to develop this control has a rich history that has touched on both 
the spiritual and the scientific.  As randomness can be described as a series of events without 
patterns, theories of human pattern recognition are briefly discussed.  How our senses perceive 
and interpret patterns will affect classifications, memory, and future recall of those same 
patterns.  Repeated errors based on those classifications can cause repeated failures.  Yet, there 
are conditions that also favor the abilities of humans to use tacit knowledge in pattern 
recognition for positive outcomes, i.e., recognition primed decision making.  In this case, 
research suggests that conditions exist where this type of knowledge can be successfully applied.  
Subsequently, both random sequence perception and cognition of randomness are considered as 
constructs and are differentiated.  Much of this research, however, describes the absence of a 
proper determination of randomness, which leads to human error.  The most common error and 
the one most universally studied is the type I error, a false positive, or seeing a pattern where 
none exists.  Research in human psychology has classified many constructs related to heuristics 
and biases.  The common constructs such as the hot hand fallacy, gamblers’ fallacy, and local 
representativeness are well known common knowledge.  Less known errors such as the idea of 
innate random generators, studies of randomness, memory or learning, and real-life experiences 
are outlined in detail as well the more insidious behaviors of the illusion of control or illusory 
perceptions.  While psychology and behavioral economics have, for decades, explored the vast 
majority of these phenomena, their application and knowledge outside these areas are limited.  
Furthermore, while some scientific studies may diminish in relevance with time, even early 




Conversely, individuals may not observe an actual phenomenon, which creates an 
opportunity for a false negative or a type II error.  Few studies have examined this classification 
citing specifically a type II error.  Some similar discussions can be found in strategic 
management literature which has documented decreasing firm longevity over the last 50 years, 
and which has studied the oldest firms, the Henokiens (for longevity see Mauboussin, Callahan, 
& Majd [2017] or Khan, Ghayas, & Kashif [2019]; for the oldest firms see Funabashi [2009] or 
Bennedsen & Henry [2016]).  
The literature review continues with one section, which focuses explicitly on behavioral 
finance and accounting.  These selected studies examined financial scenarios showing heuristics 
and biases by both investors and industry personnel that may lead to suboptimal and maladaptive 
decisions.  Often, because finance and accounting are quantitatively oriented, the business 
assumptions associated with its reliability are taken for granted.  Research suggests caution.  
Afterward, an auditing subsection reviews type I and type II errors and their avoidance within the 
corporate compliance domain.  Interestingly, the most extensive study of both type I and type II 
errors is found here.  Yet, even with extensive knowledge of their impact, susceptibility to those 
same errors may remain problematic. 
The ensuing section expands the discussion of randomness and errors into other domains 
to obtain a broader vision of its application and potential interactions.  For example, after doing 
some risk consulting for a large casino in Las Vegas, Taleb (2007) observed that three possible 
catastrophic events had nearly bankrupted the company, and those events were not even 
considered in the firm’s risk model.  Furthermore, seeing these same errors in other fields of 
study accentuates the realization of the limits of human cognition based on senses alone.  And if 




consequences of the failure to make correct assessments are enumerated.  In business, 
opportunities for great wealth and success are juxtaposed to high human costs and failures. 
To conclude Chapter 2,  the literature related to all the operational variables incorporated 
into this study is examined and contended.  Measuring randomness with statistical process 
control charts and the use of Nelson’s rules to separate random variation from special cause 
variation are explored in-depth as well as the weaknesses of the instrument.  This universal tool, 
not readily used outside of quality improvement, provides an opportunity for assessment of both 
processes and individual perceptions of those processes.  Two well-known psychological scales 
and several inherent human characteristics have been identified that may separate behavior 
tendencies into type I and type II error propensities.  These are explored as fitness for use.  For 
example, conventional wisdom might dictate that payoff curves indicating gains with small 
losses, first to market, or “look what I did” action strategies are optimal courses of action.  Or 
does research suggest that they may be type I errors?  And finally, a method of creating and 
assessing individual groups is considered and claimed as a method to avoid committing the same 
type I error that this study is attempting to examine.  Cohen’s Kappa, as a measure of interrater 
reliability, incorporates this idea of random chance pairings within its calculation. 
In Chapter 3, the methodology is investigated and explained.  First, the structural 
equation model for this endeavor is described as are the construct relationships and proposed 
hypotheses.  Next, the research method is clarified, including its suitability for use in this study.  
A discussion ensues concerning the sampling method of the selected population along with 
particular screening measures.  Then, data collection and sample size are stipulated.  The 
measures for this study are later designated and classified as either endogenous, exogenous,  




sample questions, reliability, and convergent and discriminant validities if applicable.  Finally, 
the analysis plan reviews all steps for the quantitative evaluation of the SEM model, paths, and 
measures, and the broad phases for the qualitative portion of the study are delineated to evaluate 
two open-ended questions. 
In Chapter 4, the data and analysis are presented.  Several pilot studies are described 
where the entire survey instrument was tested, as were specific methods to the approach of the 
qualitative questions.  The final survey is discussed and includes suggestions from the Qualtrics 
personnel who assisted in the data collection.  Once the survey was active, the data from 
Qualtrics was collected, reviewed, and approved, but not without some delays.  The qualitative 
portion of the study is discussed in detail before any quantitative structural equation modeling 
was performed.  Next, calculating the grouping variable, Cohen’s Kappa, was proven to be 
problematic, so an alternative is presented.  With all the data separated into tranches, the 
measurement model is explained and is followed with the analysis of the structural model using 
the partial least squares method.  One by one, each hypothesis is shown to be supported or not 
with the hypothesized path coefficients or by analyses of differences.  Procedures for unobserved 
heterogeneity are also explained, and these techniques uncovered segments whose individuals 
might have tendencies to the illusion of control or illusion of chaos.  Because of certain results to 
be developed later, the true-false assessment was also used as an endogenous variable.  
Identically, this model is also tested for unobserved heterogeneity.  The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the findings. 
In Chapter 5, several summary conclusions from the research results are outlined along 
with several ideas for future projects, and as with all research projects, limitations, and 









CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before embarking on the history of randomness and pattern identification, an important 
observation is offered.  Zbilut (2004) noted that science has traditionally attempted to separate 
order from randomness, which was considered a “nuisance.”  He commented that perhaps a 
better perspective would be to consider randomness as “an active process which informs order 
and vice versa” (p. 6). This idea of patterned-randomness or random-patterns is profound.  For 
example, among animals, the zebra and giraffe exhibit similar designs between animals but are 
also a unique design specific to each animal. Likewise, in humans, fingerprints and DNA exhibit 
similar uniqueness as a product of informed order through a randomized process.  The best of 
human nature comes from the recognition of this uniqueness of patterned-randomness, while the 
worst of humanity comes from a superficial recognition of patterns and stereotypes.  
Chapter 2 begins with a brief history of randomness, pattern recognition theories, and 
decision making.  Next, randomness and error types principally from the literature of psychology 
follows.  Several articles concerning behavioral finance and accounting are presented.  After 
these, randomness and error types from a wide variety of domains are offered enhancing the 
impact of the consequences and costs of these errors.  A summary follows a detailed discussion 






Bennett (1998) recounted a lengthy history of the development of randomizers and 
divination in antiquity, describing early games of chance, and outlining the advancement of 
probabilistic thinking.  The author noted that instruments of randomness had fulfilled many early 
functions in strategic choice, division of property, assigning responsibility, or the settling of 
grievances.  The earliest dice games date to 2750 B.C.E in Mesopotamia; another early example 
was found in Egypt in 1320 B.C.E.  Early Greek and Roman gambling games were played with 
astragali or actual animal bones.  Similarly, in Asia, one of the earliest written accounts of the 
use of chance devices occurred in a Vedic poem written in Sanskrit around 1000 B.C.E.  These 
early devices and their outcomes were often attributed to gods (see also Yronwode [2012] for a 
comprehensive treatise on shamanic traditions and divination). 
 Bennett (1998) also discussed the divine nature of randomness in some detail.  In 
Homer’s Iliad, Hector shakes lots for intervention.  The Roman historian Tacitus also recorded a 
ritual used by Teutons to cast lots.  In the Hebrew Bible, lots are frequently used in the division 
of property from inheritance or conquest.  And in defense of Masada against the Romans during 
the second Temple period, men inside the fort drew lots as executioners of the inhabitants with 
the last individual committing suicide rather than surrendering.  Similarly, in Asia, I Ching was 
considered an oracle, which involved the use of hexagrams.   
Bennett (1998) continued demarcating significant events in the history of randomness.  
She noted that Richard de Fournival was the first to write about equiprobability, dice throws, and 
set versus sequences during the thirteenth century.  Additionally, the first author to detail a 
mathematical study of games of chance was Girolamo Cardano in 1564.  In 1654, letters between 




Mlodinow (2008) had observed the philosopher Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was the first to 
speculate that individuals who lacked training in statistics and probability would have difficulty 
identifying random series. 
Pattern Recognition 
Pi, Liao, Lui, and Lu (2008) defined the theory of cognitive pattern recognition:  “an 
object, which is initiated through a visual stimulation (pattern) from the environment, is matched 
to memory where it is categorized for storage” (pp. 434-435).  The authors noted several current 
models of human pattern recognition: Theory of Template, Theory of Prototype, and Theory of 
Feature.  Templates were described as pre-existing patterns that have been encountered in the 
past and stored in long-term memory.  Therefore, when physical stimulation occurs, a matching 
process takes place.  The authors noted the limitation of the template theory as it did not offer a 
solution in dealing with new, unobserved patterns.  The notion of a prototype, however, went 
beyond the pattern-copy method and transformed the stimulation into an abstraction of the 
pattern and its associated attributes.  Therefore, when a physical stimulation occurred, broader 
recognition of patterns was possible.  Similar to prototypes, recognition of the components of a 
pattern decomposed the object into smaller elements. Finally, the authors described the theory of 
features related to perceptions of patterns and forms.  Pattern matching in this theory occurred by 
shapes and is commonly used today in developing artificial computer intelligence.  
Pi et al. (2008) continued their review with a general discussion of human memory, 
which included both the classification and storage of historical events or patterns for the recall in 
the future.  Furthermore, they separated memory into the time elements of instantaneous, short-
term, and long-term.  Employing a memory model, the authors included not only the acquisition 




As previously mentioned, this classification process enabled the ability of humans to 
create a memory.  Pi et al. (2008) provided multiple schemas that detailed the organization of 
human knowledge itself.  Their symbol-net model uses a node approach where unidirectional 
arrows linked concepts within memory at multiple levels.  The level semantic-net model detailed 
by the authors outlined the multidirectional interlinking of the node-concept in a hierarchy with 
perceived attributes.  And, the activation-diffusion model linked concepts (nouns) with attributes 
(adjectives) while also allowing knowledge creation through the connections of attributes and 
stimuli not yet perceived.  Therefore, this model includes the possibility of anticipated 
perception. 
Pi et al. (2008) concluded with a framework of pattern recognition which accounted for 
inputs of pattern collection and followed by patterns, which were influenced by both features-
prototypes and knowledge-rules.  This process produced a matching judgment, and therefore, 
pattern recognition.   
As an example of sequence pattern perception, Restle (1970) tested how college students 
learned serial patterns discovering that subjects divided the sequences into smaller parts, which 
could be generated using multiple mental rules, then reconstructed these back into longer 
sequences.  These mental linkages of short patterns are analogous to phraseology in human 
speech or movements found in themes of music.  Restle (1970) proposed that a perceived series 
also could be decomposed into a set of structural trees within a hierarchy that cascaded to 
multiple levels of binary outcomes.  Furthermore, in experimental trials of pattern sequence 





Giakoumakis, Papaconstantinou, and Skordalakis (1987) listed the three traditional 
approaches to pattern recognition including: statistical, syntactic, and hybrid.  The statistical 
approach involved classification by methods such as discriminant analysis or decision theory.  
The syntactic method used deconstruction to subparts to create primitive patterns at the most 
elemental level.  Lastly, the hybrid approach comprised a combination of both methods.  As 
Restle (1970) had used both decomposition and rules in his experiments, Giakoumakis et al. 
(1987) compared a rule-based pattern recognition system to the other three methods. They found 
that the combination of hybrid systems using a decomposition method was similar.  The hybrid 
approach was considered preferable with perceived attributes but was also considered more 
laborious. 
Wang and Hill (2005) noted that the most challenging types of pattern recognition were 
both temporal and dynamic.  The authors proposed a mathematical recognition approach by 
representing the dynamic aspect through time-invariant models, the similarity of systems 
dynamics, and state synchronization.  Several models were created, tested, and discussed. 
And finally, Kriz (1993) discussed how pattern formation in mind and its association with 
human thought could be used to understand better and treat mental illness.  These patterns in 
mind translated to exhibited individual behaviors.  These behaviors could be dysfunctional and 
occur as individuals interact through “mutual understanding” where each player fulfilled their 
role, which was determined by the rules of the game set by familial dynamics.  The author also 
described the Bartlett method where an individual would reproduce a visual pattern, which, in 
turn, was used as a stimulus for the next reproduction, much akin to the theory of rumor 




dots were redrawn by individuals into highly ordered structures (as cited in Kriz, 1993, pp. 164-
165). 
Expertise and Decision Making 
Salas, Rosen, and DiazGranados (2009) examined the types of constructs and studies that 
used expertise-based decisions through intuition.  The authors summarized several studies that 
showed how experts used instinct to make decisions and encapsulated this literature under the 
construct of naturalistic decision making.  They proposed that expertise, adapted from past 
successful performance processes within a specific domain, combined with intuition, could 
create rapid and effective judgments.  The authors described the research of two internal systems 
of human cognition.  System I contained unconscious information, reflexive, automatic 
processes, and system II housed the conscious, reflective, and controlled cognition processing.  
Therefore, among the many mechanisms of expert performance, pattern recognition occurred 
through a system I rapid perception of larger and significant patterns based on learned, domain-
specific expertise.   
Salas et al. (2009) suggested that Biggs and Wild (1985) exemplified this rapid pattern 
recognition encoding.  Biggs and Wild (1985) conducted two separate experiments to examine 
an accounting auditor’s ability to estimate certain income statement information based on 
historical trends using exponential, linear, or logarithmic changes.  However, the authors 
determined bias towards unaudited estimates, which acted as anchors and produced tendencies to 
overestimate positive trends or underestimate negative ones.  For optimal future assessments, the 
authors suggested a three-step estimation process, which included acquiring information, 
recognition of an actual pattern, and creating an accurate estimation.  However, this process 




Rapid pattern encoding was also studied by Klein (1993), beginning with the examination 
of protocols used by ground commanders during fire situations.  The author developed the 
recognition primed decision-making (RPD) model, which combined the two mental processes of 
simulation and situational assessment to accomplish tacit decision outcomes (Klein, 1993, pp. 
138-139).  Three levels of RPD were suggested.  The first echelon was a simple match of 
situational pattern recognition leading directly to implementation.  The second echelon included 
as an extra step of developing a course of action through the generation of internal mental 
scenarios.  And lastly, the third and most complex echelon included an iterative process for 
event-scenarios, which were similar but not exact matches to previous encounters.  Klein (1993) 
described this internal iterative process as a repeated simulation to generate workable solutions.  
Therefore, the features of the RPD model included: a situational assessment which excluded 
judgments of option superiorities, the incorporation of expertise towards a single-event outcome 
that eliminated multiple-option assessment, and finally, a selection process that satisfices or was 
good enough to initiate any action. 
Ross, Klein, Thunholm, Schmitt, and Baxter (2004) described how the U.S. military was 
an early adopter of the RPD model.  The military decision-making process (MDMP) had been 
considered burdensome and slower at implementing action plans due to multilevel steps in 
outcome evaluations.  The authors showed that in early field tests against the traditional 
operational processes, the pace and speed of scenario implementation was increased by 20%. 
Documenting the research tensions between naturalistic decision making and heuristics 
and biases, Kahneman and Klein (2009) collaborated to outline points of agreement and 
divergence.  Generally, both authors agreed that expertise could lead to superior, intuitive 




Furthermore, they advised that the internal source of these internal judgments could lead to 
questionable choices, even among experts.  Therefore, when non-experts would follow similar 
schemas, these individuals might be even more susceptible to these biases or errors. The authors 
recommended that experts should understand the limits of their know-how and the boundaries of 
their applicability. 
Furthermore, Kahneman and Klein (2009) recommended that the criteria for obtaining 
expertise should include an event-environment with the visibility of highly verifiable and 
positive outcomes.  Conversely, in unpredictable environments, individuals should recognize that 
some successful outcomes could result from random chance.  They further developed the concept 
of “fractionation” of skill or expertise into smaller components which occurs, for example, in 
health care by doctors, nurses, aides or in accounting by expertise in either accounts payable, tax, 
or fraud subdomains. 
This fractionation of domains or decomposition-recomposition, as discussed previously, 
is demonstrated by Restle (1970) for complex strings, in the entirety of human pattern 
recognition, from attributes to actions or in-memory storage as in Pi et al. (2008), and in the 
traditional methods shown in Giakoumakis et al. (1987).  And as will be explained subsequently, 
human pattern recognition and sequence perception are important in the application of Nelson’s 
rules for determining non-random observations within the SPC chart time series.  Traditionally, 
heuristics and bias have greatly influenced random sequence perception (RSP).  However, with 
the application of certain rules used to identify non-random sequences, the ability to decompose 
these types of series becomes increasingly routine and algorithmic.  This ability to discern 
differences to randomness will continue to improve with increasingly sophisticated software 





Cognition of Randomness (COR) and Random Sequence Perception (RSP).  For this 
review, cognition of randomness (COR) is defined as a broader and more general study of 
randomness affecting many domains. At the same time, random sequence perception (RSP) 
designates the study of randomness in terms of various sequence constructions such as a 
succession of coin tosses.  Within RSP, series can be either evaluated or created by subjects and 
are usually studied as a dependent variable.  Olivola and Oppenheimer (2008) defined random 
cognition as “a set of beliefs, mental representations, schemata, and reasoning processes that 
people use to think about random events and processes” (p. 991).  Ellis (2000) suggested entropy 
as a randomness measure, while Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, and Gauvrit (2015) offered an 
algorithmic definition of randomness. 
Furthermore, COR uses a variety of simulations and tools from television screens to 
medical imaging equipment to deepen randomness investigations.  And it can be employed as 
either a dependent variable or an independent variable to study the effects of another behavioral 
variable.  However, these distinctions were observed in the literature and not explicitly stated as 
definitions. 
Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) summarized much of the earliest RSP research between 
1953 to 1968 and classified the most interesting studies by author, year, types of symbols and 
their respective counts, lengths, pace, and medium (i.e., written, oral, or other).  In reviewing a 
sample of previous studies, the authors listed the various measures that were used in 
experiments, which included diagrams, trigrams and associated frequencies, runs, alternations, 




Nickerson (2002) distinguished between random processes and random products by 
describing the former as a property of a process and the latter as the production output of a 
process.  He noted that random products could be considered an item characteristic and 
independent from its production source.  From prior research, he explained that Lopes had 
suggested a dichotomy in the idea of randomness because sequences could have deterministic 
structure or could be adjusted non-randomly to “appear” random (as cited in Nickerson, 2002, p. 
331).  A similar paradox was exposed when considering that a series containing ten consecutive 
“heads” coin flips with an extremely low probability of occurrence would reflect the same 
probability of any other named string a priori.   
Nickerson (2002) also discussed several attributes of randomness.  The first, 
equiprobability, stated that outcomes were equally likely if each has an equal probability of 
selection.  However, he considered this condition as finite, problematic under continuous or 
infinite conditions, and difficult in actual execution.  The second attribute of randomness was 
unpredictability, i.e., no memory between events.  The third was an irregularity, which described 
a level of entropy measurement.  Moreover, the final was incompressibility, which affirmed that 
the sequence could only be described by the actual string itself and not through any decomposed 
components. 
According to one school of thought, Nickerson (2002) argued the difficulty of 
determining whether or not process outputs were random or that the prescribed tests for 
randomness were aimed at particular varieties of non-randomness.  However, in another school, 
Taleb (2007) defined randomness as simply “incomplete information.”  And when asked about 
the differences between randomness and deterministic chaos, he responded that any distinction 




Furthermore, Taleb (2007) suggested another possible bias between randomness, 
determinism, and probabilistic thinking.  The author proposed what he called the ludic fallacy: 
the association of the randomness of life events with probabilistic randomness found in casinos 
(see also Taleb, 2014, p. 184; Bennet, 2019, p. 1).  To illustrate this problem of differentiation, 
he created two hypothetical individuals, Fat Tony, a gregarious man searching for the next 
sucker, and Dr. John, a painstakingly reasonable intellectual.  To contrast their approaches on a 
series of fair-coin flips, he portrayed their responses after a series of 99 straight heads.  When 
asked what would be the probability of the 100th flip, Dr. John’s prediction was 50-50, while Fat 
Tony’s did not exceed 1% because “the coin gotta be loaded” (Taleb, 2007, pp. 123-124).  
Similarly, Silver (2012) called Dr. John's viewpoint the illusion of the sucker. 
Ayton, Hunt, and Wright (1989) were similarly critical of the way psychology had 
studied randomness.  The authors suggested that using inductive reasoning, a priori, did not 
provide criteria for randomness discernment.  And retracing Popper, they noted that the act of 
observation always included an initial point of view, a determination of problems to study, and 
interests and viewpoints.  One primary criticism which the authors discussed at length was 
instructional bias created by the researchers themselves.  Instructions for the questions in an 
experiment might contain clues to the definition of randomness or patterns.  Examples included 
subjects being asked to produce sequences like a fair coin, to make judgments of randomness by 
sets of strings that are more patterned, or to use diverse graphical representations of random 
walks versus coin-tossing nomenclature. 
Furthermore, the authors adamantly advocated that any attempt to assess the randomness 
of a process was similar to attempting to prove a null hypothesis.  And they suggested that 




To remedy the above pitfalls, the authors recommended requiring an a priori assumption of the 
frequency of occurrence based on theory. 
Error Types 
When assessing randomness, an evaluation is made based on individual outcomes.  While 
subjects can correctly assess randomness or non-randomness, two other possibilities can occur.  
Henderson et al. (2008) described two error types in terms of common versus special cause 
variation.  The first occurs when mistaking a common cause for a special cause, which is called a 
type I error, in the reverse case, mistaking special cause for a common cause creates a type II 
error. 
Similarly, in scientific hypothesis testing, a type I error occurs when rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true, i.e., claiming an effect exists that is, in reality, untrue or a false 
positive.  Conversely, a type II error occurs when not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is 
false, i.e., missing an effect that is, in reality, true or a false negative (Christensen, Johnson, & 
Turner, 2007, pp. 422-423).  Moreover, the type I error is associated with the level of 
significance defined as a confidence level or alpha, while the type II error is associated with 
power or beta.  Table 1 below details the typical hypothesis testing scenario. 
Table 1.  
Hypothesis Testing and Error Types  
Hypothesis Testing 
   Null Hypothesis 
  Random Non-Random 
No true effect: Stochastic Random Correct Type I 
True effect: Deterministic Non- Random Type II Correct 




In Table 2 below, the error types are shown for determining whether or not a sequence is 
random (RSP) using an identical format to Table 1.  Also, this is the table that will be used to 
score the SPC chart results. 
Table 2.  
Random Sequence Perception and Error Types 
Scoring Table 
   Individual Perception = Is the Series Random? 
  Random Non-Random 
No true effect: Stochastic Random Correct Type I 
True effect: Deterministic Non-Random Type II Correct 
Note. Error types are oriented upper right for type I and lower left for Type II.  
Within the accounting and auditing literature, much has been written about type I and 
type II errors.  A typical firm audit and compliance assessment will have similar outcomes to 
hypothesis testing and RSP (Sorensen, 1969, p. 556).  Table 3 displays these outcomes. 
Table 3.  
Auditing Results and Corporate Compliance 
Auditing Firm 
   Audit Results 
  Certified Non-Certified 
No true effect:  Compliant Correct Type I 
True effect: Non- Compliant Type II Correct 
Note. Error types are oriented upper right for type I and lower left for type II.  
Harris and Osman (2012) also provided a similar four-box table based on the 
controllability of any event-situation, which also follows the nomenclature of the previous two 
tables and is seen in Table 4.  All three tables reflect possible outcomes of human perception 
within a time series of finite events, which allows for the assessment of possible correct 
determination or errors ex post facto.  While the study of COR has led to the identification of 
many heuristics and biases, one of the most frequently studied is an illusion of control (IoCON), 




counterpart, illusion of chaos (IoCHA), as a type II.  These two constructs will be explored later; 
however, as will be shown in the subsequent section, the illusion of chaos or type II error 
generally has been less frequently examined. 
Table 4.  
Control of a Situation and Error Types  
Psychology (Mental Health) 
   Act as though the world is… 
  Uncontrollable Controllable 
State of the 
World 
Uncontrollable Correct rejection Type I: (Illusion of Control) 
Controllable Type II: (Miss or Illusion of Chaos) Hit 
Note.  Adapted from Harris & Osman (2012) p. 36.  Error types are oriented upper right for type 
I and lower left for type II.  
 
The following sections contain examples of type I errors that have been extensively 
studied within psychology and behavioral economics and are organized by theme, relevance to 
the business field, frequency of study, the commonness of occurrence by practitioners, and 
personal interest.  However, these inclusions are by no means comprehensive. 
Hot Hand and Gambler’s Fallacy.  A positive recency effect has been named the hot 
hand fallacy, which was originally studied in basketball shooting by Gilovich et al. (1985) and 
was based on the belief that NBA players could have non-random streaks of successive hit rates 
in shot-making.  However, initially, those strings were found to be random when comparing 
successes to a 0.5 random generator (Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991, p. 437).  Paradoxically, the 
authors noted that successive strings of 11 X’s (hits) and 10 O’s (misses) were considered 
random with the respective probabilities of 0.00049 (0.511) and 0.00098 (0.510), respectively, 
which was quite improbable.   
Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) also discussed the opposite effect of positive recency as 




effect, occurred when roulette players expected certain changes of color (either red to black or 
vice versa).  Similarly, the authors cited Gold and Hester, who determined that gamblers 
believed that changing or setting aside a particular coin could reverse a current pattern or series 
of heads or tails outcomes when experimenting with coin flips. 
Ayton and Fischer (2004) contrasted the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy.  For 
the latter, they proposed that player confidence would be gained from a series of successes to 
create additional successes.  And the authors cited Gilden and Wilson for showing streaks in golf 
puts, darts, and with detecting signals visually or auditorily; Dorsey-Palmateer and Smith for 
streaks in ten pin bowlers; Smith for modest streaks in horseshoes; and Adams for momentum in 
pocket billiards (p. 1370). 
For the former, the gambler’s fallacy, Ayton and Fischer (2004), performed several 
experiments.  In their first experiment, they asked subjects to predict outcomes based either on a 
gambling condition (roulette) or forecasting condition (by an algorithm).  As expected, the 
longer series were more likely to see a switch in color (negative recency).  Furthermore, as 
successful predictions increased, subjects’ confidence also did (positive recency).  In their 
second experiment, after individuals reviewed strings based on alternation rates between 0.2 and 
0.8, subjects were more likely to attribute streaks of lower alternation rates to human skill and 
higher alternation rates to randomness.  Similarly, Poundstone (2014) reported that individuals 
had an internal expectation of an alternation rate, which coincided with 0.75. 
Xu and Harvey (2014) studied the betting habits of 776 on-line gamblers and reviewed 
566K bets.  To examine the hot hand, the authors reviewed the winning sequences and showed 
that the probability of winning increased with successive bets.  As for the gambler’s fallacy, the 




the probability of loss increased with each successive one.  When attempting to control for skill 
level, they also discovered that the acceptable odds to gamblers during a positive streak 
decreased (safer).  In contrast, the odds accepted during losing streaks increased (riskier).  The 
authors suggested this behavior was related to a more complex gambler’s fallacy, i.e., based on 
the perception that the positive or negative streak would eventually reverse itself and bet 
accordingly. 
Stöckl, Huber, Kirchler, and Linder (2015) investigated the hot hand and gambler’s 
fallacy using investment experiments among individuals and groups of investors.  For the hot 
hand fallacy, they examined data for streaks of correct decisions made by individuals who had 
the option to use expert advice.  The authors found as streaking increased, both individuals and 
groups increased the use of expert share in decision-making.  Evidence for the gambler’s fallacy 
came from reviewing streaks of alternation where both individuals and groups selected the 
opposite direction more often than random. 
Scheibehenne, Wilke, and Todd (2011) examined whether the hot hand or gambler’s 
fallacy was a heuristic bias or an adaptive strategy.  They suggested that an individual 
assumption of patterns in series or strings was rational thinking based on patterns in nature, i.e., 
the availability distributions of animal, plant, and water resources or animal foraging strategies.  
Their experiments assessed adaptation to both negative autocorrelation (high alternation) and 
positive autocorrelation (low alternation).  For positively autocorrelated strings, the authors 
found significance in the use of a win-stay/lose-shift (stay-shift) strategy.  Conversely, with 
negative autocorrelation, significantly fewer individuals used a win-shift/lose-stay (shift-stay) 
strategy.  Interestingly, individuals, once trained, improved results with positive autocorrelation, 




Tyszka, Zielondka, Dacey, and Sawicki (2008) asked participants to predict subsequent 
values in a series of strings and observed four types of strategies: a long-run momentum strategy, 
long-rung contrarian strategy, a short-run momentum strategy, and a short-run contrarian 
strategy.  These strategies were similar to those sometimes used by stock market investors: to 
buy/sell in rising/falling markets or by taking the contrarian position.  The authors witnessed that 
as perceived randomness increased, participants employed a contrarian strategy, which 
contradicted the findings of Ayton and Fischer (2004).  Also, Poundstone (2014) noted some 
positive recency and the hot hand effects in the forecasting of business trends, i.e., the near future 
would remain as it has been among the most recent yesterdays. 
Local representativeness.  Representative judgment bias, another type I error, was first 
discussed by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and occurred when the individual expectation of a 
small sample drawn from a large population would have extreme similarity to a ratio in the 
parent population.  That is, smaller samples drawn from a larger population were expected to 
have the same proportions as large sample draws.  This bias is also known as the law of small 
numbers (Bar Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991, p. 444).  Research by Kubovy and Gilden also found 
that students who coded multiple choice answers based on coin flips, kept the constant ratios 
over short runs (as cited in Bar Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991, p. 438).   
A specific version of representativeness was described by Falk and Konold (1997) based 
on implicit encoding.  In producing sequences of random characters, subjects would develop 
excessive alternating patterns and had difficulty encoding strings.  They suggested that the 
mental difficulty level was a better predictor of randomness than by any objective assessment.  
Sanderson (2009) devised a calculation to determine the level of encoding difficulty based on the 




of duplication and replication.  The author also cited Griffiths and Tenebaum, who studied 
perceptions using mirror images: where the second half reflects the first, where sequences were 
reversed, and where the first half of the string was duplicated once (as cited in Sanderson, 2009, 
p. 5).  
Lopes and Oden (1987) tested whether or not subjects could detect randomness between 
strings generated by a Bernoulli process of p = 0.5 or those with alternation or repetition.  
Detection rates of non-randomness were statistically higher than chance, but even graduate 
students in statistics provided results that were similar to inexperienced subjects (see also Bar-
Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991, p. 436).  The authors also concluded that this type of randomness 
study might not be sufficient for real-life judgments or decisions. 
Williams and Griffiths (2013) suggested an explication for poor individual performance 
in assessing randomness was due to a nested hypothesis, i.e., randomness from systematic 
processes could be non-nested and favor either a heads/tails outcome or nested which favored 
neither.  In a series of experiments, the authors determined that subjects were able to distinguish 
the non-nested cases and recommended a search for factors affecting randomness judgment 
beyond general bias. 
Several other common biases towards type I error were offered by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974).  The following deserve mention as they continue to reoccur regularly:  
Insensitivity of sample size, misconceptions of regression, retrievability, imaginability, illusory 
correlation, and anchoring.  Insensitivity to sample size occurs when statistics from a smaller 
sample size create the perception (illusion) of much larger variation than what occurs in larger 
sample sizes.  The misconception of regression occurs when regression towards the mean is not 




a subsequently smaller one.  Retrievability occurs when the frequency of something is 
constructed by readily available instances and not a probability, and imaginability describes a 
flawed assessment outcome that dictates the course of action based on extremely improbable 
events.  The illusory correlation arises when associations are made by suggestion, ease of 
memory retrieval, or mental construction.  And finally, anchoring occurs when an initial estimate 
is presented, and approximations are made around that value regardless of its accuracy. 
Innate random generators.  Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) reviewed whether or not a 
random generator might exist innately within the human mind; however, they quickly cited three 
reasons against it.  First, accurate random generators were difficult to observe in the natural 
world.  Second, if it existed, its functionality in mind would be questionable because of other 
biased belief systems that individuals might retain.  And third, it perpetuates a belief of an 
internal homunculus.  
While this literature review did not uncover any medical studies of randomness and brain 
scanning methods such as MRI techniques, future studies may incorporate image techniques 
while subjects are assessing random or non-random strings.  Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, and 
Schacter (2001) completed a similar study by scanning brain regions and having subjects assess 
true or false statements or perform memory tasks.  
Randomness and real life.  Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) suggested the importance 
of judgment between randomness and determinism occurred when such knowledge provided a 
guide to real-life.  They questioned whether alternation or repetition was a more appropriate 
approach in the real-world.  Some researchers, such as Lopes did not incline to speculate either 
way.  Scheibehenne, Wilke, and Todd (2011), as previously noted, believed that foraging 




Wright (1989) echoed this sentiment, although Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) indicated that 
the utility or payoff of recency might be recognized by humans more than the alternation.  While 
examining repetition in nature, Mandelbrot (1977) has shown the scaling behavior and the power 
law of a fractal world would also point to recency.  Alternatively, Bennett (1998) remarked that 
children who generally have an ingrained sense of fairness might wonder if the chance was “fair” 
(p. 13).  She noted that this idea of fairness was interwoven with sharing or “taking turns” whose 
outcomes are largely different from repeated coin flips.  From this view, higher non-random 
alternation would be associated with equitability while chance with equiprobability. 
Taleb and Goldstein (2012) discussed real-world randomness from the viewpoint of the 
type of distribution assumption associated with particular events.  The authors argued against the 
use of the typical random Gaussian distributions as they expected real-word distributions would 
be characterized by excessive standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis, which drastically 
affect outcomes when errors occurred.  Moreover, they argued that in cases of reduced 
information, the actual distribution type might not be known or was perhaps unknowable, and as 
a hedge, recommended limiting one’s exposure to extreme measurement errors. 
Moreover, Kimhi and Zysberg (2009) studied randomness, locus of control, and rare life 
events.  They defined randomness as a “chance” event occurring within a series.  The authors 
generated eight vignettes, four related to self and four related to others, and included both 
positive and negative outcomes.  And they examined whether these events were considered 
accidental/non-accidental or predetermined/not-predetermined.  As expected, subjects with a 
higher external locus of control were more likely to attribute randomness to rare events. 
Similarly, Zysberg and Kimhi (2011) again studied randomness and life events but 




questionnaire to the 2009 study and used a dice throwing procedure to determine the gain 
(highest number), loss (lower number), and a neutral (neither).  Interestingly, individuals in the 
neutral condition perceived outcomes as most random and maintained a firmer belief in a 
predetermined effect when compared to the other two conditions.  However, these results were 
dependent on controlling for gender and religiosity. 
Ebert and Wenger (2011) conducted two experiments to understand whether or not 
randomness could be ascribed to free will.  The authors described the belief paradox among 
individuals, stated as “free will was incompatible with a fully deterministic universe” (p. 3).  
Based on the theory of apparent mental causation, the authors postulated that because individuals 
believed that intentions caused actions, any movement of randomness could be mistaken for free 
will.  In two separate experiments, the authors examined both actions of the individual-self and 
perception of the actions of others.  While they did find evidence for the association of 
randomness and free will, several qualifications were enumerated:  outcomes had smaller effect 
sizes; with complexity, indeterministic actions could be seen as deterministic; randomness could 
be mistaken for free will if that action appeared to aid (or was rationalized after the fact as 
helping) a perceived goal; and lastly, the problem of determining whether or not individuals 
actually possess free will. 
Learning and randomness.  Similar to the encoding of Falk and Konold (1997), Bar-
Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) also reviewed a study by Neuringer, who attempted to teach 
individuals how to assemble non-biased strings of a random sequence.  Subjects began by 
generating 60 series of 100 binary sequences, and in subsequent sessions, the feedback was 
proposed for improvement with each successive attempt.  This feedback included alternations, 




that subjects could not learn “randomly,” and that the retention of the knowledge gained was 
short-lived (pp. 441-442). 
Randomness and memory.  Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) also reviewed historical 
literature and the role of memory in randomness perception.  The authors noted one study by 
Kubovy and Psotak who asked individuals to choose a digit between zero and nine, and through 
histograms, observed that the subsequent distribution was not uniform.  Similar studies have 
verified patterned responses for color, furniture, or fruit, and with coin tosses where heads, for 
example, was selected 80% of the time.  Furthermore, the authors observed that short term 
memory capacity was usually limited to seven items, plus or minus two; therefore, producing 
long strings without excessive repetition was problematic.  And they described how individuals 
often formed sequences through an imaginary moving window of repetitive strings.  Similarly, 
Poundstone (2014) explained how early mentalists used these more frequently cited responses 
and similar techniques to fool the public in their demonstrations of telepathy.  The author 
summarized how Goodfellow had debunked this pseudoscience through his Zenith experiments 
in the late 1930s.  
Olivola and Oppenheimer (2008) explored the interactions between random perception 
and memory of past events.  In their first experiment, the authors tested reconstructive memory, 
i.e. past memories that generated the same biases occurring in current memory.  They found that 
subjects recalled shorter string lengths if they thought the string was random.  Conversely, if 
subjects perceived it as deterministic, i.e., created by an algorithm, no recall bias was found.  In a 
second experiment, the authors tested the effect of placing a long streak within shorter ones and 
determined that a series was considered more random when the streak occurred in the middle 




randomness based on both the streak and series length.  When recalling a string from memory, 
subjects would equally judge short and long streaks to be random.  However, those who were 
able to view the entire string continuously, i.e. always visible, saw randomness only in the longer 
strings. 
Zhao, Hahn, and Osherson (2014) suggested the possibility that individuals might be able 
to separate randomness from non-randomness but might not be able to classify the resulting 
groups into either category.  They also proposed that coding the string itself and the ease of its 
memorization would affect random perceptions.  The authors found that subjects were better able 
to differentiate between strings than to classify them but also discovered that mirror images were 
less likely to be labeled random. 
Illusion of control.  Langer (1975) defined an illusion of control (IoCON) as “the 
expectancy of personal success…inappropriately higher objective probability would warrant” (p. 
311).  Referring to Table 4, this behavior would be a type I error when individuals perceived 
more control than exists.  Langer (1975) provided six experiments by introducing attributes such 
as competition, choice, familiarity, and involvement in chance situations, which created 
excessive confidence.  Similarly, Rodin and Langer (1977) examined the effects of choice and 
responsibility within a nursing home environment and observed that high levels of choice 
opportunities positively affected subjects based on ratings by staff and other health metrics. 
Presson and Benassi (1996) performed a meta-analysis of the construct of IoCON.  At 
that time, which was 20 years after Langer’s publication, the authors remarked that its popularity 
as a subject of the study had increased, and her article had received over 400 citations.  A recent 
Google Scholar search shows a count of about 5,200, which indicates continued exponential 




demonstrated IoCON when individuals preferred their purchased lottery tickets to an option of 
exchange for a non-purchased one.  Another example showed that allowing subjects to choose 
target bets produced additional confidence in dice rolling. 
Similarly, when viewing task outcomes, those subjects with early successes thought their 
control exceeded others, i.e., even when those outcome sequences were demonstrated by a coin 
toss.  Adding personal control in a task study was also shown to increase IoCON , and IoCON 
increased when subjects preferred to call a specific color before tossing a multicolored cube.  
Moreover, any active involvement by subjects not influencing outcome was shown to increase 
IoCON.   
Presson and Benassi (1996) also noted a distinction between IoCON as defined above 
and illusory predictions associated with IoCON.  For example, they reported a previous study by 
Benassi et al. (1981), where subjects perceived more control when they could guess the result of 
the dice roll before it occurred.  But the authors lamented the fact that much of the IoCON 
research focused on prediction, judgment, capacity, contingency or some unknown variables 
which were difficult to classify.   
Novovic, Kovac, Duric, and Biro (2012) examined positive and negative affect and the 
illusion of control.  Several studies had shown a tendency that IoCON would provide some 
resistance to depression, and that individuals with higher IoCON were less downcast and 
despairing.  In their experiments, the authors explored IoCON as a trait, by testing subjects in a 
two-week pre-period before the actual experiment, and as a state, contingent on pre- and post-
experimental results.  The negative effect was found to have no real impact on IoCON at any 
time.  Positive affect was correlated with IoCON as a trait, and in pre- post-state conditions.  




to positive affect which created IoCON or the task created IoCON and perceived success, which 
led to positive affect. 
Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, and Galinsky (2008) investigated the relationship between 
IoCON and power in four experiments.  Three experiments were designed to determine if power 
led to IoCON and any effects associated with optimism, self-esteem, or orientation to action.  
The fourth was designed to assess the interaction of power with a positive mood as opposed to 
IoCON.  To generate the IoCON in the first experiment, the authors reported that when 
predicting the outcome of a dice roll, who rolled the die (experimenter or subject) made a 
difference.  Those with high IoCON preferred to perform the roll.  In experiments two and three, 
the authors found that high power individuals were more optimistic and showed higher esteem 
and more action orientation.  Only IoCON mediated power, action orientation, and self-esteem.  
And finally, the mood was determined not to affect the relationship between power and IoCON. 
Harris and Osman (2012) challenged much of the research of IoCON by advocating that 
it was a rational and adaptive behavior.  The authors argued from a Bayesian perspective that 
individuals would have some prior knowledge and, therefore, a prior estimate of probability, 
which would be updated through subsequent trials.  Furthermore, they suggested that the 
psychological scenarios created for many experiments were not like those situations encountered 
in the natural world and that those real situations should be more controllable.  Beyond Bayes, 
the authors turned to decision theory for a discussion of controllability by suggesting outputs 
reflected not only probabilities but also whether the possible outcomes would be either positive 
or negative.  In an example of actions taken after the London Riots, the authors proposed that 
costs associated with IoCON, a type I error, were less than those associated with IoCHA, a type 




Wagenaar and Keren (1988) designed two experiments in an attempt to distinguish 
chance from luck.  In the first experiment, subjects wrote about experiences that were scaled 
along twelve dimensions.  In the second experiment, researchers created stories based on 
surprise, consequence, or superstition.  The authors confirmed that the perceptions of luck and 
chance were different.  Large benefits were perceived to come through luck, such as winning a 
lottery.  In a specific gambling scenario, luck was applied to the perception of the gambler’s 
betting choice but did not affect the game or its probabilities, per se.  Also, individuals perceived 
that luck could be influenced, which created the IoCON.  And when an event was surprising, 
individuals associated it with a chance. 
In a qualitative study, Ohtsuka and Ohtsuka (2010) examined Vietnamese Australian 
gambling habits.  They noted the existence of higher gambling problem tendencies within 
culturally and linguistically diverse communities, and that a reliable predictor of gambling 
frequency was a gambler’s belief in the control of illusory outcomes.  However, the authors 
distinguished between perceptions of luck between West and East, the former attributing luck as 
controllable, and the latter, attributing luck as a vacillating flow of plus and minus tendencies.  
Therefore, understanding of luck’s “current” tendency and flow was vital to Australian 
Vietnamese gamblers.  The sample of gambling subjects included a variety of skill levels, and 
the authors compiled a list of the signs for both good and bad luck and a list of indicators 
showing if one was in or out of luck.  The authors found that common gambling habits, such as 
the illusion of control, rationalization, and remembering wins more often than losses, were 
universal traits.  Ohtsuka and Ohtsuka (2010) also suggested that cultural beliefs might reinforce 
some of the illusion tendencies and that superstition might provide a perception of supplemental 




internal qualities and losses to externalities.  And the authors uniquely observed how random 
outcomes could be anthropomorphized by suggesting that the game “lets me win.”  This 
behavior is similar to how the West treats its stock markets and associated pundit commentary, 
e.g., “the market reaction.” 
Similarly, Silver (2012) described a “fish” in gambling circles as usually the worst player 
at the table who would lose at a much faster rate than those who were winning or breaking even.  
Specifically, the author observed that a small proportion of bad players supported moderately 
skilled players.  In describing why this occurred, one individual gambler suggested that some 
players had delusional perceptions about their abilities, which stemmed from a sense of 
entitlement.  For example, when a player would lose to a low probabilistic hand after making a 
series of optimal probabilistic bets, a “tilting” behavior, i.e., excessively bad play would likely 
ensue. 
Filippin and Crosetto (2015) observed that within economic studies, IoCON behavior had 
not been supported.  Using a self-developed software task requiring the accumulation of 
individual boxes, each subject received a monetary incentive for each box collected.  However, 
hidden within one box was a “bomb,” which would explode if chosen and would result in a total 
monetary loss. Using four separate conditions, which included an individual choice of boxes and 
an IoCON condition, the authors failed to find significant differences among subject groups.  The 
authors suggested that IoCON could be displaced through the use of incentives, which had been 
confirmed in previous economic research.  And as Harris and Osman (2012) had discussed, 
Filippin and Crosetto (2015) also mentioned the hypothetical nature of the scenarios used for 
some of the psychological tests and suggested a deeper involvement of subjects participating in 




Soyer and Hogarth (2012) reviewed the manner and form of statistical information found 
in academic studies to determine if interpretations would change based on the method of 
presentation.  In a survey involving 257 economists in academia, the authors tested the 
interpretation of a dependent variable on certain values of the independent variable and found 
that respondents exhibited an illusion of predictability, i.e., underestimation of the width of 
confidence intervals along with the exclusion of the error term in their computations.  However, 
when graphical representations of the error term were presented without the numerical data, 
estimates made by experts were more accurate, but not when both data and graphs were 
presented.  Neither level of training nor professional rank produced a significant effect.  Finally, 
the authors advocated for the availability of simulations to accompany scholarly articles to 
enhance understanding and increase the accuracy of inferences.  
Interestingly, Taleb (2014), in his discussions with Kahneman, noted that providing 
random forecasts to individuals increased their risk profiles even if the individuals knew the 
forecasts were random.  Furthermore, when discussing the creation of various forecasting 
models, Silver (2012) stated that a common error was overfitting, which would reduce accuracy 
by including randomness in the model, i.e., a type I error.  Furthermore, underfitting a model 
would, in the same way, create the exact opposite effect (see Kolassa [2016] for a similar 
discussion of error rates in forecasting; see Delsole & Tippett [2016] for forecasting skill). 
Illusory perception.  Whitson and Galinsky (2008) assessed whether or not the loss of 
control would affect illusory pattern perception.  In six separate experiments using a variety of 
stimuli, the authors observed that subjects who were likely to see false patterns were associated 




moderated when individuals could contemplate their personal values (see Waggner-Egger & 
Bangerter [2007] for studies focused on conspiratorial associations; or Lobato et al. [2014]). 
Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, and Gauvrit (2015) disputed the findings of Whitson and 
Galinsky (2008) with the results of three experiments.  The authors suggested that a faulty 
randomness perception had been associated with four types of conspiracy theories through the 
idea that nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic.  However, the authors found no evidence of 
conspiratorial beliefs and loss of control. 
However, more recently, Whitson, Kim, Wang, Menon, and Webster (2018) again 
reviewed IoCON and its association with conspiratorial perceptions through regulatory focus, i.e. 
goal pursuit.  The authors suggested that regulatory focus could either be promotion oriented 
when individuals seek opportunities or prevention-oriented when individuals are sensitive to 
loss.  The authors concluded that loss of control in participants with a promotion focus showed 
higher conspiratorial perceptions.  No associations were noted with a prevention orientation. 
Most recently, Stojanov and Halberstadt (2020) performed a meta-analysis that included 
23 studies and 45 effect sizes.  Based on their computations, the relationship between lack of 
control and conspiracy theories was not statistically significant even while adding several types 
of moderation.  They did suggest that measuring specific conspiracy theories were more likely to 
provide a significant result than general conspiratorial statements. 
Behavioral Accounting and Finance  
In this section, some of the behavioral finance literature will be discussed that included 
subjects who were actual personnel working specifically in the accounting/finance industry, 




topics.  Each item mentioned here contained some aspects of finance or accounting in its study 
design. 
As noted previously, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) examined the relationship between 
illusory perceptions, control, and conspiratorial beliefs.  In one experiment, they manipulated 
their control group by priming a subject for either a stable or volatile stock market.  The authors 
created positive and negative statements about the hypothetical company in a ratio of 2:1, i.e., 
either 16 positive and eight negative statements or eight positive and four negative statements.  
The authors found that market volatility priming affected investment choice and that subjects 
overestimated negative information. 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) offered advice for investors based on investor beliefs and 
biases.  The authors developed several sections offering both rhetorical questions and 
recommendations to investors and advisors.  In the first section, they discussed judgment bias, 
which accompanied overconfidence, excessive optimism, hindsight bias, and an overreaction to 
significant change events.  The second section reviewed preferential errors such as probability 
weighting (expected value), perception of changes in value versus changes in state, the value 
function from prospect theory, the shape of gambles, the use of purchase price as a reference 
point, framing, risk policies, and short- versus long-term views.  And in the third section, the 
authors discussed living with the consequences of investment decisions, regrets, and the 
combined effects of regret and risk.  The essay concluded with a self-assessment checklist for 
financial advisors. 
Heuer, Merkle, and Weber (2016) investigated the perception of fund managers’ skill 
towards investors using three surveys.  The first survey evaluated fund manager skill and 




The authors confirmed a tendency of investors to chase returns and invest in underperforming 
funds.  First, they observed that among a large group of possible investments, investors might not 
correctly assess the random component of returns and ascribe this variation to manager skill.  
Similarly, the number of available funds did not seem to alter selection behavior.  And using a 
measure of superior returns, called alpha, investors did not seem to realize that volatility affected 
a fund’s ability to generate those high returns.  These factors created what the authors termed as 
an illusion of skill. 
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) examined the illusion of control and trading performance 
among actual traders.  The authors studied 107 individuals from four London investment banks 
who traded a variety of instruments and made various assessments of risk.  Senior managers 
within those investment banks also had input to the sample of traders selected for the study.  To 
measure the illusion of control, the authors selected a computer task to avoid a long survey and 
as a novelty to attract participation.  Furthermore, trader performance was also determined 
through management interviews, which examined traders' past successes.  The authors found that 
IoCON was a maladaptive behavior under certain circumstances: it did not provide a 
performance benefit in either market or risk management; it added less profit to the firm; it did 
not affect interpersonal performance, and individuals with IoCON were compensated less.  To 
enhance these effects, the authors suggested three courses of action.  Firstly, as a learned 
behavior, training could address the toxic aspects of IoCON.  Secondly, management could take 
steps to change structural or environmental attributes that might induce IoCON behavior. And 
finally, for individuals with tendencies towards the error, future recruiting assessments of IoCON 




Taleb (2004) also noted some trader foibles based on his career in the industry.  As 
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) had alluded, Taleb (2004) observed that traders overestimated the 
accuracy of their personal mental constructions (of the market and environment) and did not 
consider random variation.  The author suggested that their loyalty to these mental schemas 
would also attach them to their current stock positions.  Then, if losses were incurred, traders 
would switch narratives from short-term to become longer-term investors (see Mlodinow [2008 
p. 201] for the consequences of the illusion of inevitability).  Furthermore, Taleb (2004) 
suggested that traders did not construct alternative plans in the event of losses and would not 
readily question their frameworks or evaluation criteria.  And in the worst case, traders would 
deny the reality of actual value as shown by its asset price and would prefer his/her mentally 
constructed value, i.e., denial and illusory perceptions. 
Ackert, Church, and Qi (2016) attempted to understand various factors causing investors 
to hold inferior portfolios.  In four experiments, the authors designed assessments of choice using 
assets that were 100% negatively correlated.  The experiments included a control group that 
participated in a series of trades with increasing variability in returns while also fluctuating the 
timing of payouts and the information related to the actual outcomes.  In the first two 
experiments, using a base case and enhanced variability, investors held imbalanced portfolios.  
With higher variability in returns, the individual bankruptcy rate increased.  The last two 
experiments varied the payout periods, the first by a random selection of the period and the 
second at the end of all periods.  The authors noted that as information available to the investors 
decreased, balanced portfolios increased.  After reviewing all experimental results, they observed 
that the overconfidence measure showed no significant effect on portfolio balance; however, 




Uecker and Kinney (1977) assessed the representative and protectiveness heuristics 
among practicing CPAs.  As previously discussed, the representativeness heuristic, the law of 
small numbers, occurs when sample characteristics are assumed to be those of the parent 
population.  The protectiveness heuristic is manifested when sampling preference is for the 
highest dollar value items over smaller ones or when larger sample sizes are preferred to smaller 
ones, i.e. not employing comparative sample size and error rate tables.  The authors constructed a 
five-case scenario where subjects would select sample size A or B based on invoice and error 
counts and the calculated error rates.  The authors concluded with both positive and negative 
results.  On the positive side, only 9 of 112 consistently selected lower error rates and ignored 
sample size while 17 of 112 only selected the large sample size.  However, on the negative side, 
54% made at least one error of representativeness while 37% made at least one error of 
protectiveness.  And 56% made two errors among only five scenarios. 
Johnson (1994) tested individuals and groups of Big Six auditors for both memory 
recognition and recall with time delays.  For a fictitious client, simulated working papers were 
created, which included discussions of risk in product inventory and long-term debt.  Subjects 
were then required to write review comments as a memory encoding step.  After a delay, 
subjects, either individually or after group discussion not requiring consensus, responded to 
statements related to those papers along with their confidence level on a 9-point Likert scale.  
The author found that memory accuracy and confidence were higher among groups while also 
making fewer type II errors.  Additionally, he observed that experience did have a positive effect 
on error recognition but no effect on recall, recognition, or confidence. 
McSweeney (2006) wrote a scathing essay suggesting that net present value and its use 




Idealized Financial Reporter (IFR) who omnisciently recorded every known transaction as it 
occurred.  However, even with this knowledge, he observed that the future would remain 
uncertain.  Moreover, the author suggested that organizations should have processes that 
generate future activity without illusions of certainty.  However, he observed that most cash flow 
forecasting was based on perceived futures as desired by advocates of certain narratives.  And 
that often, the deification of the NPV technique occurred at the expense of the discussions it 
could generate. 
The audit function and error types.  From a chronological perspective, the 
development of auditing analysis has been extensive and profound.  Table 3 showed the potential 
audit results based on the compliance of the firm.  Among this group of studies, several were 
selected which focused either on the error types themselves or the cost of making these errors.  
For example, Sorensen (1969) discussed a Bayesian framework for auditing analysis and 
sampling, which was constructed based on an historical Bayesian prior, the dollar value of 
potential actions, and the added knowledge of the financial results gained from sampling.  With 
some basic assumptions, the author created a payoff table using the percentage of defectives, 
costs of inspection or as-is acceptance, and possible losses from which the auditor could revise 
the prior probability.  He concluded by suggesting that this approach offered a supplemental 
method to enhance auditing science and move away from non-systematic methods. 
Also, Kinney (1975) approached the auditing sampling problem from decision-theory.  
The author defined a type I error as unnecessary audit prolongations, needless changes to 
statements, or unwarranted qualified opinions.  Conversely, he suggested that type II errors 




reputation.  The author recommended this approach as an additional appraisal technique because 
of its insensitivity, the estimation of error costs, and as a benchmark to accounting heuristics. 
Similarly, Kinney and Salamon (1982) investigated the use of regression analysis and the 
applied rules in auditing.  This study simulated both monthly and yearly results employing the 
STAR approach used by Deloitte, Haskins, and Sells to detect account events where an audit was 
advisable (as cited in Kinney & Salamon, 1982, p. 350).  The authors also “seeded” type I and 
type II error events within the 200 audit years.  The author concluded that despite an overall type 
II error risk of 36.5%, the STAR model performed at expected levels. 
Lastly, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987) assessed the possibility to predict types 
of auditor decisions using historical financial and market variables.  The types of auditor 
opinions reviewed included those that were either clean or first-time qualified along with 
supplemental qualifications of going-concern, litigation, asset realizing, and those firms with 
multiple issues.  Five financial statements or ratio variables were used, and four stock market 
variables among publicly traded companies separated by SIC code.  A probit model for the 
assessment was constructed with weighted exogenous sample maximum likelihood procedures.  
A model type I error occurred when classifying a qualified opinion as clean and vice versa for 
type II while using measures of relative costs for error types.  The authors concluded that the 
model could predict initially qualified opinions; however, estimated probability scores varied 
across opinions (see Geiger & Rama [2006] for a going-concern assessment suggesting that the 
Big Four made significantly less type I/II errors than regional or third-tier firms; and Dunn, Tan, 
& Venuti [2012] for a similar but more recent study of the Big Six). 
There are also a few studies tying error types to corporate fraud, a recurring and costly 




assess management fraud.  The authors constructed the typical auditing four-box decision table, 
which included “hit rates” as observing signal, “correct identification” as noise, “false alarms” as 
type I errors, and “miss rates” as type II errors.  Likelihood ratios were calculated as hit rates as a 
percentage of false alarm rates, which were subsequently compared to a criterion value based on 
prior probability and consequences.  The authors suggested that costs of type I errors such as 
additional working hours, unnecessary adjustments, and lost business and revenue were not 
evaluated and problematic.  For type II errors, they noted that a 10 to 99 multiplier of type I error 
cost was typical. 
Furthermore, they cited a statement made by Arthur Anderson, which estimated that 12% 
of all Big Six revenue was related to type II error cost (as cited in Deshmukh, Karim, & Siegel, 
1998, p. 132).  The authors recommended an increased tolerance for type I errors and false 
alarms as a remedy to combat fraud.  They also postulated that this tolerance for error would 
need to be increased as the disparity between costs of type I and type II errors continued to 
mount. 
Studies of Randomness in Diverse Domains 
The previous section has illustrated predominantly type I errors.  Understanding how 
randomness and corresponding error types are viewed and studied in other domains can provide 
additional perspective, insight, and opportunities to avoid errors where interactions within 
different fields may occur.   
CEO effect.  The CEO effect attempts to explain the benefit of a CEO using a variance 
decomposition method, which dates to Liberson and O’Conner (as cited in Fitza, 2014, p. 1840).  
In this technique, return on assets (ROA) was separated into parts based on year, industry, 




method by demonstrating the effect of adding a randomly generated element that would simulate 
possible performances by “chance.”  He indicated that performance outcomes could be randomly 
influenced by both factors within and outside of the CEO’s control.  To account for this effect 
and to validate this approach, the author created a dummy variable to replace the ROA using the 
identical mean and standard deviation of the calculated ROA followed by a 100-trial simulation.  
Previous studies had estimated the CEO effect between 17% and 19%.  The random variable 
simulations yielded about 14% of the variation, which significantly reduced the CEO effect. 
Quigley and Graffin (2017) took exception to the analysis by providing a rebuttal based 
on the incremental R2 values and proposed a new quantitative tool of multilevel modeling 
(MLM), which returned the CEO effect to slightly lower historical levels.  However, Fitza 
(2017) applied his randomization method to MLM and observed that the CEO effect was largely 
due to chance.  All authors concluded that the most appropriate next step was to determine 
situations when or under what conditions the CEO effect was most important. 
Similarly, Parnell and Dent (2009) reviewed firm performance and the notion of luck.  
They suggested that as management knowledge of firm resources and capabilities increased, 
management perception of the role of luck increased.  And in another study, Kim, Eberhart, and 
Armanios (2016) employed bootstrap simulations to quantify luck and performance.  They 
determined that 95% of performance outcomes between high and average performers could be 
attributed to random effects. 
Type I or Type II Errors in Diverse Domains 
Sensitivities to an error in randomness perception have been widely studied in many 
domains.  In discussing calibration and forecasting by the Weather Channel, Silver (2012) noted 




discussing the reason for this strategy with personnel at the television station, they explained that 
viewers were more sensitive to failure to predict rain, a type II error, as opposed to false alarms 
when rain was predicted and did not materialize, a type I error.  So, forecasts were expressly 
increased to avoid failure in prediction.  Silver (2012) also interviewed Murray Campbell, who 
led the team of IBM programmers for Deep Blue before the chess match with Gary Kasparov.  
The author described a unique type I error committed by Kasparov during the first match of 
1997.  A computer bug occurred in its 44th move that was completely random.  The IBM team 
had known about the bug and had presumably fixed it.  However, during the second game and 
after a serious blunder by Kasparov, Campbell recalled that Kasparov had attributed that first 
game random move as a sign of superior computer intelligence and not as a simple error. 
Similarly, Poundstone (2014) recounted the development of the earliest “outguessing” 
machine created in Bell Laboratories of the 1950s.  The machine’s logic was based on the 
assumption that individuals would not make random choices.  The programmers determined that 
the best strategy for the machine would be to make a prediction of human behavior when it was 
winning and play randomly when losing.   
Anderegg, Callaway, Boykoff, Yohe, and Root (2014) discussed type I and II errors in 
the study of climate science.  The authors suggested that to lower the possibility of a type I error 
to avoid political and other “drama,” hurdle rates were excessively restrictive. The authors 
suggested that researchers should equally account for both types of errors and outlined the risks 
of a type II error:  limited actions with the passage of time and precluding communication and 
debate about the possible risk to human life and world economies.  The authors suggested the 
classification of uncertainty into four types: risk, with known odds; uncertainty with known 




which was defined as conditional knowledge intermingled with influence from science, society, 
and politics.  To alleviate this asymmetry of errors, the authors recommended a balanced 
treatment of error types, the consideration of a wide variety of possible outcomes while drawing 
information for multiple sources, and the use of elicitation analysis to understand broader 
impacts. 
Davidson (1986) noted type I and type II error asymmetry in the publication of clinical 
trials.  After studying 107 trials, the author found that 71% of those favored new therapies, of 
which 43% were sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.  And of the 31 trials that favored 
traditional therapy, only 4 had pharmaceutical sponsorship.  The author determined a statistical 
significance between the source of funding and study outcome.  However, he also enumerated 
several reasons for this publication bias.  Typically these studies could have used smaller sample 
sizes which caused weak power calculations and possible type I errors; discontinuation of studies 
which were showing no effects (see O’Brien & Fleming [1979] for early termination of medical 
trials; and Freiman, Chalmers, Smith, & Kuebler [1978] for type II errors in negative trials); the 
possibility that unsuccessful trials would decrease research funding, and the conflicting 
constituencies of researchers, pharmaceuticals, regulators, and the public. 
Similarly, Ioannidis (2005) posed similar questions of the validity and replicability of 
research findings.  The author created a metric called the positive predictive value (PPV) using 
type I and II error rates, a bias factor, and a pre-study probability of a true relationship (see Silver 
[2012, pp. 242-255] for a discussion of a Bayesian prior, conditional probability, and frequentist 
schools; or Mlodinow [2008, pp. 171-172] for the development of significance testing by Fisher).  
Ioannidis (2005) made several suggestions for improvement in research studies which included 




trials and a de-emphasis of single findings of significance; and a reduction of the prominence of 
statistical significance while obtaining a better a priori understanding of probabilities before 
attempting a research project.  Beyond those recommendations, Forstmeier, Wagenmakers, and 
Parker (2017) complemented and added to that list with their table of problems and proposed 
solutions.  Several issues that the authors identified included novelty seeking, HARKing or 
hypothesizing after the results were known, discarding unsuccessful experiments, confirmation 
and hindsight bias, incorrect interpretation of regression towards the mean, and overfitting of 
models, among others. 
Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin (2007) stated flatly that 
many patients, physicians, and other individuals did not understand health statistics.  The authors 
suggested that statistical illiteracy was rampant in many fields and illustrated this through several 
recent examples:  the contraceptive pill scare of the U.K. in the 1990s which led to a significant 
increase in abortions; the inability of gynecologists to understand positive mammograms; 
misinterpretations of survival and mortality rates; or overdiagnosis, defined as finding a clinical 
disease which was non-progressive and did not require treatment.  The authors also noted that 
overdiagnosis (a type I error) could have harmful effects when unnecessary treatments were 
prescribed.   
In previous research, Gigerenzer et al. (2007) observed the lack of medical literacy was 
compounded with the illusion of certainty, which they defined as a need for certainty where none 
exists.  Several consequences of statistical illiteracy were listed.  First, patients were susceptible 
to manipulation, which could lead to additional anxiety or false hope through questionable 
advertising.  Or in the cases of patients with a pseudo-disease, treatments would cause actual 




of informed consent and the shared decision making between doctor and patient.  And finally, 
they offered numerous causes and remedies to enhance the statistical knowledge for patients, 
doctors, and population at large. 
 Silver (2012) discussed this similar problem of medical illiteracy and extended the 
discussion to the 9-11 terrorist attack in New York City.  He recommended that any assessment 
include a Bayesian approach based on probability of occurrence, non-occurrence, and a prior 
probability.  And Bennet (1998) began her entire discussion of randomness with the 
interpretation of a hypothetical tuberculosis test, conditional probabilities, error rates, and 
associated misjudgments. 
Taleb (2014) discussed the “do you have evidence” fallacy and its relationship to 
iatrogenic, i.e., the study of harm done by the medical personnel.  The fallacy expressed the idea 
that “evidence of no harm” was not equivalent to “no evidence of harm” and was similar to the 
conclusion in medical diagnostics between “no evidence of disease” and  “evidence of no 
disease” (p. 337).  The author further generalized this argument to the confusion generated from 
“absence of evidence” and “evidence for absence” which occurs when proponents for something 
argue the former and imply the latter.  He also observed that individuals were more likely to “fit 
beliefs to actions rather than fit their actions to belief,” which could create illusory beliefs or 
self-deception (p. 415).   
As in hypothesis testing, researchers have preferred to minimize type I errors by 
restricting hurdle rates while increasing the possibility of type II errors.  Rizzolli (2016) 
described these errors within the field of law and adjudication as a choice between convicting 
innocent defendants, a type I error, juxtaposed to allowing guilty defendants to go free, a type II 




he observed that type I errors were being examined more frequently with the advent of 
sophisticated DNA analyses.  He estimated a judicial type I rate of 3.5% to 5% between 1982 
and 1989. 
Similarly, law enforcement faces the same dilemma regarding arrests.  Garoupa (1997) 
examined the idea that private law enforcement would increase the non-offender arrest rate or a 
type I error as arrests would enhance revenue.  The author concluded that without regulation of 
these private organizations, more crime and arrests of non-offenders would occur.  However, if 
penalties were established for excessive detection (minor crimes) and if incentives were 
established for under-detection (major crimes), the error problems would be resolved. 
Consequences and Costs of Type I and Type II Errors 
The costs and consequences of type I or type II errors can be high as was demonstrated 
firm going concern issues within the domain of corporate compliance.  From several diverse 
business research sources, additional impacts of these errors will be discussed here:  from the 
waste of time and skills defined in basic quality literature, an issue of efficiency, to consequences 
that could result in financial distress or bankruptcy of the firm, a concern of effectiveness.  At a 
minimum, error avoidance could save resources or lead to opportunities for success.  This section 
details some of these potential influences. 
Skhmot (2017) listed the eight types of waste identified in quality improvement and lean 
quality methodology.  The author noted that the first seven were initially included as part of the 
Toyoda Production System through the TIMWOOD acronym during the 1970s: transportation, 
inventory, motion, waiting, overproduction, over-processing, and defects.  The eighth was added 
in the 1990s, which was skill waste due to nonuse, misuse of employee skills, knowledge, and 




type I error is the same as discarding cash or wasting any other company asset.  This type of 
waste is the inefficient use of personnel.  For classifications of waste, see also leanway.net, 
leansmarts.com, leanmanufacturingtools.org, shumla.com, and kasama.us. 
From an anthropological perspective, Graeber (2018) has documented the proliferation of 
meaningless work, useless jobs, or perhaps brought them to the forefront of discussion.  The five 
job types that he identified included flunkies, goons, duct tapers, box tickers, and taskmasters.  
The author relayed the frustration of those individuals who lamented specific parts or all of their 
work and suggested industrialized society has developed a cult of work itself regardless of its 
benefits. And the author discussed many possible causes, origins, and potential remedies, some 
of which could be considered controversial.  Once again, failures to address special causes or 
searching for one-off errors within random variation would demoralize any employee.  And the 
manager who assigns these types of tasks would be considered a type of taskmaster. 
Harris and Osman (2012) offered an example where the illusion of control might be 
preferable to the illusion of chaos.  As an example, they reviewed the U.K.’s government 
response to the London riots in 2011.  The authors suggested that allowing the riot to continue in 
an incontrollable state would cost more than perceiving the situation as controllable (illusion of 
control) even without knowledge of the actual state of the situation.  Therefore, the authors 
suggested that this reaction of assuming an illusion of control state was perfectly rational and 
reasoned.  This schema also suggests that an assumption of IoCON is preferable and least costly 
when actual knowledge is scarce. 
Other literature has suggested the consequences of these errors.  Tellis (2013) discussed 
type I and type II errors concerning the innovation of the firm and undertaking new capital or 




associated with research, development, testing, and eventual commercialization.  Similarly, he 
noted that a type II error occurred when a failure to approve a potentially successful innovation.  
The author described a four-box matrix with the go/no-go tradeoffs and error types. 
In some cases, the firm would successfully accept good projects and reject potential 
failures.  Depending on the screening criteria, the types of potential error would change.  Looser 
project hurdle rates lowered type II errors by allowing more ventures but created the possibility 
of type I errors by approving unsuccessful opportunities.  Conversely, tightening criteria 
decreased the possibility of a type I error as more projects are rejected while increasing the 
chance of type II errors and missing an opportunity.  This argument is similar to the tradeoff of 
type I and type II errors used in statistical hypothesis testing and quality improvement (see 
Deming, 1982). 
Furthermore, Tellis (2013) stated that the costs associated with type I errors were limited 
and finite.  However, costs associated with type II errors could be large: on the upside, high 
market capitalization, market impact, and wealth; on the downside financial distress, 
reorganization, or bankruptcy.  The author suggested that type I errors, their measurable impacts, 
and recency effect might cause management to fixate on these types of error.  However, he also 
observed that the effect of a type II error might not be immediately manifested, but when known, 
it might be passed the time to react effectively.  Therefore, the author encouraged companies to 
consider both types of error with their innovation decisions, which could be considered as 
options of smaller and varied opportunities with large but rare possible payouts (p. 73). 
Tellis (2013) made two assumptions in his analysis.  First, that all projects would be 
known, and the second, an optimal hurdle rate would be selected.  In many business 




resources are constrained.  Therefore, in an economic sense, an opportunity cost is created from 
those wasted resources which could be deployed elsewhere.  Individuals whose selection criteria 
are biased are reviewing randomness to assign a cause, a type I error, and use resources 
inefficiently, which should be deployed in exploring actual special cause variation.  Furthermore, 
this behavior might simultaneously increase the opportunity to make a type II error through 
resource exhaustion, which suggests both types of error might co-occur. 
Furthermore, to encapsulate the behavioral impact of IoCON/IoCHA, an obligatory 
summary follows.  These maladaptive behaviors affect not only staff personnel but also 
management itself.  With IoCON, individuals are overconfident, make bold statements, 
sometimes without follow-up, and create an illusion of certainty where there is none.  They can 
be excessively optimistic, exaggerate their talents while thinking they have more control of their 
destiny than in actuality.  Moreover, they tend towards hindsight bias, “I knew it all along,” 
which increases faulty rationalizations, ignoring or discounting lessons learned, and repeating 
similar mistakes.  And they are less likely to predict negative outcomes or chance events. 
Conversely, the effects of IoCHA for the firm and managers could also be serious.  
Contraction of the number of projects through spurious quantitative criteria and bias for action 
may well direct the firm towards cosmetic and superficial changes.  The creation of analysis 
paralysis and fixation of type I errors might precede stagnation, financial distress, or worse. 
Literature of Operational Terms 
Measuring randomness:  Statistical process control charts and Nelson’s rules.  In his 
seminal work, Shewhart (1931) outlined three postulates for the scientific basis of control in 
manufacturing: all causes are not alike, chance causes exist in nature, and assignable causes can 




special or assignable cause, which equated to influences outside the current process 
(phenomenon) being studied, i.e., non-random error.  The second was a common cause, which 
was created by factors internal to the process, i.e., random.  The author completed a systematic 
review of the history of various distributions using both graphical and analytical examples, 
specifying their general and particular characteristics:  from Simpson and LaGrange in 1756-
1773 to Tschuprow in 1910-1916.  Shewhart (1931) devoted a large part of his book to 
explaining the detection of deterministic observations and how to calculate process limits, which 
would be used in SPC charts.  He concluded by stating that the purpose of the quality report was 
separating common causes from special causes and explicating the actions necessary to eliminate 
special cause variation.   
Wheeler and Chambers (1992) specified how to create the SPC chart used today using a 
manual method.  The chart itself is a graphical representation of observations within a time-
series that are plotted along a centerline where each event varies around it.  The basic center-line 
calculation uses the mean or average of the data points and a measure of dispersion, the range, 
and standard deviation.  Control limits, both the upper and lower bounds (UCL, LCL), are 
numerical values demarcating the minimum and maximum limits that separate common and 
special variation, the former falling within three standard deviations of the mean while the latter 
falls outside those limits (see also Mohammed, Cheng, Rouse, & Marshall, 2001, p. 463). 
 Wheeler and Chambers (1992) also noted four myths related to the use of SPC charts.  
The first was that data must be normally distributed.  However, as noted previously, Shewhart’s 
original analysis discussed many types of distributions.  Second, SPC charts successfully 
function because of the central limit theorem or, the third, that data with serial correlations were 




They indicated that the purpose of the control chart was to obtain insight and not calculate the 
probability.  And finally, the fourth myth stated that observations must be within controllable 
limits before charts can be used.  This requirement is unnecessary since one of their functions is 
to work towards process control, which implies “out of control” processes.  Similarly, Deming 
(1982) designed the “red bead” experiment, which demonstrated the impossibility of 
handpicking special cause variation from a larger random sample.  In sum, the essence of quality 
process improvement is to separate special from common cause, eliminate special cause, and 
further reduce common variation by process changes (see Deming, 1982, p. 321; and Wheeler & 
Chambers, 1992, p. 6; or Keys & Reding, 1992,  for accounting and TQM).   
The rules and interpretation of control charts have changed since Shewhart’s original 
work.  As previously noted, his demarcation between common and special cause variation was 
plus or minus three standard deviations.  Noskievičová (2013) provided both a brief history and 
summary of chart rules (also known as Nelson’s rules) over the history of quality improvement.  
The table below represents a summary of the historical rules, year developed, and changes over 
time.  Sigma XL and SPC Excel are software packages designed for quality improvement, but 





Table 5.  
SPC chart rules through time 















Test 1: 1 point more than 3 
StDev from CL Test 1:  1 Test 1:  1 Test 1:  1 Test 1:  1 Test 1:  1 Test 1:  1 
Test 2: 7 points in a row on 
same side of CL     Test 2: 9 Test 4:  7 Test 2: 9 Test 4:  8  
Test 3: 7 points in a row all 
increasing or all decreasing     Test 3:  6 Test 5:  7 Test 3:  6 Test 5:  6  
Test 4: 14 points in a row 
alternating up and down     Test 4:  14 
Test 8:  
14 Test 4:  14 Test 7:  14  
Test 5: 2 out of 3 points more 
than 2 StDev from CL (same 
side) 
  Test 2: 2 of 3  
Test 5:  2 
of 3 
Test 2: 2 
of 3  
Test 5:  2 of 
3 Test 2: 2 of 3  
Test 6: 4 out of 5 points more 
than 1 StDev from CL (same 
side) 
  Test 3:  4 of 5  
Test 6:  4 
of 5 
Test 3:  4 
of 5  
Test 6:  4 of 
5 Test 3:  4 of 5  
Test 7: 14 points in a row 
within 1 StDev from CL 
(either side) 
    Test 7:  15 Test 7:  15  Test 7:  15 Test 6:  15  
Test 8: 8 points in a row more 
than 1 StDev from CL (either 
side) 
  Test 4:  8  Test 8:  8 Test 6:  8 Test 8:  8 Test 8:  8  
Note.  (modified Noskievičová, 2013, p. 3) showing different rule number conventions and 
default values.  From right to left: SigmaXL rule defaults, Shewhart’s original work, Western 
Electric, Nelson, SPC Excel defaults, and suggestions from Griffiths and Noskievičová.   
 
The first column in Table 5 lists the rules found in the SigmaXL package, the software 
used to construct the measures for this test.  Each rule is numbered from one to eight; however, 
each rule number varies over time and by software package.  Similarly, each rule contains a 
quantity of a certain number of observations, which demarcates the division between special and 
common cause variation.  These are also visible in the table.  In his original work, Shewhart 
(1931) only described the three-standard deviation rule.  By the late 1950s, Western Electric had 
expanded their rule list to four.  With the quality of revolution that resulted from the success of 
Japanese companies in the 1970s and 1980s, Nelson (1984) expanded the rule list to eight items 




Furthermore, Nelson’s rule two stated nine points in a row on the same side of the 
centerline.  The two software packages use seven points, and Noskievičová (2013) used eight, 
which correspond to different probabilities of occurrence.  However, the default values in most 
software packages can be adjusted as necessary to the desired probability.  While a general 
standard of the exact number of points does not seem to exist, Griffiths, Bunder, Gulati, and 
Onizawa (2010) calculated probabilities for a selection of rules and proposed a fixed probability 
of occurrence with a convergence of ratios of 0.003.  The authors also noted that the rules were 
not mutually exclusive, and that one observation could be assigned multiple rule violations. 
Moreover, they computed the probability of rule four, which described sequences of 
alternation and reviewed early alternation studies dating to Andre (1879, 1881, 1883).  Given the 
tendency,  previously noted, of non-random alternation rates, Griffiths et al. (2010) also created a 
table of probabilities based on alternation rates between three events (probability of 0.667) to 14 
events (probability of 0.005).  The probability calculation was based on the equation p = 2.5592e-
0.452x, where p is the probability, and x is the number of alterations (Griffiths et al., 2010, p. 5). 
Additionally, Griffiths et al. (2010) calculated the probabilities of each of Nelson’s eight 
rules.  Based on the Sigma XL rule differences as noted in Table 5, these probabilities were 
adjusted, where appropriate, and are visible below in Table 6.  Because of the law of large 
numbers, simulated random occurrences should approach the calculated probabilities in large 
samples.  Table 6 also contains sample sizes of 5,000 and 100,000 trials that resemble actual 





Table 6.  




















for 10 Trials 
10K number strings 
MS Excel 
[NORM.INV(RAND(), 
mean, standard dev)] 
for 10 Trials 
Random10K 
(Random.org) 
for 10 Trials 
Test 1 0.00270    0.00220 0.00252 0.00257 
Test 2 0.01563 0.01400 0.01560 0.01559 0.01544 
Test 3 0.00040    0.00040 0.00004 0.00010 
Test 4 0.00457 0.00500 0.00180 0.00250 0.00204 
Test 5 0.00306    0.00260 0.00161 0.00183 
Test 6 0.00553 0.00680 0.00540 0.00440 0.00443 
Test 7 0.00478    0.00140 0.00446 0.00507 
Test 8 0.00010 0.00020    0.00012 0.00011 
Total   0.02540 0.02800 0.03019 0.03059 
Note.  From left to right, calculated probabilities of individual Nelson’s rules, associated 
simulations of 5,000 and 100,000 trials using MS Excel or random.org. 
 
The uses of either the probability of rule occurrence or a simulation of error frequency 
are two points of reference for any time series.  Using a method of error frequency, one can 
compare time series of any type with any other, e.g., a sales variance process, a service 
accounting metric, or a stock price.  If the calculated non-random (special cause) variation 
exceeds random chance, then special cause variation exists in that string.  Table 7 below details a 
large frequency simulation, a six-month sales variance process assessment, Mondelez and SP500 
prices for 275 trading days, and a service recovery two-year assessment.  Each series contains its 
associated rate of non-random variation by rule.  Also, beside each rule of the series, p-values 
have been calculated to show significant differences from what would occur randomly in a 
simulation.  And using a simulation method also allows for a calculation of overall error rate 




from the simulation.  For example, in the random trials, 3% error rates are expected by chance 
versus 13% of sales process, 9% of Mondelez, 7% of SP500, and 4% of service recovery. 
Table 7.  













































Test 1  0.00257 0.02721 0.000 0.03636 0.003 0.01818 0.053 0.04167 0.338 
Test 2 0.01544 0.04723 0.122      0.01091 0.470      
Test 3 0.00010                    
Test 4 0.00204 0.00282 0.390                
Test 5 0.00183 0.00334 0.002 0.01091 0.147 0.00727 0.288      
Test 6 0.00443 0.00026 0.000                
Test 7 0.00507 0.05364 0.000 0.05091 0.001 0.03273 0.010      
Test 8 0.00011                    
Total 0.03059 0.12782 0.000 0.09091 0.001 0.06545 0.019 0.04167 0.786 
Note.  Error rates based on Nelson’s rules from left to right: random occurrence, 6-month sales 
variance, Mondelez, SP500, and a 2-year service recovery with associated p-values. 
 
An additional method to examine, compare, or benchmark time series processes is 
through a ratio of special versus random variation.  This calculation separates the total variation 
of a time series into its components by calculating the underlying amounts related to special 
cause variation and whose difference to the total variation in the series would be the random 
variation.  Table 8 details the similarities of non-random variation in a sales process over a 10-
year period is a stable and scalable prediction.  The R2 of this decade of observations was 96% 
given by the power graph line of y=0.128x1.0437.  While Sigma XL does not provide these results 
in the current version, all the elements are present to allow a computation.  For the two stocks 
previously mentioned, the special cause variation for Mondelez and SP500 were 20% and 8%, 




attributed to Juran, i.e., 85% of the root causes of errors are attributable to “systems, processes, 
and structure while 15% can be traced to people” (Clemmer, 1992, p. 67). 
Table 8.   





















2009 $2,840,207  $5,508,677  $8,348,883  $1,874,309  $6,474,574  22.4% 77.6% 
2010 $3,260,460  $5,795,934  $9,056,394  $2,335,479  $6,720,916  25.8% 74.2% 
2011 $3,932,765  $5,540,532  $9,473,297  $2,679,310  $6,793,987  28.3% 71.7% 
2012 $3,037,403  $5,221,363  $8,258,766  $2,396,269  $5,862,497  29.0% 71.0% 
2013 $2,663,584  $8,553,638  $11,217,222  $3,474,567  $7,742,654  31.0% 69.0% 
2014 $1,743,874  $7,872,060  $9,615,935  $2,182,877  $7,433,058  22.7% 77.3% 
2015 $1,786,043  $8,335,417  $10,121,460  $2,747,146  $7,374,314  27.1% 72.9% 
2016 $2,533,672  $4,577,125  $7,110,797  $1,314,652  $5,796,145  18.5% 81.5% 
2017 $2,021,944  $1,979,637  $4,001,581  $1,023,995  $2,977,587  25.6% 74.4% 
2018 $1,688,443  $1,915,520  $3,603,963  $1,008,100  $2,595,863  28.0% 72.0% 
2019 6-monthYTD $583,204  $542,457  $1,125,661  $261,947  $863,714  23.3% 76.7% 
Note.  10-year sales variation, which separates over/undersold and assigns associated non-
random variation based on Nelson’s rules. 
 
Furthermore, Noskievičová (2013) and SPC Excel (n.d.) provide a list of possible special 
causes listed by rule based on previous research in manufacturing environments.  An adapted 
version of their tables appears below in Table 9 and includes some unpublished identified causes 
from an amalgamation of individual sales variances in a construction company. 
While most individuals with general knowledge of SPC charts consider their use, 
specifically in manufacturing or sales environments (see Selden, 1996), the methodology is also 
applicable to service industries.  Henderson et al. (2008) review patient stroke care of 2,962 
patients in three U.K. hospitals by retroactively plotting SPC charts to assess common or special 
cause variation in four areas: brain imaging, prescribing aspirin after stroke, the proportion of 
patients receiving strong unit care, and the proportion of patients discharged on a statin.  
Findings included the confirmation of improvements in patient care and those improvements that 
were expected but did not occur.  Moreover, the authors stated that several unexpected signals of 




Table 9.  
SPC Chart Rules and Possible Causes  
 
(modified Noskievičová, 2013, p. 4; SPC Excel, n.d., pp. 8-9) 
 
Mohammed et al. (2001) provided several examples of retrofitting SPC charts to 
determine both special and common cause in a hospital setting: mortality rates of children 
younger than one year from the UK Cardiac Surgical Register, mortality rates from the medical 
doctor and serial killer Harold Shipman, IVF treatment, prevalence of coronary heart disease 
among general practitioners, and neonatal deaths.  The authors also cited several U.S. studies, 
which included the study of mortality rates in hospital trauma cases, infection control, and 
monitoring and detecting outliers in public health reporting.  The variety of type and domains 
analyzed points to the overall applicability of the tool and its ability to gain insight into diverse 
problems. 
Measuring randomness:  weakness of SPC charts.  Taleb (2008) has argued many 
weaknesses of variable measurement in economics based on moments of probability, mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis.  The author stated that most conventional methods 




be insufficient when consequences were large.  And he observed that rare events will be 
infrequent or will not occur in most small samples (see Bye et al., 2011, for climate cycle 
composed of 30-year random walks, also Silver, 2012, pp. 190-193] for rare events).  Therefore, 
this weakness also applies to the SPC chart, whose limits and moment calculations are based on 
small samples determined by the analyst.  And even though the types of distributions are not 
limited, events that violate the rules, especially rule one, could include observations, which are 
many multiple standard deviations from the mean.  As an example, Figure 1 below shows two 
different distributions plotted on the chart.  The top image, the SP500 graph, shows limits of 
approximately +/- 2% on its Y-axis, while the limits of the bottom graph are approximately 
+30% to -35%.  The red numbers visible near the observations denote each non-random 
occurrence, and the number itself represents the rule which was violated.  
Mandelbrot and Taleb (2010) described these types of rare events in the bottom graph of 
Figure 1 as wild randomness, which they defined as any single observation or event that 
inordinately affected to the total.  The authors gave examples of this type of concentration in 
certain winner-take-all markets.  As examples, they cited best-selling authors by book volume or 
sales, internet traffic, and an outlier effect in the stock market: “10 trading days represented 63% 
of the returns for the past 50 years” (p. 50).  In a table, the authors compared non-scalable versus 
scalable distributions.  In the former, winners get small pieces of the total while in the latter, 
winners-take-all or the vast majority of the total.  Non-scalable distributions include human 
physical qualities such as height and weight, where deviations are easily estimated.  Scalable 
distributions are difficult to predict even from historical information and are governed by the 




industry and showed how only a few movies garnered the majority of revenue or were profitable 
while most generated losses. 
 
 
Figure 1. SPC returns for SP500 and a Sales Process Noting Scale Differences.  Observations of 
two separate processes where the SP500 above indicates a plus or minus 0.02 upper and lower 
control limits with extreme values to -0.03.  The sales process limits are 0.27 to -0.40, 
respectively, with extreme values to -1.20. 
 
Characteristics Related to Type I and Type II Errors 
Payoff curves.  Taleb (2014) described two types of payoff curves:  those that are 
concave with known visible gains and unknown errors, and those that are convex with small 
known errors and large possible gains.  The latter were considered antifragile and based on 
optionality of future possibilities while the former was based on a narrative or story which might 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similarly, in mapping types of fragility as a time series, Taleb (2014) distinguished 
between a negative blowup or black swan event after a series of positive gains and losses, which 
resulted in a catastrophic loss.  This was described as fragility.  Conversely, the positive value 
change resulting from a positive black swan would be antifragility.  In between these two 
scenarios would be a robust investment which would be immune to both events.  Gains with 
possible losses might be characterized as stock market investing, while losses to gains might 
characterized entrepreneurial start-up companies, venture capital endeavors, or sophisticated 
capital budgeting projects. 
First mover advantage.  Golder and Tellis (1993) examined first mover or pioneer 
advantage (FMA) across 50 categories of products and assessed the reliability of PIMS and 
ASSESSOR databases.  Theories that favored FMA focused on the advantages of consumer 
loyalty and earning economic rents.  However, the authors also offered several reasons why 
FMA could be disadvantageous such as free-riding the technology, changing consumer 
preferences, “incumbent inertia,” or obtaining an ideal market placement (pp. 161-162).  In 
reassessing FMA and the databases, the authors determined that market share leadership existed 
for 11% of 36 categories and that leadership was maintained an average of 12 years or a median 
of five years.  Similarly, long-lived leadership occurred in only four of 50 categories. 
VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) performed a meta-analysis of FMA.  The authors found 
that using market share as the variable of FMA produced more significant effects than using 
profitability or survivorship.  They noted, however, that market leadership was industry-specific 
and that there were cases of negative FMA. 
Look what I did - look what I avoided.  Taleb (2014) defined the idea of naïve 




action.  He observed that society recognized accomplishments appreciably more than avoidance 
of harm and that rewards generally came from things accomplished.  Yet, he also described 
several examples of the benefits of procrastination: the Roman general Fabius Maximus who 
avoided direct fighting with Hannibal; the Fabian Society in the U.K.; the Latin expression 
festina lente, i.e. make haste slowly; or Lao Tzu’s wu-wei, i.e., passive achievement.  And he 
proposed that this bias for action was exemplified by the continued revisal of societal do’s and 
don’ts based on the most recent statistical associations. 
Similarly, Deming (1982) designed a Monte Carlo experiment to show how intervention 
behavior could be harmful.  In his experiment, a funnel was placed at a given height above a 
target through which a marble is dropped onto a board.  The marble would roll some distance 
away from the original target position.  In the simulation, several interventionist rules are 
discussed which purport to maximize results.  Rule one leaves the funnel fixed over the target 
position which is the optimal placement.  Rules two through four create a compensating behavior 
(intervention) based on the previous marble end-position.  For example, rule two moves the 
funnel target in the opposite direction of the final position of the previous; rule three moves the 
distance of rule two except it adjusts from the original target; and finally, rule four places the 
target over the last final position.  The simulation demonstrates that rules two through four 
always increase the variation, and rule four transforms the series into a random walk.  These 
tampering effects, at minimum, increase variation (rules two and three) or, at maximum, blow up 
a process (rule four).  An actual example of rule two would be adjusting a quota to reflect current 
output; of rule three would be to increase bets to cover losses; and of rule four would be to allow 




Deming, 1982, pp. 331-332; Walton, 1990, p. 163).  Similarly, rules two through four are 
designated as over-controlling a process, which is a typical type I error (SPC Excel, n.d.). 
Personal fear of invalidity.  Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, and Moskowitz (2001) 
described the history and various applications of the personal need for structure (PNS) and the 
personal fear of invalidity (PFI) constructs.  In a brief history of the constructs, the authors stated 
that the desire to create meaning by understanding his/her surroundings was common among 
humans. They documented that Pierce (1877/1957) had proposed that this need was formed from 
the desire for survival and from the necessity to separate pleasant and unpleasant experiences.  
The authors also remarked that Heider observed that human desire was centered on achieving a 
particular state and on reducing doubt and uncertainty. 
Since these constructs were developed from a basic human desire for structure and to deal 
with uncertainty, they are similar to each other and yet different constructs (Thompson et al., 
2001, p. 22).  Past studies had reviewed both constructs together or with others (Thompson et al. 
[2001] for PNS, PFI scale development; Clow & Esses [2005] for PNS, PFI, and need for closure 
[NFCC]; Rietzschel, De Dreu, & Nijstad [2007] for PNS and PFI; and Blais, Thompson & 
Baranski [2005] for PNS, PFI, and Need for Cognition [NFC]).  But more often, many 
researchers in past studies have preferred the use of PNS as an individual variable (Svecova & 
Pavlovicova, 2016; or Davidson & Laroche, 2016). 
In developing the two scales, Thompson et al. (2001) described PNS attributes as those 
individuals who prefer structure and clarity while avoiding ambiguousness and uncertainty.  
Also, these individuals would be seen by others as decisive and confident, and they would be 




the authors noted that this behavior was generally praised in society but could lead to rigidity and 
a reliance on stereotypes.  
Similarly, Thompson et al. (2001) noted that instead of concern for structure, individuals 
might be more concerned with the damage of committing errors, a high PFI.  These persons were 
usually highly concerned with the risk of an undertaking, vacillating between courses of action, 
seeking alternatives, and exhibiting some distress when personal errors were enumerated.  
Moreover, the authors found a significant relationship between PFI and authoritarianism but an 
insignificant relationship to the rigidity of personal habits. Also, they found a strong correlation 
to depression, both public and private self-consciousness, and social anxiety. 
Rietzschel, De Dreu, and Nijstad (2007) discussed previous studies of PNS and 
creativity, where higher levels of PNS generally had a negative effect on creativity.  The authors 
studied the interaction between PNS and PFI and proposed that individuals who were high on 
both scales were likely to a negative relationship to creativity; however, higher levels of PNS 
with lower levels of PFI were expected to produce structured responses in uncertain 
environments.  Moreover, they indicated that PNS resulted in simplification while higher PFI 
resulted in complexification.  And the authors concluded that high PNS alone might allow for 
creativity, but coupled with high PFI, it might reduce it.  Also, the authors did not find any 
significant relationship between PNS, PFI, or their interaction in the measure of flexibility 
(distinct semantic categories). 
Similarly, Clow and Esses (2005) listed several significant findings for PFI while 
examining that construct with PNS and NFC.  The authors found that when individuals created 
group stereotypes from descriptions, those with high PFI sought additional information but were 




construct stereotypes, lower PFI individuals also created more detailed stereotypes.  And when 
subjects were presented with a quantity of descriptions that were more or less than desired, high 
PFI and lower PNS and NFC individuals created more accurate stereotypes. 
To review PNS, PFI, and NFC, Blais et al. (2005) used three comparative judgment tasks, 
which included assessing knowledge, vocabulary, and perception.  While subjects with higher 
NFC had a superior performance on judgmental tasks, substructures for PNS and PFI did not 
show any significant effects. 
The desirability of control.  Burger and Cooper (1979) developed the construct of the 
desirability of control (DC).  The authors conceived of the construct based on the work of Adler 
(1930), Kelly (1965), and Kelley (1971).  A person with high DC wants to have control in their 
life.  They prefer to influence others, often seek leadership within groups, and appear decisive 
and assertive.  Where payoffs for control were small, both high and low DC individuals are not 
expected to exert control.  Within a betting game, the authors found that high DC individuals 
exhibited an IoCON with pre-bets using a gambling scenario.  The authors also reported several 
studies that investigated learned helplessness, which is manifested in individuals who are 
continually exposed to negative and aversive events.  Other research suggested that higher DC 
individuals were more susceptible to learned helplessness. 
Dembroski, MacDougall, and Musante (1984) tested the relationships between DC, locus 
of control, and other standard psychological measures, including the type A coronary prone 
behavior pattern.  The authors made their type A assessments through both an interview process 
and quantitative measures.  They found that high DC individuals were susceptible to the type A 
coronary prone behavior pattern, whether assessed through an interview or self-report.  




interview-based type A subjects, DC, and voice mannerisms.  However, no subjects who used 
the LOC I/E questionnaire showed any significant correlation with either the interview type A 
assessment, with voice, or with DC. 
Gebhardt and Brosschot (2002) tested three separate samples of more than 300 
respondents to assess the DC construct, to create a Dutch version, and to review the relationships 
with DC and LOC, coping style, repression, achievement motivation, personality characteristics, 
trait anxiety and depression, trait worry, burnout, and somatic complaints.  Each construct was 
measured with its particular scale. Using factor analysis, the authors determined three subscales 
within DC, which included controlling others, relinquishing control, and self-control.  While the 
authors listed 17 significant relationships to DC, the strongest positive associations were 
dominance, self-esteem, and problem solving, while the strongest negative associations were 
social inadequacy and avoidance strategies.  Similarly, the authors also found significant 
negative relationships between DC and anxiety, depression, and worry. 
True-False guessing.  Developing a true-false guessing strategy was first documented by 
Fritz (1921).  As an instructor, he noticed a pattern with students’ incorrect responses as his 
pupils seemed to guess a true response more than a false one.  To test his idea, he examined 19 
tests among four professors and found similar results.  To further investigate the phenomenon, he 
designed a 58-statement examination based on items found in a medical encyclopedia and 
devised questions which would be unknown to a lay-person.  In two trials, the author obtained 
similar findings, i.e., 60.9% and 62% of the responses were true.  Similarly, Poundstone (2014) 
described various true-false test-taking strategies and revealed that “recalling a fact was easier 
than creating a falsehood.”  Therefore, based on his research, he suggested that examiners were 




Krueger (1933) used a frequentist approach to assess several correct answers in a true-
false guessing strategy based on question series of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100, 200, 300, and 
500 items using 1,000 subjects for each series.  Within each of the sequences, a 50-50 
representation of true-false questions was constructed.  He also separated the subjects into two 
groups: one group who would know the 50-50 ratio and the other who would not be given any 
information.  In the results for the 10-item questionnaire, seven of the subjects were able to guess 
either 10 or 0 correctly, while 31 subjects were able to get 9 or 1 correct.  In the 20-item 
questionnaire results, no subjects were able to guess 19 or 20 questions correctly or 0 to 2 
correctly; however, 4 subjects guessed 17-18 correctly.  Therefore, a standard 20-question 
guessing questionnaire would severely eliminate the possibility of correct/incorrect guessing 
given the extreme values whose probabilities of occurrence are (0.5)20 or 9.54 x 10-7. 
Similar to Poundstone (2014), Burton (2005) described 15 myths related to true-false and 
multiple-choice questions based on un-speeded tests, which allow respondents ample time for 
completion.  While discussing those myths, the author elaborated on blind guessing, which he 
suggested was not totally blind.  He observed that responses were not necessarily “completely 
uninformed and random” if clues were available from poor question construction or linguistical 
choices.  Furthermore, the author commented on the difference between incorrect knowledge and 
complete ignorance and whether or not any differentiation should exist when scoring responses.  
He did not equivocate and emphasized that there was no difference between accepting or trusting 
misinformation and complete ignorance as any error based on false confidence (i.e., type I) 
might contradict the correct understanding of an entire topic. 
Using a mathematical approach, Morrison (1978) suggested two possible “true” 




or expensive/cheap wine, he observed that a subject either could discriminate between two 
options or would be forced to guess.  The author compared the actual distributions to two other 
extreme outcomes:  samples of 100% guessers and 100% discriminators.  Through an iterative 
process and various statistical techniques, the author showed how the separation of guessers and 
discriminators could be determined.   
And finally, distinguishing true-false has entered the medical field through experiments 
examining the brain using MRI techniques.  Cabez et al. (2001) examined brain images of 
subjects while employing recognition tests of true-false.  Their findings suggested that subjects 
were generally capable not only of recognizing true items and eliminating new items but also of 
accepting false items as true.  The results also yielded true-false distinctions in the posterior 
medial temporal lobe (MTL). 
Cohen’s Kappa.  Viera and Garrett (2005) provided a synopsis of Cohen’s Kappa, which 
attempts to standardize the subjective judgments between observers of some phenomenon.  The 
statistic is calculated by counting the agreement among the observers and agreement by chance, 
i.e., observed and expected agreements.  There are four zones that require computation.  Zones A 
and D count were both observers either agree positively or negatively.  Zones B and C count, 
where either observer disagrees with the other.  In a table the authors provided an interpretation 
of the statistic which ranges from -1 to +1:  Kappa statistics less than 0, less than chance 
agreement; between 0.01 to 0.20, slight agreement; 0.21 to 0.40, fair agreement; 0.41 to 0.60, 
moderate agreement; 0.61 to 0.80, substantial agreement; 0.81 to 0.99, almost perfect agreement; 
and 1.0, perfect agreement.  They also suggested that the statistic might be inappropriate for rare 
observations, which yielded low kappa values with high levels of agreement (also McHugh, 




exploring the symmetry and balance between agreements and disagreements and demonstrating 
where those marginal totals might yield unexpected Kappa values.  In a separate article, Cicchetti 
and Feinstein (1990) reviewed other omnibus indices to correct for these asymmetries and 
suggested that kappa should also be accompanied by individual values of 
agreement/disagreement.  And McHugh (2012) argued for using both kappa and only the 
percentage of the agreement to enhance interpretational clarity.  
Byrt, Bishop, and Carlin (1993) suggested an additional correction to the Kappa statistics 
by adding an index for bias and prevalence so that additional information could be gained.  The 
authors recommended that the bias-adjusted kappa (BAK) should replace actual counts in zones 
C and D with average values.  They also introduced two additional adjustments.  The first was 
the prevalence index (PI), which was computed as the difference between the probabilities of yes 
and no.  And the second was the prevalence and bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK), which would 
allow for a linear relationship in observed agreement. 
Other research efforts have suggested further adjustments to Cohen’s Kappa.  For 
example, Kvålseth (2015) suggested a logistic transformation of negative Kappa values.  
Warrens (2014) provided new category coefficients for use with more than one rater.  And von 
Eye and von Eye (2005) reviewed disagreement zones, triangles of disagreement, and 
disagreement by one unit on ordinal scales. 
Summary 
This literature review began with the history of randomness and examined how 
attribution of its effects was interpreted as the decision of the gods.  Often these ideas were false.  
When discussing pattern recognition itself, various theories have suggested how the mind and 




feedback loops, ideas of tacit knowledge and recognition primed decision-making show how 
experience can save life using historical behavior with the occurrence of new situations.  
However, psychology, in studying human subjects, has found extensive human bias or non-
logical thinking with uncertain situations or in cases of limited feedback.  For those of us 
working in a quantitative area such as finance and accounting, its mathematical nature tends to 
assign a scientific rigor that may not be deserved, and these facts were explicitly documented in 
the literature.  Yet perhaps these weaknesses are not well-known to practitioners or those outside 
the profession.  Several maladaptive behaviors showed how professionals could be deceived 
within their minds.  So, perhaps many readers were surprised or appalled at these biases where 
others were dismissive of their importance.  The latter may be those individuals subject to these 
illusions of the mind. 
Furthermore, seeing these follies in other domains should reinforce our desire to accept 
the limits of our professional knowledge, which should not be judged as free from error, as is 
often the case.  Concurrently, embracing those errors through self-critique can also advance our 
profession.  As has been duly documented, the stakes are high, whether the outcomes are either 
positive or negative.  Ironically, the inability to recognize, accept, and to profess these limits 
render many financial techniques no better than our ancestors’ astragali, I Ching, or magic eight 










CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
Proposed Model and Relationships 
This study attempts to assess participants’ type I and type II error tendencies using 
random sequence perception, as suggested by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003).  Furthermore, as 
proposed by Nickerson (2002), the research allows individuals to show their comprehension or 
instincts about randomness in a candid way by permitting them to write about their strategies, 
thought patterns, or ideas directly to the researcher through open-ended questions. 
The proposed model for this study is shown in Figure 2, which delineates the types of 
positive and negative relationships between latent constructs and hypotheses.  Each of the blue 
nodes or circles represents a latent construct.  All extended literature elements and details of each 
latent construct and measure are found in chapter 2.  The research expectations include 
desirability of control (DC) which is positively related to the type I error rate, and personal fear 
of invalidity (PFI) which is positively related to the type II error rate.  Similarly, the 
characteristics are designed to show a positive effect on one type of error. In contrast, the polar 
opposite characteristics would indicate a positive effect on the converse error type.  Each of these 





Figure 2. Proposed Model of Study and Associated Relationships.  Latent constructs are blue 
circles with arrows indicating the direction of relationships.  Hypotheses are numbered on the 
path of the appropriate relationship. 
 
Hypotheses 
Figure 2 shows how each of the ten hypotheses is related to the latent constructs within 
the PLS-SEM model.  Hypotheses H1 through H6 and H10 are related to the PLS multivariate 
model, while hypotheses H7 through H9 are not SEM model-related assessments but are 
evaluations of the attributes of the sample.  These particular hypotheses are related to the nature 
of the data obtained and whether the current sample maintains specific aspects from the results of 
historical studies. 
Again, as seen in Figure 2, the desirability of control (DC) was anticipated to have a 
significant positive effect on the type I error rate.  Consequently, the desirability of control, 
following Burger and Cooper (1979), would lead to an illusion of control where individuals 




Hypothesis 1:  High DC provides a significant positive path to type I error rate. 
Conversely, personal fear of invalidity (PFI) would have a significant positive effect on 
type II error rate.  Individuals with type II error tendencies would want to avoid making any 
errors and might prefer the complexification of difficult questions.  Consequently, those with 
high personal fear of invalidity, following Thompson et al. (2001), would defer to making 
specific pronouncements, add qualifiers, subtleties, and tend towards type II errors.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 2:  High PFI provides a significant positive path to type II error rate. 
Certain behavioral characteristics are associated with both type I and type II errors.  
These sets of characteristics are mirror images of each other and are expected to have significant 
positive effects on each error type.  The first characteristic, payoff curves, following Taleb 
(2014), suggests that gains with possible losses characterize typical stock market investments 
while robust and anti-fragile investments might offer small losses with the possibility of large 
gains.  The second, first-mover advantage, following Golder and Tellis (1993), argues that first 
movers may not actually be first in the market or are perhaps are those that were first 
remembered, i.e., survivorship bias.  Third, a more subtle characteristic examines an avoidance 
tendency versus an action orientation in individual behavior.  Any action certainly opens the 
opportunity for type I errors, following Taleb’s (2014) discussion of a bias for action.  And as 
previously explicated, Deming (1982) warned that action on any process would be considered 
tampering and would worsen outcomes.  However, individual incentives and compensation 
within an organization do not usually reward people for avoiding errors.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3:  Characteristics of type I (gains to losses, first-mover advantage, look at 




Hypothesis 4:  Characteristics of type II (losses to gains, follower strategy, look what I 
avoided) provide a significant positive path to type II error rate. 
Furthermore, an assessment of true-false guessing strategies would be explored.  Cohen’s 
Kappa, an assessment of interrater reliability, is used to form groups of respondents from that 
assessment following Viera and Garrett (2005).  Based on simulations with extreme oscillation 
bias, at least two select groups should emerge either by chance, tacit tendency, or specific 
individual strategy in sequences of true-false or false-true, following Poundstone (2014):  those 
with a propensity to commit type I errors and those with a propensity to commit type II errors 
which are positively related to each respective error type as in Figure 2.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5:  Kappa group of type I from the True-False assessment provides a 
significant positive path to type I error rate. 
Hypothesis 6:  Kappa group of type II from the True-False assessment provides a 
significant positive path to type II error rate. 
Within the true-false assessment responses as mentioned above, some participants were 
expected to make excessive non-random alternation (under-alternation or oscillation) between 
true and false answers following Ayton and Fischer (2004), Poundstone (2014), Lopes and Oden 
(1987), and Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991). Therefore,  
Hypothesis 7:  Because of heuristic bias, the alternation rate of actual True-False 
assessment will be significantly different from a randomly generated True-False 
assessment. 
Both the endogenous error rate responses and the exogenous true-false assessment 
responses are evaluated by calculating the percentage of correct responses and rates of type I and 




and a random one, the percentage correct in the SPC error rate evaluation should be superior to 
respondents’ guessing strategy.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 8:  Percentage correct of the SPC Error Rate assessment is significantly 
higher than the percentage correct in True-False assessment. 
Following Fritz (1921), Krueger (1933), Burton (2005), and Poundstone (2014), 
respondents would answer a higher percentage of true responses to false responses.  And when 
answering true, the probability of making a type I error would also increase.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 9:  Distribution of the actual percentage of True responses in the True-False 
assessment group will be significantly higher than the percentage from a random 
distribution. 
Hypothesis 10: a higher percentage of True responses in the True-False assessment 
group provides a significant path to type I error rates. 
And lastly, the qualitative assessment explores the strategies employed, if any, in the 
assessments of both the error rates and true-false latent constructs. 
Justification of Methodology 
Following a pragmatic research view, this study used a concurrent mixed-method 
approach, i.e., data were collected at one time and contained both qualitative and quantitative 
elements.  The mixed-method approach is appropriate as it attempts to uncover new research 
directions, as suggested by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) and by Nickerson (2002) as previously 
explained.  And as advocated by Hussein (2009), using mixed-methods can enhance an area of 
study by triangulation of the underlying phenomenon.   
For the quantitative portion, a multivariate design was employed, which includes the use 




Goodson, and Neilands (2007) recommended the use of SEM based on four factors.  The first, 
based on the complexity of many research questions, favored SEM as it can handle many 
variables.  Similarly, SEM facilitated the examination of multiple relationships and accounted for 
experimental error better than older multivariate methods.  The method also offers data analysis 
flexibility because it includes the calculation of all effects (total, indirect, and direct) and is more 
forgiving with the treatment of incomplete data versus the older techniques.  Lastly, Astrachan, 
Patel, and Wanzenried (2014) stated that more indicator variables were retained with PLS-SEM 
than with CB-SEM. 
For the qualitative portion, Creswell (2009) advised several types of mixed method 
strategies available to researchers.  This study uses the embedded design where the qualitative 
data is collected simultaneously and plays a supportive role to deepen and enrich the analysis.  
The open-ended questions would allow individuals to show their comprehension or instincts 
about randomness candidly by permitting them to write about their strategies, thought patterns, 
and ideas directly to the researcher. 
Population and screening criteria.  Within the behavioral finance literature, rarely have 
actual practitioners been surveyed.  For example, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) created 
experiments to assess actual traders’ susceptibility to IoCON and their performance in market 
outcomes within an organization.  Similarly, real accounting professionals were used by Uecker 
and Kinney (1977) to test for sampling errors; by Biggs and Wild (1985) to review estimates of 
unaudited results and investigate bias, and by Johnson (1994) to test the memory of audit 
evidence between individuals and groups.  Taleb (2004, 2007, 2014) discussed bias in financial 




investor misattributed behaviors.  However, most psychological studies use student populations 
as participants and subjects, and they may lack practical experience in the workplace. 
For this study, corporate finance and accounting personnel are surveyed.  Screening 
criteria employed were based on business functional areas such as marketing/promotion, 
customer service, sales, accounting/finance, distribution, R&D, administrative/management, 
production, operations, IT, purchasing, and legal.  From these groups, only finance/accounting 
are selected to continue to the survey.  If an individual had worked in different functional areas, 
respondents were requested to choose their functional area based on the highest number of years 
toiled.  The level of accounting/finance experience was a minimum of five years following 
Johnson (1994).  A bipolar 6-point Likert scale was used to evaluate a tendency towards 
qualitative/quantitative skills.  Furthermore, consideration was given to stratified samples based 
on qualification level, job title, company size, and/or international experience.  Due to budget 
considerations, none of these criteria were used for screening; however, the first two items were 
collected for informational purposes only.  
Data collection and sample size.  An initial survey instrument was created, which 
included 84 observed variables, 11 latent constructs, and the screening variables.  Kyriazos 
(2018) discussed the several factors affecting SEM sample size, which included model 
complexity, type of data distribution, reliability of the underlying variables, missing or imprecise 
data, number of interactions, among other criteria.  The following parameter estimates were used 
to determine minimum sample size for this study: minimum effect size of 0.20 based on 
previously unpublished research (using a 0.30 would not change in minimum respondent count);  




standard probability level of 0.05.  These combined factors yielded a minimum sample size of 
588 based on the model structure and 488 to detect an effect. 
Participants for this study were reached through a screened Qualtrics panel of 
respondents.  During a previous research project, the Qualtrics database of potential respondents 
allowed for an ample dataset that was returned to researchers punctually.  Using these 
participants meant that this study was sourced from a voluntary response sample.  The estimated 
time to completion of the survey instrument was about 20 to 25 minutes. 
Measures 
Each of the measures in this study was separated into the endogenous, exogenous, 
grouping, and demographic variable categories.  The exogenous variables are those exterior to 
the model and similar to independent variables, while endogenous variables are those being 
studied and are internal to the model.  
Endogenous variables.  The endogenous variables, rates of type I and type II errors, 
were created from the results of a 20-question sequence instrument constructed using statistical 
process control charts to assess RSP and error rates.  The choice of 20 questions follows Krueger 
(1933).  A data set, crafted using a random number generator with a specific mean and standard 
deviation, is used to create the charts.  From this sequence, ten strings were selected that were 
random, and ten strings were selected that violated the selected random rules used in SPC charts, 
as shown below in Figure 3.  Twenty separate sequences-questions were generated from the 
dataset with each non-random error being included at least once to create a 50-50 ratio of random 
to deterministic items (see Table 5 for a list of non-random rules).  Therefore, this assessment 




random) that generated a percentage of correct answers, type I and type II errors.  Calculating 
these rates transformed the constructs into continuous measures. 
 
Figure 3. SPC Chart Randomness Diagram 
Eighteen observations from the average or green centerline.  Brown lines show control limits of 
three standard deviations. 
 
Consideration was also given to include the actual data points of each event or use only a 
graphical representation.  For learning and education, Schnotz and Wagner (2017) suggested that 
both pictures and graphs were superior to either case.  However, when examining economics 
statistical and error terms, Soyer and Hogarth (2012) found that economists provided more 
accurate interpretations with graphical representations only.  To avoid unnecessary 
complexification, which might also generate distraction and given the selection of a speeded test 
to be discussed below, graphical representations were considered the better choice. 
Initially, two scenarios were considered to frame the test using one accounting and one 
finance context.  But, in the interest of simplification, one scenario was selected using financial 
references based on abnormal stock returns.  The exact wording of the scenario is as follows: 
For a company automation project, you are a trader reviewing a fictional stock for daily 
abnormal returns after a series of 18 trading days.  Abnormal returns occur when the 
series of percentage changes from one day to the next is not random.  A random series of 
returns do not exhibit any patterns.  You must identify those sequences or series of 





Specific details on the scales, standard deviation, and limits calculations for the SPC chart, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, were explained in detailed instructions to respondents without hinting 
about the nature of any specific random rules following Burton (2005) and Ayton, Hunt, and 
Wright (1989).   
Consideration was given as to whether answering time limits, which created speeded 
tests, would be preferable to un-speeded ones.  In this approach, a speeded test was preferred 
because of two factors: first, the assessment forces the respondents to answer correctly or 
incorrectly without being pre-informed of the questions, and second, the timed element 
eliminates the possibility for internet or other types of searches.  For these questions, 25 seconds 
per question was initially adopted.  
The validity and reliability of the SPC chart are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.  It 
was demonstrated how this tool separates common variation from special cause (random versus 
non-random) along with the probability of each of the eight rule occurrences occurring 
randomly.  The history and continued use of this tool by many businesses and the unceasing 
development of its software point to the robustness of this application. 
Exogenous variables.  The two exogenous latent constructs use standard psychological 
scales.  The first, desirability of control (DC), follows the development by Burger and Cooper 
(1979).  The scale is composed of 20 questions on a 6-point Likert scale of “this statement 
doesn’t apply to me” to “this statement always applies to me.”  Two sample statements include 
“I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it” and “I try to avoid 
situations where someone else tells me what to do.”  And of the 20 items, seven are reverse 




Burger and Cooper (1979) performed as an assessment of DC reliability using the initial 
sample of respondents and obtained a Kuder-Richardson value of 0.80.  And, with a second 
sample, the authors obtained a coefficient of 0.81.  Similarly, in creating a Dutch version of the 
DC scale, Gebhardt and Brosschot (2002) received an overall Cronbach alpha of 0.77.  
Furthermore, Burger and Cooper (1979) got a test-retest coefficient of 0.75 after a six-week 
interlude between assessments.  And after a one-week interval, Gebhardt and Brosschot (2002) 
obtained a test-retest coefficient of 0.86. 
Burger and Cooper (1979) also demonstrated the discriminant validity of the DC scale.  
The authors simultaneously administered the locus of control test to over 200 in the original 
sample.  A small negative relationship between DC and LOC was found of -0.19.  Gebhardt and 
Brosschot (2002) obtained mixed results of discriminant validity as they tested both multi- and 
unidimensional versions of LOC.  The unidimensional scales were positively correlated but not 
significant overall; however, the multi-dimensional version was significantly positively 
correlated with an internal LOC subscale and significantly negatively correlated with “powerful 
others” LOC and “chance” LOC subscales.  And finally, when Dembroski, MacDougall, and 
Musante (1984) separately tested low DC and high DC groups with LOC, they found neither 
significant differences between groups nor any significant correlation between DC and LOC.  
The authors detected a small significant correlation between DC and two type A scales. 
The second exogenous variable, personal fear of invalidity (PFI), follows Thompson et 
al. (2001).  The scale is composed of 14 questions on a 7-point Likert scale of “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree.”  Two sample statements include “I may struggle with a few 
decisions but not very often” and “I never put off making important decisions.”  And of the 14 




Likert scale anchor points will be adjusted to a 6-point Likert to follow the DC scale (for 
researcher preference and reliability see Chyung, Roberts, Swanson, & Hankinson [2017]; also, 
Garland [1987]; Armstrong [1987]). 
Thompson et al. (2001) assessed PFI reliability using the initial sample of respondents 
and obtained a final Cronbach alpha of 0.84.  And with a second sample, the authors obtained a 
coefficient of 0.94.  Similarly, Clow and Esses (2005) reported a Cronbach alpha of 0.82. 
Thompson et al. (2001) also demonstrated the discriminant validity of the PFI scale.  The 
authors simultaneously administered the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), rigidity about 
personal habits (RAPH), and the Beck depression inventory (BD) scales to 157 participants in a 
previous round.  Small positive significant relationships between PFI and RWA, and PFI and 
RAPH were found of r = 0.22 and r = 0.15, respectively, which the authors cited as evidence for 
discriminant validity.  A large positive significant relationship between PFI and BD was found of 
r = 0.64, which the authors cited as evidence for convergent validity. 
Four exogenous characteristics that suggest a behavioral separation between individuals 
with either type I or type II error tendencies were identified.  This variable is composed of five 
questions on a bipolar 6-point Likert scale.  Two statements concern the types of payoff curves, 
following Taleb (2014), and are anchored by “small losses with a small probability of a large 
gain” and “small gains with a small probability of a large loss” or by “medium losses with a 
medium probability of large gains” and “medium gains with a medium probability of large 
losses.”  One statement concerns first-mover advantage, following Golder and Tellis (1993), and 
is anchored by “follower strategy” and “first to market, first-mover strategy.”  The final two 
statements concern tampering and interventionism, following Taleb (2014) and Deming (1982), 




“tried-and-true.”  The left-side anchors reflect the tendency towards a type II error while the 
right-side anchors reflect type I leanings.  Specifically, the type II scale reflects the mirror image 
of the type I. 
Grouping variables.  With this project, two types of grouping variables were selected 
for comparison within the SEM model.  The first is based on a true-false guessing assessment in 
which questions were designed to be unanswerable, as in Fritz (1921) and Krueger (1933).  A 
20-question assessment was created based on a random selection of certain words within several 
personal book selections and was designed to be unknown to respondents. Again, the choice of 
20 questions follows the error rate assessment.  Two sample statements include “Qohelet 1:5, 
Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is ‘son,’” and “Qohelet 1:5, Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is ‘lieu.’”  
Each question follows this method where each pair of questions was constructed using precisely 
the same wording except for a “true” word or a “false” word highlighted in quotes.  This 
assessment is a formative latent construct consisting of true-false binomial responses.  These 
responses will generate percentages of correct answers, type I, and type II errors, which mimic 
the endogenous error rate responses.   
The true-false grouping variable was based on Cohen’s Kappa calculation between 
respondents of the true-false assessment.  As mentioned in the hypothesis section, simulated 
responses with excessive oscillation bias would create at least two self-forming groups.  It was 
expected that no more than 40% of the respondents would have unique answers.  Similarly, the 
second grouping variable was based on the number of true responses as respondents were 
expected to answer about 60% true following Poundstone (2014), Burton (2005), Krueger 




Similar to the SPC chart question construction, both speeded, and non-speeded tests were 
considered.  For the same reasons as previously discussed, a speeded test was preferred.  To 
maintain this section of the survey to force guessing only, a 15-second limit was selected. 
Two statements were also created to assess firm or familial stress as major past or current 
events, which could have affected individual responses toward error types, following Kriz 
(1993).  These questions employed an “affected me” 6-point Likert scale anchored by “not at all” 
and “significantly.”  These two statements were as follows:  “How much has participating in a 
financially distressed company affected your business perspective?  (Financial distress includes 
major reorganization, credit workout, rescue, bankruptcy, and liquidation)” and “How much 
have particular life stresses affected your business perspective?” 
Demographic variables.  Several demographic variables were selected for evaluation.  
Generational information was gathered based on birth year ranges, as described by Dimock 
(2019).  Zysberg and Kimhi (2011) had noted some differences within gender, as did Burger and 
Cooper (1979); therefore, male/female gender was collected.  Even though Fenton-O’Creevy et 
al. (2003) had not found any differences between education and IoCON, the level of education 
was also added to the survey.  These demographics questions use a five-category ordinal 
response scale for birth year, from the Millennial to the Greatest generations; a three-categorical 
response for gender; and a six-categorical nominal response for education, from some high 
school to a graduate degree.   
Qualitative variables.  Two open-ended questions were created to understand various 
strategies that respondents might employ to answer both the true-false guessing and the error rate 
assessments in the event they had no knowledge.  The suggestion to directly ask respondents 




separate guessing behavior from actual knowledge.  The two sample statements include, “Please 
discuss how you determined your answers to the graphical series charts (statistical process 
control) test questions.  All details about your thought processes are appreciated.” and “Please 
discuss how you determined your answers to the true-false test questions.  All details about your 
thought processes are appreciated.”   
Analysis Plan 
Following Christensen, Johnson, and Turner (2014), several pilot surveys for the 
questionnaire were undertaken to receive feedback on the instrument.  Several areas were 
verified to ensure clarity of understanding among respondents especially concerning the financial 
scenario, the SPC graphs and their visibility and size of the display to the participant, the open-
ended questions designed to elicit participant strategies, the timing length of both the true-false 
and SPC un-speeded assessments, and the overall instruction guidelines.  A convenience sample 
of colleagues in the accounting and corporate finance area, and friends were asked to participate 
without any of the screening data.  Feedback was used to modify it as necessary. 
Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2017) outlined an eight-stage procedure for the 
application of partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM).  The first step 
involves specifying the structural model, creating the latent constructs, and their respective 
relationships.  The structural model or inner model shows the directional relationships among 
latent constructs (blue circles), as displayed in Figure 2.  In step two, the measurement or outer 
model is specified, which denotes the relationships between the measures and each latent 
construct.  In Figure 4, DC is a reflective variable, and the characteristics of type I errors is a 




construct and towards the individual measures while the arrows of the formative constructs 
return towards the variable. 
 
Figure 4. Example of Reflective and Formative Constructs. 
A partial view of the internal model showing formative, reflective, and single relationship 
variables. 
 
Step three involves data collection and the analysis of the initial responses for the 
treatment of missing data, suspicious response patterns, or outliers.  In step four, the model 
calculation begins with the PLS algorithm, which assesses path model, i.e., beta regression 
weights between constructs, and both the outer weights for formative constructs and outer 
loadings for reflective ones.  In step five, the outer measurement model is evaluated.  For 
reflective measures, internal consistency, and convergent and discriminant validity were assessed 
by Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability; indicator reliability and average variance 




Similarly, for the formative measures, convergent validity, the significance of outer 
weights, and outer loadings were assessed.  For discriminant validity, the hetero trait-mono trait 
method (HTMT) is preferred, and for internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha and composite 
reliability are preferred.  In this study, convergent validity was determined between the 
characteristics of error types and actual type I and type II error rates as no previous global 
measures exist.  Collinearity was evaluated using the variance inflation factor (VIF), while a 
bootstrapping procedure would assess significance and relevance.  Step six assessed the 
structural model itself by reviewing collinearity (the model VIF); the significance of the path 
coefficients through bootstrapping; the value of the coefficient of determination, R2, and the 
effect size, f2, which assesses the strength of R2; the out of sample predictive relevance, Q2, and 
the effect size q2, which assesses the strength of Q2.  In step seven, moderation and mediation are 
analyzed but were not integrated into this model.  And lastly, the final step involved all the 
interpretations and discussion. 
Similarly, all the grouping and demographic variables are entered into the Smart PLS 
software as groups.  Steps four through six were repeated for each of those variables to 
determine which groups are significantly using the same criteria as the complete model.  The 
specific group model would be the same as in Figure 2, and interpretations were based on the 
identical complete model. 
Moreover, several tests are designed to verify the historical relationships within the 
sample and to a randomly generated sample from a simulated true-false assessment.  Three 
relationships were examined internally within the sample of respondents using simple t-tests:  the 
percentage correct, type I, and type II rates.  T-tests were used to evaluate the percentage of true 




because of a bias towards alternation (excessive oscillation), a statistical runs test, the 
above/below non-parametric exact runs tests, was employed to assess excessive alternation or 
lack of it within both the SPC and the true-false assessments.  This runs test reviews the number 
of singlets, doublets, triplets, etc. in a series for each type of binomial response, counts the actual 
responses, and creates a confidence interval to assess random versus non-random alternation.  To 
avoid type I errors, a 99% confidence level was selected, which was recommended by SigmaXL 
statisticians. 
For the open-ended questions, Creswell (2009) proposed several analytical steps that 
included data cleaning, developing codes and chunking, clustering them to find patterns, and 
summarizing the findings.  A priori codes were deduced from the chapter 2 literature review of 
type I errors such as positive or negative recency, alternation, etc. but these potential strategies 
would need to be validated when reviewing respondent answers.  Conversely, a posteriori codes 
could be induced from the actual data as well as respondents’ psychological valence.  Both of 
these methods were incorporated into this study.  NVivo software was the means employed in 
the analysis because it offers many visualization tools such as word trees, frequency diagrams, 









CHAPTER 4 – DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter encompasses the creation of the research instrument, the three pilot tests to 
assess various aspects of the questionnaire, the final view of the research instrument and its 
rollout to the Qualtrics panel of respondents, the qualitative and quantitative analyses, and the 
findings of this study in a discussion at the end of the chapter.   
Survey Construction and Pilot Studies 
After a successful proposal defense, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Rollins 
College approved this dissertation research after the submission of the required documents.  In 
this section, questionnaire construction, pilot surveys, and feedback from Qualtrics are 
highlighted. 
Questionnaire construction.  Building the questionnaire was an iterative process that 
traversed many versions as new information was obtained from participants, which included the 
DBA cohort students, friends, and colleagues.  The initial graphical representations of the 18-
point SPC charts used to create the endogenous variables were produced from a random number 
generator using a mean of 0.0, a standard deviation of 0.05, and a sample of 100,000.  These 
random strings created both random and non-random sequences by using the SPC chart 
assessment tool within the SigmaXL software.  Ten representations of each were extracted from 
the sample and recalculated again using the software.  Also, during the selection of the ten non-
random strings, six of the eight Nelson’s rules were selected one time while two rules were 




the instrument.  No further randomization occurred internally within the survey because, in the 
case of guessing behavior, question order was important.  This order would be lost if the 
questions were randomized for each recipient.  Appendix Table A1 shows the question number, 
the answer, the error type if incorrect, and rule violation if applicable, in the final randomized 
order. 
A similar process was undertaken for the creation of the true-false assessment.  Various 
sentences were extracted from books in a personal library where the ten true questions were 
based on random word selection, and the ten false questions were created from selecting either 
the word before or after the correct one within the same sentence.  Appendix Table A2 shows the 
question number, the answer, the error type if incorrect, and the actual question in the 
randomized order. 
The exogenous variables, desirability of control (DC), and personal fear of invalidity 
(PFI) questions and their respective scales can be viewed in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, 
respectively.  The question numbers, questions, and coding (straight or reversed) are listed for 
each.  The characteristics’ questions with bipolar scales are also listed in Appendix Table A5 and 
with the Likert scale items in Appendix Table A6.  Lastly, Appendix Table A7 contains the 
demographic items selected for this study, which included generation, education, and gender. 
All these items were incorporated into an initial Qualtrics questionnaire.  During this 
process, it was discovered that “trial and error” versus “tried and true” were reversed on the 
bipolar scale.  The former would be associated with type I errors (repetition) while the latter 
(non-repetition) would be correlated with type II.  Specifically, “tried and true” implies that if 
maintenance, changes, or adoptions within a system never occur, then one expects that system to 




constant adjustment of any process, when unnecessary, would cause a type I error (see Deming, 
1982). 
Concurrently, as the questionnaire was assembled, additional phraseology of the 
qualitative questions was examined based on feedback from Rollins colleagues.  The initial 
open-ended questions were changed from “Please discuss how you determined your answers to 
the graphical series charts (statistical process control) test questions?  All details about your 
thought processes are appreciated” to “How do you think other individuals answered the 
graphical series test questions.”  The same verbiage was also applied to the true-false test 
questions.  This style of wording was preferred based on the research of Grossman and Kross 
(2014), who discussed what they termed “Solomon’s paradox,” which stated that individuals 
make better decisions for others than they do for themselves.  The authors reported that subjects 
showed improvement in their reasoning when thinking about others rather than themselves.  So, 
when participants were asked to move away from an egocentric perspective to a distance away 
from themselves and towards another individual, the paradox was eliminated.  Furthermore, the 
authors asserted that age played no role in superior reasoning, which is contrary to the wise-old 
sage archetype. 
Initial pilot trial.  Several pilot studies were completed to look for any issues related to 
the scenario, the instructions given to respondents and their interpretation of those instructions, 
the visibility and clarity of the SPC charts, the phraseology of the open-ended questions, and the 
timing length for both the SPC chart questions and the true-false grouping variable following 
Christiansen, Johnson, and Turner (2014).   
The initial complete version of the questionnaire was delivered to a convenience sample 




completed, while one was only partially finished.  In an initial analysis of the percentage correct 
for the SPC charts and the true-false, the pairs were 60%-50%, 50%-50%, and 35%-35%, 
respectively.  To obtain a significant result from a 20-question test, 16 of 20 or 79% must be 
answered correctly (p-value = 0.049, effect size = 0.61); therefore, no initial results showed 
knowledge above guessing.  Similarly, and as anticipated, two true-false strategies were 
observed:  replying both all true or all false, which yielded a 50/50 correct-type I or correct- type 
II error, respectively.  This would appear to be an optimal strategy to maximize the score of 
correct answers and to minimize a result which is less than random. 
Average survey completion times ranged from 14 to 19 minutes.  The average time to 
complete each SPC chart assessment was about 9 seconds with a standard deviation of 5.5 
seconds.  The coefficient of variation of 0.61 suggests a uniform distribution.  The true-false 
questions averaged 2.5 to 4.5 seconds with a maximum of 15 seconds and a standard deviation of 
2 seconds, which suggests, once again, a non-normal distribution. 
The results of the qualitative questions were disappointing.  Responses to “how do you 
think other individuals answered the graphical series test questions” included “similar to my 
answers,” and “I think other people were just looking to see how drastic changes were to 
determine randomness.”  Moreover, responses to “how do you think other individuals answered 
the true-false test questions” included “most others may have created a mix of true and false 
guesses” and “randomly.”  Assessing the percentage correct, type I and type II rates did not 
exceed random results while testing for cluster, mixture, trend, and oscillation bias were not 
significant.   
Each of the respondents was emailed to see if they would submit to a post-questionnaire 




suggested three steps to understand whether or not a subject guesses: first, respondents would 
write an answer to a question; second, researchers would determine whether or not a guess or 
calculation was made based on that text; and third, an interview with each subject would occur to 
test the researchers’ assessment methods. In this case, one respondent agreed to be interviewed 
while the second did not wish further contact.   
The interview lasted about 30 minutes and covered all items in the questionnaire.  Some 
of the topics included the following themes.  The scenario instructions were deemed clear and 
comprehensible; however, he preferred “think I see” and “think I do not see randomness” versus 
a true-false response to the question, “Is this string random?”  His interpretation of non-
randomness within each string was to “look for trends.”  The initial time of 25 seconds for the 
SPC chart representations was perceived to be too short, which was confirmed in a review of the 
“time to page submit” calculation.  His suggestion was 40 to 45 seconds.  However, the true-
false assessment time of 15 seconds was not considered limiting.  The respondent confirmed that 
once he realized the nature of the unanswerable questions, he consistently responded true.  Also, 
qualifiers for the bipolar scales of “small, medium, large losses or gains” were discussed.  He 
suggested additional simplification. 
Furthermore, the open-ended questions were again reviewed along with two new options 
based on Taylor and Small (2002) who, in a meta-analysis, had assessed differences in reliability 
between situational and past behavioral questions in structured interviews, i.e., employing a 
“suppose that” format versus a “can you think of a time when” format.  Likewise, the 
interviewee discussed whether or not questions centered on distinguishing random events in life 




Second pilot trial.   Because of the disappointing responses to the qualitative portion of 
the study in the first pilot and to provide additional insight into the respondents’ perceptions of 
random sequences, a second partial trial to differentiate the types/styles of qualitative questions 
was warranted.  Additional research was required to provide alternative open-ended approaches 
from which respondents could choose a preferred method.  Allowing this choice would further 
enrich the quantitative portion of the study. 
Beyond Solomon’s paradox of Grossman and Kross (2014) and the write aloud method 
of Gigerenzer (2000), other qualitative methodologies were considered.  Among them, 
Overgaard, Gallagher, and Ramsoy (2008) reviewed first-person data collection methods.  The 
authors began with a history of these approaches but followed with descriptions of the two major 
trends in psychology today.  The first, neurophenomenology, which is currently termed 
microphenomenology, is a method where subjects gain insights into their conscious experience 
through mental training.  Furthermore, subjects are guided by an interviewer who, through open-
ended questions and not predefined categories, aids them in recognizing their experiential 
knowledge and making it available to others.  The second, front-loaded phenomenology, seeks to 
differentiate human actions between a sense of agency and ownership.  The authors described the 
concept of agency as occurring when individuals were in control of a movement, i.e. its initiation 
and causation such as raising an arm; however, the concept of ownership occurred when, for 
example, a researcher would complete a movement for a subject, i.e. raise the subject’s arm 
while the subject would remain passive even though the actual movement would indeed occur.  
Similarly, Kordes (2012) described a complementary approach called Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES), where the time between a stimulus and its description was minimized.  For 




records his/her thoughts at that moment with as much detail as possible.  Preselected categories 
are used to classify the descriptions which provide a better understanding of the lived experience 
(see also Petitmengin, 2006). 
Despite the fact that microphenomenology is a qualitative interview method, it offers an 
avenue for open-ended questions.  Petitmengin (2019) provided the main scientific criticism of 
the study of introspection in western cultures generally believing that it is impossible to actually 
do a task and simultaneously be an observer of that task.  Is it possible to “walk in the street 
while watching oneself from the balcony,” Auguste Comte summarized western philosophy (as 
cited in Petitmengin, 2019, p. 3)?  However, the author noted that this method was successful in 
understanding implicit learning and tacit knowledge and had helped experts who did not 
understand certain hidden aspects of their knowledge.  Once this knowledge was uncovered, it 
could be passed along to others, used for training, etc.  For example, the firefighters studied in 
Klein’s theory of recognition primed decision making (RPD) would be interviewed to delineate 
specific items of insight within specific experiences that led to a particular course of action.  
Similarly, Petitmengin (2006) described microphenomenology as a method which went beyond 
“what” in a narrative sense to the actual “how” in an actual sense.  Similarly, she critiqued the 
think-aloud method of Ericsson and others as these types of methods would not ascertain the 
actual attribute that determined choice but rather default to a narrative description of what 
occurred (p. 241).  Her description of the interview process occurred in five steps: stabilizing the 
subject’s attention on an experience; focusing on the experience; reformulation when the subject 
digressed; returning to the actual particular experience; and encouraging the subject as he/she 




With these two additional techniques, a new pilot questionnaire was created to assess the 
three qualitative styles of questions.  The survey began with the SPC scenario and requested 
comprehension and comments.  Next, using three SPC charts, a question based on Solomon’s 
paradox was constructed (Grossman & Kross, 2014): “How do you think other individuals 
answered the graphical series test question from the previous page?”  Next, several questions 
based on microphenomenology were constructed (Petitmengin (2006, 2019):  “Please think back 
to when you first viewed the graphical questions.  What did you do?”; “How did you begin?”; 
“And then afterwards?”  And for the third style, one question based on either write aloud 
(Gigerenzer, 2000) or think aloud (Ericsson, 2003) was created:  “As you are viewing the 
graphical series question, please write down all thoughts, ideas, or internal mental commentary 
as they occur to you and which lead to your choice of random or non-random.”  A final survey 
question asked respondents to rank which type of question provided their best explanation.  
Then, this instrument was sent to another convenience sample of accounting and finance 
professionals. 
Additionally, three true-false questions using the three styles mentioned above were sent 
to volunteers with the Rollins Gameboard Club.  Since the initial pilot had revealed specific 
guessing strategies, this short survey sought to confirm preferred qualitative styles that would 
create additional depth of responses from individuals who specialized in gaming strategies. 
For both evaluations, there were eight respondents, four from accounting and finance, 
and four from gamers.  In the quantitative assessment, the percent correct for both groups was 
33% and 50% for SPC and true-false, respectively.  In the SPC group, one person scored all three 
charts correctly, while others correctly identified only one.  In the true-false group, each person 




responses.  As noted in chapter 2, when individuals guess answers to questions, the expectation 
is roughly 60% true.  Gamers guessed at a true rate of 67% or 2:1.  However, within the SPC 
group, the result was 50% or 1:1.  These outcomes were encouraging while realizing that the 
sample size was small. 
In choosing a preference between the styles of advising others (AO), write-think aloud 
(WTA), and microphenomenology (MP), no respondent in any group preferred AO.  In fact, this 
style produced three single-word answers, which would add little depth of understanding to the 
research questions.  Within the SPC group, two preferred both WTA and MP, respectively, while 
in the true-false group, three out of four preferred WTA.  In character (letter) counts within each 
text box, AO consistently and in all cases produced the shortest responses, but in five of the eight 
responses, MP produced longer ones.  This respondent perhaps captured the reason for WTA 
preference:  “The question number two option which was like why did you choose this, it was 
the most helpful because it was on the same page as the graph,” i.e., being able to see and write 
concurrently. 
Several other results were confirmed.  The presence of valence or sentiment was 
exhibited in the true-false assessment:  “How am I supposed to know unless I memorize the 
book?” or “I was confused on what was being asked…” or “I am thinking, ‘Boy, I sure do not 
know this book’” or “I am a lot less trusting of this question now.”  One senses some negative 
emotions of frustration and perhaps agitation or anger.  Moreover, the necessity for time limits to 
the questions was established with this quote: “I thought about the book.  Thought about how 
much effort it would take to find.”  Finally, some expectations were not confirmed.  No 
respondent specifically mentioned Nelson’s rules nor any rules related to non-randomness.  No 




thought of patterns and “parts of patterns,” which led to him/her to suggest that all responses 
were non-random: “…as I literally followed with any type of pattern...any...”  And this comment 
may have expressed Nelson’s rule one, i.e. an observation greater than three standard deviations 
from the mean:  “I observed whether there were clear differences between the pattern of data 
points at the end and whether there was a large deviation from the mean that separated a change 
in the pattern.” 
Some unexpected results did occur, which were used to improve the final instrument.  
Since the SPC charts, mean, limits and standard deviation lines are color coded to aid in 
comprehension, the comment “Well, I’m color blind, so there's problem #1” was an obvious 
oversight and was corrected in the instructions.  The colors were also a technical issue among 
respondents: “Consider using the color red instead of blue or purple for the lines, as the colors 
appear similar on my screen.”  Similar technical issues with the size of the graphs also occurred 
despite the recommendation of a laptop or desktop computer in the instructions:  “Make the lines 
larger and easier to see.”  Furthermore, two additional true-false guessing strategies were 
uncovered:  first, respondents selected true if the word was common in English usage:  “‘with’ is 
a common word used in sentences.”  Second, some respondents chose false because the question 
created suspicion: “I answered false because I no longer trusted the nature of the question,” and 
this breach of trust would generate false guessing and type II error. 
Final survey creation.  Based on the results of the pilot surveys, the complete final 
version was created, including the following eight changes.  First, as requested by the IRB, the 
disclaimer page was modified along with adding a notification that the graphs were in color.  
Second, the SPC scenario remained the same; however, additional descriptions included the 




centerline.”  Third, the time limit for the SPC chart evaluation was raised to 40 seconds.  Fourth, 
the SPC chart responses were changed from true or false to random or non-random.  Fifth, for 
the last question which requested the qualitative assessment, the time limit was removed and the 
open-ended question “As you are viewing the graphical series question, please write down all 
thoughts, ideas, or internal mental commentary as they occur to you and which lead to your 
choice of random or non-random” was added.  Sixth, the same adjustment was made to the true-
false final question, adding the open-ended question “As you are reading the true-false question, 
please write down all thoughts, ideas, or internal mental commentary as they occur to you and 
which lead to your choice of true or false.”  Seventh, the anchors for the bipolar characteristic 
questions were changed to “small losses with a probability of a large gain” versus “small gains 
with a probability of a large loss” and “medium losses with a probability of large gains” versus 
“medium gains with a probability of large losses.”  And eighth, the request for generational 
categories was changed to birth year.  Appendix B shows the final survey instrument and the 
associated changes. 
Third pilot trial.  Once again, to check for any additional oversights of the entire 
questionnaire, a convenience sample was chosen for the third trial to test the revisions before 
submission to Qualtrics.  Additional programming help from the Qualtrics online community 
facilitated much clearer graphs by switching from .JEG file types to .PNG.  Also, additional 
HTML text was created, which allowed respondents to enlarge each of the strings to the original 
file size.  Lastly, the qualifier term of “consistent” was added to the characteristic questions 
concerning types of payoff.  Consideration was given between “consistent” payouts, the idea of 




“Consistent” was judged to be most appropriate as the scenario focused on stock returns.  This 
change can be viewed in Appendix Table B8. 
Qualtrics feedback.  The completed survey was sent to Qualtrics, who assigned a project 
manager and panel projects team who reviewed the survey logic and attributes.  They asked 
about the first characteristics question which probed for preference between “what I avoided” or 
“what I did.”  As a remedy, additional instructions were provided to respondents to clarify that 
they were choosing not only a preference but also a degree of preference.  Finally, during the 
initial start-up phase of the roll-out, Qualtrics agreed to restrict survey availability to non-mobile 
devices only, which would allow for maximum SPC chart visibility.  However, if response rates 
declined, the questionnaire would need to be opened to responses using mobile devices to 
achieve the required sample size. 
Final Study 
This section describes the Qualtrics soft launch, the data collection process which 
necessitated voiding a large number of the first data set, the final data set, the qualitative analyses 
using NVivo software, and the quantitative analyses using MS Excel, SigmaXL, and SMART-
PLS software.  This section ends with a discussion of results. 
Qualtrics soft launch.  Once the final changes were completed, Qualtrics invited 
respondents for the soft launch as an additional quality check for both the data integrity and 
research expectations.  After a short analysis of the data from 38 respondents, the following 
modifications were undertaken.  First, the median response time was 14.5 minutes, which was 
11.5 minutes less than expected.  As a Qualtrics best practice, exclusion of responses would 
occur at one-half the median time to complete or 7.25 minutes; however, these responses were 




were added to years of experience.  Some respondents entered the year that they had begun work 
instead of the number of years working, but the average experience was 13 years.  Third, the 
highest job title and professional qualifications questions were randomized to make sure that 
respondents did not automatically choose the first or second choice (63% were either CPA or 
CFA).  Fourth, as some respondents did not respect the time limits, i.e., leaving the survey and 
returning, a review would be allowed for click-to-submit times.  The largest time gap in the soft 
launch was 22 minutes.  Fifth, Qualtrics mapped all the IP addresses to verify that people 
actually took the survey from the United States.  Sixth, some of the qualitative responses were 
difficult to understand, but it was agreed that some leeway was necessary due to the nature of the 
questions.  Finally, as noted in the previous pilot studies, negative sentiment was observed in 
some responses, i.e., frustration and anger. 
While a comprehensive analysis was not undertaken, similar expected and unexpected 
indications arose.  The favorable gender ratio of 58% male and 42% female was achieved despite 
the lack of quotas.  To ascertain whether or not respondents used strategies to guess both SPC 
and true-false questions, a runs, or alternation test was also performed.  For the SPC questions, 
there were six straight line responses, 14 trends bias responses (under-alternation), no oscillation 
bias responses (over-alternation) at a 99% confidence level.  Similarly, for the true-false 
questions, there were four straight line responses, 11 trend bias responses, no oscillation bias 
responses at the same confidence level.  Therefore, for the SPC chart questions which have 
definitive rules for determining non-randomness, 53% of respondents provided non-random 
responses while in the true-false series, the rate was 40%.  To verify that randomization of 
questions had occurred during the original process, the same tests were performed again.  




responses were 49% versus 51% for the true-false, not statistically different (p-value = 0.891).  
Similarly, the type I and type II error rates for SPC were 20% and 31%, respectively, while the 
true-false rates were 32% and 17%, respectively, which was not statistically significant (p-values 
= 0.236 and = 0.164, respectively).  Also, first versus second responses were also verified in both 
categories. The SPC series was 60% first response versus 64% true for the true-false set, and, 
while not a statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.687), it was consistent with patterns 
first documented almost 100 years ago.  Lastly, both psychological scales were verified to 
understand the composition of respondents who were higher DC, higher PFI, and those that were 
equal. 87% (33) of respondents showed a DC tendency, 11% (4) with a PFI tendency, and one 
with equal responses (2% or 1).  The PFI proxy estimate used for the original sample size 
calculation would have suggested one respondent.  Four individuals with higher PFI were found 
in this small sample, which was an optimistic trend. 
First data set.  When the first final data set was presented, the same data assessment 
procedures as the soft opening were followed.  In Table 10 below, the relationships between 
answers to the SPC data versus the true-false are shown.  As above, both SPC and true-false 
were answered in no better than random.  However, the SPC charts generated more type II 
errors, i.e., respondents did not see non-random effects while in the true-false, they observed 
non-random effects that were actually random.  Not only were respondents’ answers guesses, but 
the error rates changed with the type of assessment.  The smallest significant effect size of 
0.3169 was verified to achieve 0.80 power which yielded a sample size of approximately 850.  
The odds ratio (OR), as described by Sullivan and Feinn (2012), was recommended for binary 
questions and is the ratio of one metric to another.  OR adds an additional dimension to 





Table 10.   
SPC versus True-False Assessments: A Comparison of Attributes 





Percentage Correct 0.5008  0.4947  1,027  0.7825  0.0122  1.0123  
Percentage Type1 Error 0.1784  0.3211  1,027  0.0000  0.3326  1.7993  
Percentage Type2 Error 0.3207  0.1842  1,027  0.0000  0.3169  1.7412  
First Answer Bias 0.6423  0.5902  1,027  0.0150  0.1073  1.0884  
Note.  Odds Ratio from Sullivan and Feinn (2012).  Significant relationships are shown in bold. 
Several other checks were undertaken to review the underlying data.   
Following Hair et al. (2017) and Christensen et al. (2014), straight-lining of the 
psychological scales was observed in approximately 40 instances.  Also, reverse coding was 
explored to check for consistency of responses.  The birth years were examined for instances of 
impossible ages, which were also uncovered.  The birth years, when added to years of 
experience, also created some fantastic dates stretching well into the future (as far as 2040).  
Clearly, some socially desirable responses were occurring to impress the researcher (Steenkamp, 
De Jong, & Baumgartner, 2010).  Following Sheehan and Pittman (2016) and Wessling, Huber, 
and Netzer (2017), a simple review of the qualitative responses was undertaken.  Based on 
verbatim text responses, it appeared that one respondent could have taken the instrument more 
than once, i.e., ballot-box stuffing.  Moreover, in the text fields, some respondents typed in 
random or repeated characters that were gibberish.  These concerns were presented to Qualtrics, 
and their analytics team did a complete review of all the data.  Qualtrics reported their results in 
the email message below, which required the deletion of 472 of the 1,027 total responses:  
“We utilized a combination of available in-platform quality measures and 
external data cleaning to address response quality. The in-platform features 
included speeder checks (which is set based on the median soft launch completion 
time) and duplication checks (via the 'prevent ballot-box stuffing' setting). While 
we have these in-platform features enabled, we also performed external data 
cleaning. This process checks the data on the back-end for a variety of behaviors 
to flag low quality responses -- this includes instances such as straight-liners, geo-




survey durations, excessive response selection, etc.). For this particular survey, 
we also removed responses whose combination of responses seemed illogical 
(such as starting a career in finance before they were old enough to have a college 
degree).” 
 
Final data set.  When the second final data set was presented, the same procedure was 
followed as the soft opening and the first final data set.  All verifications were made, as 
previously discussed.  The response rate slowed as the second round of data collection began.  
After two additional weeks had passed, respondents were allowed to use mobile devices.  Even 
though the graph enlargement feature continued to allow excellent visibility, it was also possible 
that the nature of the responses would change.  When the sample reached approximately 1,000 
responses, Qualtrics reviewed the data one additional time.  About 82 responses were rejected 
from that set.  Then within a couple of weeks, the final sample size of 1,050 was achieved. 
In Table 11, the relationships between answers to the SPC chart data versus the true-false 
assessment are given for the final dataset.  The elimination of the questionable responses had 
also resulted in a reduction in the effect sizes between type I and type II error rates.  Yet when 
examining these effect sizes, power was maintained with a sample size of 850.  Moreover, there 
may have been a device effect.  While the sample size for mobile does not meet the correct 
power level, respondents may be making different selections depending on how they viewed the 





Table 11.   
SPC versus True-False Assessments: a Comparison of Attributes from Final Data 







Percentage Correct 0.5022  0.4997  1,050  0.9062  0.0051  1.0051  
Percentage Type1 Error 0.2119  0.2947  1,050  0.0000  0.1911  1.3912  
Percentage Type2 Error 0.2859  0.2118  1,050  0.0001  0.1717  1.3496  
First Answer Bias 0.5740  0.5397  1,050  0.1126  0.0692  1.0637  
Percentage Correct (non-mobile device) 0.5019  0.5001  899  0.9380  0.0037  1.0037  
Percentage Type1 Error (non-mobile device) 0.2046  0.2756  899  0.0004  0.1667  1.3472  
Percentage Type2 Error (non-mobile device) 0.2935  0.2244  899  0.0008  0.1583  1.3084  
Percentage Correct (mobile device) 0.5043  0.4974  151  0.9038  0.0139  1.0140  
Percentage Type1 Error (mobile device) 0.2553  0.2368  151  0.7083  0.0431  1.0783  
Percentage Type2 Error (mobile device) 0.2404  0.2368  151  0.9408  0.0085  1.0154  
Note.  Odds Ratio from Sullivan and Feinn, (2012).  Significant relationships are shown in bold. 
 
Given the device visibility issue and consistent with Blair and Zinkhan (2006), an 
assessment of non-Response bias was made between the first and last halves of the samples for 
both the SPC and the true-false assessments.  Table 12 outlines the results with the SPC 
instrument.  No p-values were significant, which indicated respondents answered similarly 
regardless of when they viewed the survey. 
 
Table 12.   
SPC Non-Response Bias Assessment: Front Half versus Back Half Sample 







Percentage Correct 0.5045  0.5000  525  0.8848  0.0090  1.0090  
Percentage Type1 Error 0.2056  0.2181  525  0.6211  0.0305  1.0607  
Percentage Type2 Error 0.2899  0.2819  525  0.7744  0.0177  1.0284  
Note.  Odds Ratio from Sullivan and Feinn, (2012).  No significant relationships were found. 
 
A similar view of non-Response bias for the true-false assessment is visible in Table 13.  
As with the SPC test, no p-values were significant; therefore, no evidence of non-Response bias.  
Lastly, the open-ended questions were reviewed to determine possible duplicate respondents.  





Table 13.   
True False Non-Response Bias Assessment: Front Half versus Back Half Sample 







Percentage Correct 0.5008  0.4986  525  0.9435  0.0044  1.0044  
Percentage Type1 Error 0.2652  0.2747  525  0.7245  0.0218  1.0364  
Percentage Type2 Error 0.2340  0.2267  525  0.7780  0.0174  1.0324  
Note.  Odds Ratio from Sullivan and Feinn, (2012).  No significant relationships were found, 
 
Descriptive statistics of the final data set.  The final sample of 1,050 responses was 
composed of 64% male and 36% female.  Using generational categories as proposed by Dimock 
(2019), respondents were 54% Millennial, 35% Generation X, 11% Baby Boomers, and one 
respondent was from the Silent Generation.  Fifty-two percent of the individuals had some 
college or a college degree, while 47% had some graduate work or a graduate degree.  Seventy-
four percent of respondents’ principle work effort was quantitative, 46% were affected by 
employment in a financially distressed company, and 69% suggested life stress might affect their 
business perspective.  The minimum experience required to complete the survey was five years.  
One respondent had 48 years of experience while the average was 13 years, and all were based in 
the United States. 
Qualitative results.  This step was originally proposed to be the last one but was 
repositioned after dataset approval to avoid any bias that might be created from the quantitative 
analysis.  As previously noted, Nickerson (2002) suggested that respondents should be allowed 
to explicate their knowledge of randomness; therefore, one question from each of the SPC and 
true-false sections asked them to write aloud.  The analysis for both the SPC and true-false 
assessments followed Creswell (2009).  Open codes were developed for the SPC graph using 
concepts from literature and the results of the pilots.  For the former, when respondents were 
searching for non-randomness, several concepts emerged:  Clustering, data points falling on one 




Oscillation, data points constantly fluctuating up and down; and Trends, where seven or more 
data points continuously increased or decreased.  These types of comments occurred in about 
22% of the commentaries.  For example, respondents described oscillation as “I looked to see if 
there was a pattern between where the up and down occurred,” or “There are various ups and 
downs, and the middle line is not consistent, so I have chosen randomly.”  As an example of 
mixture, one respondent noted, “Fairly consistent trading pattern first two weeks and the three 
days of volatility before returning to its norm.”  This was the correct assessment of the graph, yet 
only 4% of respondents made the correct observation.  About 8% used some form of incorrect 
logic.  As an example of this, “Random is due to the two big falls at the end of the graph,” which 
was correct but drawing an incorrect conclusion. 
Other open codes included valence, both positive and negative.  For positive valence, the 
sentiment was, as Steenkamp et al. (2010) discussed, socially desirable responding but aimed at 
the researcher:  “This graphical series question is very good.”  The negative valence examples 
were respondents who did not understand what was being measured, were frustrated, and 
sometimes angry:  “This is a very odd survey, I don’t know what you are getting at?” or “I don’t 
see the point of this exercise. Can you tell me the point of this exercise?”  Valence represented 
about 12% of the responses, 10% positive and 2% negative.   
Respondents also discussed patterns and the absence of patterns about 10% of the time:  
“I did not see many patterns.  Most were random,” or “There is no repeating pattern in this 
sequence.”  But also, quite the opposite view was present:  “It is very much random because of 
the way the pattern goes.”  In this instance, randomness has a pattern that conveys two opposite 
views.  Similarly, respondents had personal theories and described them, “A random walk of 




fact may be true from a theoretical perspective; however, the observations contained only 18 data 
points.  Another example included “It's non-random because points 2, 10, 17, 18 are on the 
positive side while points 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 are on the negative side.  Meanwhile, the 
number of points in the line of alignment is lesser than the number of points in disarray.”  This 
philosophizing occurred about 12% or the time. 
Finally, about 25% did not comprehend the exercise, repeated the question, or otherwise 
guessed:  “I just see and guess them.  I base it on the image and those values to decide it's 
random or non-random,” or “The randomness of individuals sometimes tends to decline for no 
apparent reason.”  The inability to articulate an answer will be examined in the discussion 
section below and Chapter 5.  Figure 5 shows a word cloud based on respondents who guessed, 
described, or repeated the question using the synonym setting and most frequent 1,000 words 
with five or more occurrences. 
 
Figure 5.  Word cloud of SPC Open-ended Question.  The actual answer was non-random.  
These are the words associated with a random response. 
 
Other random/non-random keywords mentioned by respondents included: predictability, 




reliable, chaos/volatile, slope, absolute, control, rationality, certainty, and outlier, but these were 
rare.  Also, what was not present was anyone citing Nelson’s rules or the 68-95-99 standard 
deviation rule for a normal distribution, a fundamental statistical concept.   
The open coding for the true-false assessment was much simpler.  Positive and negative 
valences were 19% and 15%, respectively, or 34% of the total:  “I like it, is innovative and fun, 
stirs my emotions,” versus “May I confess? This exercise makes absolutely no sense to me, and I 
don't know what information you're expecting to glean from surveying people about the 
placement of words in various texts.”  Many respondents assumed that they could guess better 
through a personal theory based on English language usage or equated the question to “True, 
False, Not Given” responses to reading comprehension exams.  This occurred about 14% of the 
time, but the majority, 51%, just guessed, described, or repeated the question.  Figure 6 shows 
the results of the guess category following the same criteria used for the SPC instrument.  In 
comparing the clouds, two of the most frequents words, “random” and “false,” are both incorrect 
answers.  These responses are narratives and do not reflect any real understanding of probability 
or the rules related to non-random strings.  This comparison further confirms the idea that 
guessing occurred widely in both instruments and which converges with the quantitative 





Figure 6.  Word Cloud of True-False Open-ended Question.  The actual answer was true.  These 
are the words associated with a random response. 
 
Creation of Cohen’s kappa grouping variable.  The expectation that the data set would 
contain high alternation bias (oscillation) was not met.  In initial simulations of 1,000 data points, 
the result should have been approximately 400 unique strings with groups of ten or larger 
ranging from 10 to over 70 respondents, e.g., those TF and FT repeated ten times.  However, in 
the data from actual respondents, there were 833 individual groups with only three groups with 
ten or more data points.  Moreover, the Kappa calculation did not allow for values that could be 
assembled into groups with the use of a caliper technique (a range of  Kappa values). 
In the SPC assessment, respondents returned 591 non-random patterns, which were 
calculated using the runs test for oscillation and trend within the SigmaXL software.  Over-
alternation was expected to be the dominant pattern but occurred only 22 times.  Straight-lining 
first and second responses occurred 103 and 33 times, respectively, while under-alternation 




37, either all responses of true or false, 65 and 82, respectively, and under-alternation 368 times 
for a total of 552.  Once again, these results showed how respondents turned a fixed randomized 
order into patterned responses. 
To overcome the lack of oscillation bias and continue the idea of groups based on the 
manner that questions were answered, the true-false non-random respondents were organized as 
follows:  All true (65 elements), “more true” under-alternation (174), more false under-
alternation (81), all false (82), over-alternation (37), and the balance of the sample (611).  Figure 
7 shows the kappa values of group two or the “more-true” under-alternation group.  As shown, 
grouping towards true or false tendencies created an unusable wide range of Kappa values. 
 
Figure 7.  More True Under-alternation Group Cohen’s Kappa Values, Group Two. 
 
SEM measurement model.  Following Klarner, Sarstedt, Hoeck, and Ringle (2013) and 












All constructs were assessed for reliability and validity.  Desirability of control (DC) and 
personal fear of invalidity (PFI), the two reflective measures, were analyzed first by examining 
convergent validity through their outer loadings which are visible in Appendix Table C1.  Values 
greater than 0.7 were acceptable, while those between 0.4 and 0.7 needed additional evaluation.  
DC7, DC10, DC16, DC19, DC20, were accepted while PFI3, PFI4, PFI5, PFI6, PFI13, and 
PFI14 also passed. 
Next, the formative measures of the characteristics of type I and type II errors were 
examined for convergent validity.  First, an evaluation of the significance of the outer weights 
was completed with results visible in Appendix Table C2.  Second, if the characteristic was not 
significant, the value on the outer loading was reviewed.  Those above 0.5 were retained, while 
those below 0.5 were excluded.  C2 and C2R were retained for significance, while C3, C3R, and 
C4 were retained based on their outer loadings.  In Appendix Tables C3 and C4, the 
improvements in convergent validity are shown by the increase in the average variance extracted 
(AVE). 
Similarly, the improvements to the reliability measures of Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability can also be seen in Appendix Tables C3 and C4.  The SPC error rate 
reliability measures are 1.00 by definition of the errors themselves, missing an effect or type II 
error versus observing an effect that is non-existent or a type I error.  Next, the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) were examined for collinearity among the items, and DC and PFI passed.  The 
characteristics of type I and type II errors had no values because of the mirror image effect 
employed in this study.  And finally, to measure discriminant validity, the Fornell Larker 
criterion was used for the reflective measures, DC and PFI, which are visible in Appendix Tables 




type I and type II error rates and formative measures, Hetero-Trait Mono-Trait (HTMT) values 
were evaluated and are listed in Appendix Tables C7 and C8.  A complete bootstrap procedure 
was run to see if the 95% confidence intervals contained the value 1.0.  All measures passed this 
discriminant validity verification; therefore, based on the results of the updated model, all 
measures of reliability and validity were achieved.  The next step was to evaluate the structural 
model and relationships with the latent constructs. 
SEM structural model.  A standardized procedure was followed to analyze the 
structural model and the proposed hypotheses that were investigated.  In Figure 8, the structural 
model, path coefficients, and R2 are shown.   
 
Figure 8. Structural Model with Path Coefficients and Respective R2. 
Specifically, R2 for type I and type II errors rates were 0.046 and 0.054, respectively, and 




shown in Table 13 below.  Those values indicate, however, an extremely weak relationship 
because a typically weak result carries a value of 0.02; the values in Table 13 are between 2.5 
and 20 times inferior to a weak result.  In Appendix Table C9, the structural models’ path 
coefficients and significance levels are listed.  Hypothesis H1, stating DC provides a positive 
path to the type I error rate, was supported (mean = 0.131, standard deviation = 0.048, p-value = 
0.007).  Therefore, higher DC individuals would generated more type I errors.  Also, as expected 
and not hypothesized, DC had a significant negative relationship with the type II error rate.  
Hypothesis H2, stating PFI provides a positive path to the type II error rates was not supported 
(mean = 0.065, standard deviation = 0.051, p-value = 0.198).  Therefore, higher PFI individuals 
would not necessarily generate more type II errors.  PFI also had a non-significant negative 
relationship with the type I error rate. 
Table 14.   
F2 Evaluation of Effect Sizes 
Measures SPCType2 Error Rate SPCType1 Error Rate 
Char Type1  0.006 
Char Type2 0.008  
DC 0.006 0.007 
PFI 0.002 0.001 
Note.  Values for f2 for small, medium or large effects are 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35, respectively. 
 
The characteristics for a type I error rate were C2, C3, and C4  which were supposed to 
have a significant positive relationship with type I error rates, but, in fact, were negative (mean  
= -0.085, standard deviation = 0.032, p-value = 0.009); therefore, H3 was not supported.  
Therefore, gains to losses did not generate more type I errors.  Similarly, the expectation that the 
reverse characteristics, C2R and C3R, would provide a positive path to type II errors, H4, was 
not supported and negatively associated (mean = -0.099, standard deviation = 0.033, p-value = 




switch between types I and II errors was related to question design versus respondents’ 
interpretation.  Respondents interpreted the payoff curves in a conventional way: win-stay (no 
switching which yields type II errors), lose-shift (switching which yields type I errors).  Yet, the 
question was designed to differentiate between both conventional and contrarian views, i.e., a 
win-stay, lose-shift strategy as opposed to a win-shift, lose-stay strategy (see Scheibehenne, 
Wilke, & Todd, 2011). 
To assess the predictive value of the model, Q2 was calculated using a blindfolding 
procedure.  A default distance of 8 was selected based on a software technical requirement that 
the sample size divided by the distance needed to be a non-integer result.  Q2 values exceeding 
zero are considered predictive.  Type I error rate and type II error rate predictive values were 
0.039 and 0.050, respectively.  The calculated Q2 effect sizes were -0.011 and 0.012, 
respectively, and extremely weak. 
Hair et al. (2017) explicated model fit measures within Smart PLS, which included 
goodness-of-fit (GoF), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and root mean square 
residual covariance (RMStheta).  The authors recommended not to use any of these measures as 
the current research did not have solid positive results.  Some promising studies pointed to 
RMStheta as a promising metric, so, for completeness, the value in this study was 0.20. 
Multigroup analysis.  Following Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, and Gudergan (2018), there are 
several methods to test groups within Smart PLS.  The measurement invariance of composite 
models (MICOM) necessitates three qualifying conditions to calculate differences between two 
groups.  These conditions are configural invariance, compositional invariance, and equality of 
composite mean values and variance.  Another technique available in Smart PLS is the Multi-




To use either of these techniques for the six Kappa groups, one group would need to 
serve as an anchor, which would logically be the Kappa/Alternation group six containing the 
responses with no oscillation or trend bias.  Group six would be the anchor to which other groups 
will be compared to avoid a familywise error.  Appendix Table C10 lists the path coefficients 
and p-values for Kappa group six.  Unfortunately, this method could not be employed as the 
group six model had values that were different from the complete model; therefore, each group 
model was assessed individually.  It was possible to retain configural invariance from the 
MICOM criteria.  Hair et al. (2018) stated that for configural invariance to exist identical 
indicators, identical data treatment, and identical algorithm usage must occur.  Since the 
respondents were grouped from the same study, and the exact measurement model was used 
along with identical optimization techniques, the measurement model passed configural 
invariance criteria. 
Furthermore, Hair et al. (2018) recommended that all groups should meet a minimum 
sample size, which was determined by the maximum number of arrows pointing to a latent 
construct multiplied by ten.  For this study, a minimum of 30 was needed for group formation.  
For the five groups to be tested, all met minimum sample size requirements. 
The two hypotheses to be assessed based on the Kappa/Alternation groups were as 
follows: hypothesis H4 with a positive path to type I error rates using groups one and two 
(straight line true, true/under-alternation); hypothesis H5 with a positive path to type II error 
rates using groups three and four (false/under-alternation, straight-line false).  Hypothesis H10, 
where true responses exceeded false responses leads to a positive path to the type I error rate, 




Appendix Tables C11 and C12 show the path coefficients and p-values for Kappa Groups 
one and two:  those that straight-lined all true and those that had true tendencies with under-
alternation bias.  In the DC to type I error rate relationship, group one results were mean = 0.203, 
standard deviation = 0.199, and p-value = 0.308, while group two results were mean = 0.113 
standard deviation = 0.134, and p-value = 0.399.  Therefore, hypothesis H5, a group with a 
positive significant path to type I error rate, was not supported, i.e., the tendency to respond true 
did not generate type I errors. 
In Appendix Tables, C13 and C14 are the path coefficients and p-values for Kappa 
Groups three and four:  those that straight-lined all false and those that had false tendencies with 
under-alternation bias.  In the PFI to type II error rate relationship, group three results were mean 
= 0.124, standard deviation = 0.182, and p-value = 0.495, while group four results were mean = -
0.233 standard deviation = 0.224, and p-value = 0.299 (not in the correct direction).  Therefore, 
hypothesis H6, a group with a positive significant path to type II error rate, was not supported, 
i.e., the tendency to respond false did not generate type II errors. 
Appendix Table C15 presents the path coefficients and p-values for higher percentage 
true responses from the true-false assessment.  In the DC to type I error rate relationship, this 
group’s results were mean = 0.129, standard deviation = 0.073, and p-value = 0.076.  Despite 
being close, hypothesis H10, with a positive significant path to type I error rate, was not 
supported, i.e., the tendency to respond true did not generate type I errors. 
Analysis of final three hypotheses of this study.  A major expectation in this study was 
the presence of alternation bias.  Hypothesis H7 predicted that the alternation rate in the true-
false assessment would be significantly higher than a random sample.  As noted in Chapter 3, 




strings, which yielded an exponential function of  2.5593e-0.452.  Therefore, the probability of 20 
randomly alternated true-false responses is 0.0003 or 3 basis points.  Furthermore, a simulation 
was created using the binomial inverse function in Microsoft Excel with parameters of 1 trial, 
0.50 probability, and the random number generator repeated 1,050 times.  The same SigmaXL 
runs tests, the above/below non-parametric exact runs tests, were completed with p-values at a 
99% confidence level.  The results of these simulations showed no alternation bias or straight-
line bias at all.  However, there was excessive trend bias in 247 cases or 24% of the sample.  In 
the true-false assessment, there were 37 observations with oscillation bias.  Even with only 37 
observations, the difference was significant in a t-test (p-value = 0.000, effect size = 0.378).  In 
fact, to be significant at the 95% confidence level, only four observations were required.  
Therefore, hypothesis H7 was supported but not in an expected manner.  The expectation of high 
oscillation bias was not achieved as expected in the literature. 
Hypothesis H8 predicted that the percentages of correct responses would be significantly 
higher in the SPC assessment than in the true-false assessment simply because finance and 
accounting personnel would know and recognize non-randomness, would know Nelson’s rules, 
or would have ideas about outliers, trends, oscillation rates, etc.  From Table 11, it is clear that 
respondents guessed or had incorrect strategies as there was no significant difference between 
the two assessments. (p-value = 0.9062, effect size = 0.0051, and odds ratio = 1.0051).  
Therefore, H8 was not supported.  This lack of random sequence knowledge in corporate finance 
and accounting personnel was disappointing but not surprising. 
The final hypothesis to be evaluated was H9, which predicted that the percentage of true 
responses in the true-false assessment group would be significantly higher than the percentage 




tradition.  A t-test of  the percentage true rate of 0.5397 against 0.500, a random expectation,  
produced a p-value = 0.069, effect size = 0.070, and odds ratio = 1.079.  Running 10 simulations 
with sample sizes of 1,050 observations, for a total of 10,500 using the inverse binomial 
function, as previously described, yielded the results of mean = 0.5010, standard deviation = 
0.0037, skewness = 0.0071, and kurtosis = -1.4675.  The t-test calculation resulted only in 
miniscule changes from 0.5000.  Examining the confidence intervals using the upper limit 0.512, 
yielded a non-significant p-value = 0.205, effect size = 0.055, and odds ratio = 1.054.  Using the 
lower limit of 0.490 produced a significant p-value = 0.023, effect size = 0.099, and odds ratio = 
1.101, however, in the literature, the expectation was closer to 0.60 true, i.e., when faced with a 
random choice individuals guess true significantly more often than false.  Therefore, hypothesis 
H9 was not supported. 
Modeling unobserved heterogeneity.  Since oscillation, under-alternation, and Kappa 
groupings did not find any significant paths.  The next step was to test for unobserved groups 
within the dataset.  Hair et al. (2018) indicated that traditional clustering methods such as k-
means clustering did not meet expectations for a PLS model.  Instead, the authors recommended 
methods such as latent class techniques or response-based segmentation techniques.  
Furthermore, they offered a step-by-step method to investigate unobserved heterogeneity.  First, 
finite mixture partial least squares (FIMIX-PLS) calculated several fit indexes for any number of 
segments based on theory or research preference.  Segments that contained the lowest calculated 
index value were considered optimal choices.  SMART-PLS contains ten different indexes.  
Some of those types include Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), Modified Akaike’s 
Information Criterion with Factor 3 (AIC3), Modified Akaike’s Information Criterion with Factor 




(CAIC), and Minimum Description Length 5 (MDL5), among others.  Second, the prediction-
oriented segmentation partial least squares (POS-PLS) was executed, which moved data points 
between the selected number of groups to maximize explained variance.  Once these groupings 
were completed, it was the responsibility of the researcher to explain the structure, if any, and to 
re-examine group-specific models using the PLS-SEM procedures previously described 
In Appendix Table C16, 11 separate fit indexes are listed across eight segments that were 
calculated in eight separate trials.  The minimum sample size criteria was also based on the 
largest number of arrows directed to any single latent variable divided by the sample size; 
however, 35 groups were not feasible.  Assuming group sizes of between 60 and 210 respondents 
or roughly 5% to 10% of the sample leaving a large unclassified group would seem to follow 
leading research on personality types (see Gerlach, Farb, Revelle, & Amaral, 2018).  Therefore, 
the number of groups might be between five and seven.  Furthermore, some index combinations 
provided more accurate estimates of the explained variance than others.  According to Hair et al. 
(2018), the pecking order of matching indexes to estimate segments was as follows:  AIC3 and 
CAIC, AIC3 and BIC, and AIC4 and BIC.  The latter combination, whose actual minimized 
values are shown in Appendix Table C16, indicated the possibility of six segments.  Also, the 
entropy statistic normed (EN) of 0.643 was larger than 0.500, the hurdle rate, and provided 
additional confirmatory evidence of six groups. 
Next, each segment group was reviewed for the minimum size relative to the sample of 
1,050 respondents.  Appendix Table C17 indicates each of the segment sample sizes met the 30-
respondent minimum.  And finally, Appendix Table C18 shows the estimated R2 values of each 
segment.  Segments three to six have R2 values over 80%, while segment two is approximately 




With the FIMIX-PLS segment solution determined, the next step was to execute the 
prediction-oriented segmentation (POS-PLS) procedure.  By random assignment and using an 
optimization procedure that was designed to maximize the explained variance of the endogenous 
variables, respondents were placed in one of the six groups (Hair et al., 2018).  Appendix Table 
C19 lists the path coefficients for each of the POS groups, and Table C19 indicates the R2 values.  
Once each respondent had been assigned to a group, a determination was made as to the 
characteristics of these groups.  Initially, a review of the qualitative responses was undertaken to 
see if patterned commentary or specific coding had occurred among segment members.  
Subsequently, a review of the quantitative data, including the screening criteria and several of the 
demographic variables, was considered.  Unfortunately, no information was forthcoming.  
However, several of the segments revealed a type of finance/accounting personality based on an 
approach to errors which was much richer than anticipated.   
Specifically referring the Appendix Tables C19 and C20, segment six indicates either an 
individual with high DC or one with high PFI with strong positive tendencies to the type I error 
rate and a strong negative tendency to the type II error rate.  These individuals could be 
described either as “control freaks” or perhaps micromanagers or as super fearful persons who 
check everything multiple times.  These activities would cause many type I errors through the 
effort to verify nonexistent effects.  These could be the individuals most subject to maladaptive 
behaviors described by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003).  In total opposition to what was expected, 
segment five individuals had stronger tendencies of DC to type II error rates and PFI to type I 
error rates.  These controlling individuals perhaps know accounting and finance subject matter 
and may be exhibiting some hubris or other IoCON behavior, which leads them away from 




Conversely, the semi-fearful finance individuals will be checking for effects constantly 
and, therefore, making more type I errors as in segment six.  And lastly, segment two individuals 
are similar to those anticipated in this study.  These individuals have a weaker tendency of DC to 
the type I error, but it remains significant.  They control and make type I errors, but much less 
than segment six.  Moreover, segment two also contains the most fearful finance individuals of 
all segments, the highest path of PFI to type II error rate.  These individuals are so fearful that 
this behavior leads them to indecision and IoCHA.  Their remedy would be to follow the advice 
of Harris and Osman (2012) and “pretend” they had control despite their perception of chaos. 
Once the groups were identified, it was possible to add the POS-PLS groups to the data 
and calculate additional individual segment models.  As an example of this, Appendix Table C21 
shows segment six’s path models and p-values.  All paths are significant except for the 
characteristics type I to the type II error rates (compared to the original model in Appendix Table 
C9).  For the type I error rate, the R2 and R2 adjusted were 0.983 and 0.982, respectively, while 
the type II error rates were 0.986 and 0.985, respectively.  Moreover, when comparing the effect 
sizes of DC and PFI, f2, listed in Table 14, to those below in Table 15, these were extreme 
values. 
 Table 15.   
F2 Evaluation of Effect Sizes for POS Segment Six (an example) 
Measures SPCType2 Error Rate SPCType1 Error Rate 
Char Type1  0.032 
Char Type2 0.216  
DC 47.382 39.440 
PFI 0.032 9.067 
Note.  Values for f2 for small, medium or large effects are 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35, respectively. 
 
True-False SEM PLS model.  Rather than knowing the rules of randomness within 




but also to the SPC assessment as repeatedly stated.  Therefore, there was another possible PLS 
structural model that was created using the true-false assessment as endogenous variables.  For 
parsimony and the fact that this model was not anticipated, only the model and final results were 
presented.  The question to answer was whether or not respondents answering both assessments 
would group similarly in each segment. 
In the same standardized procedure as the SPC PLS model, the true-false model was 
constructed.  First, convergent validity was assessed for the measurement model.  Outer loadings 
were examined for the reflective variables of DC and PFI, and outer weights and loadings for the 
formative characteristic variables.  Figure 9 shows the current model.  DC2, DC4, DC5, DC11, 
DC12, and DC15 were retained for the desirability of control.  PFI3, PFI4, PFI5, PFI6, PFI7, PFI 
11, PFI12, and PFI14 were retained for personal fear of invalidity.  Characteristics C2, C5, C2R, 
and C5R were also kept.  The structural model in Figure 8 below was reviewed for reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and AVE), discriminant validity (Fornell-Larker and 





Figure 9.  True-False Structural Model with Path Coefficients and Respective R2. 
Once the structural model was completed and path coefficients were examined, along 
with their significance, through the bootstrapping technique, the blindfolding procedure was used 
to review out of sample predictive power.  Next, the FIMIX-PLS process was used to determine 
the number of segments,  shown in Appendix Table C22.  The segment sizes prohibited any 
segments over six, but since no fit indexes were minimized at that number, the optimal choice of 
five segments was selected. 
The POS-PLS process was completed to assign each respondent to one of the five groups.  
In Appendix Table C23, R2  are listed for each segment, as are the weighted average and original 
values.  Overall, R2 remained weak, yet some of the segments had high explained variance 
though not as elevated as the SPC model.  The path coefficients are listed in Appendix Table 
C24.  The hypothesized paths of DC to type I and PFI to type II are seen in segment five, which 




between PFI and type I error rates as in SPC segment five but without a strong DC to type I error 
rate relationship.  A crosstab count of the respondents in both the SPC and true-false assessments 
is shown in Appendix Table C25.  While the initial reaction to this difference might appear 
problematic, Table 11 showed that the same individuals reacted in different ways to each 
assessment, i.e., missing effects in the SPC graphs, and perhaps, overthinking in the true-false 
guessing game.  Moreover, this may provide evidence for Brunswik’s representative design, 
which is discussed in the next section (see Gigerenzer, 2000). 
Discussion 
The most interesting finding and contribution of this study is that accounting and finance 
personnel, when faced with time series, do not appear to be able to distinguish between a random 
series and a non-random one.  Our findings clearly showed that where the time-series graph had 
no positive or negative slope overall, the results of the individual assessments were no better than 
guessing.  Likewise, this fact was evident in the qualitative responses.  Respondents were more 
likely to admit to guessing in the true-false assessment, but roughly the same percentages (12%-
13%) had developed their own personal logic, narrative, or rationalization.  While some 
respondents did know what to look for statistically, i.e., oscillations, trends, mixture, 
stratification, etc., actually operationalizing this general knowledge into correct answers was 
problematic.  And no apparent knowledge appeared to exist concerning Nelson’s rules or the 65-
95-99 rule of standard deviations in a normal distribution.  As over half had college degrees and 
a large portion, at minimum, some graduate work, one might anticipate some exposure to a 
statistics class that was perhaps long forgotten but urgently required. 
The second finding is the obvious observation of the inability of respondents to write 




provide complementary phrases, or even turn to frustration and anger.  However messy this 
process was, it fulfilled the idea suggested by Nickerson (2002) that subjects should be able to 
write about what they know about randomness.  Microphenomenology, as a qualitative research 
technique, may provide a solution to this issue and will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Third, the assessments themselves revealed something about human adaptability.  Table 
11 showed that in the SPC assessment, there was a significance in type II errors, i.e., missing the 
non-random effects within the series.  However, in the true-false assessment, the tendency 
moved to type I errors, i.e. seeing effects that were not there.  What was designed to give purely 
random answers was instead used by some who attempted to “see” what the researcher was up to 
or to ascertain some hidden knowledge.  The same respondents, in effect, guessed one way in the 
SPC assessment and another in the true-false.  Gigerenzer (2000) described Egon Brunswik’s 
probabilistic functionalism which was composed of four precepts: achievement when individuals 
attempt to adapt to their environment; the ambiguity of cues that exist in that environment; 
vicarious functioning when those individuals attempt to process environmental cues by 
recombination and re-substitution; and representative design which researchers should use both 
to capture this vicarious functioning and to generalize beyond just one assessment of 
stimulus/response.  In fact, this study also measured randomness in two ways (complex versus 
simple) which provided two error tendencies (missing effects, seeing non-existent ones) and 
which points to the insight of Brunswik’s argument, i.e., without both assessments, those insights 
would have gone undetected. 
Fourth, the SEM-PLS modeling process was a powerful tool to understand latent 
construct relationships.  However, the models that were created revealed minimal explained 




between the desirability of control and the type I error rate was the only significant one.  And the 
characteristics, while showing significant paths, were inverse, e.g., gains to losses were 
associated with a type II error rate.  Therefore, as a generic assessment tool to identify illusion of 
control or illusion of chaos, SPC and true-false methods were inadequate.  And yet, the quest for 
an objective error rate instrument that measures all individuals in a sample as hoped for by 
Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) must continue. 
Fifth, Smart PLS multi-group analysis would have been effective with only two groups.  
However, the FIMIX-PLS and POS-PLS represented newer tools to maximize explained 
variance.  These tools uncovered more complex relationships between control, fear, and error 
rates.  The use of these modules to create groups from which individuals could then be 
interviewed and from whom characteristics could be determined marked a path forward in the 
studies of illusion of control and illusion of chaos.  Moreover, using new statistical methods with 
older constructs coincides with the “tools to theories” heuristic advocated by Gigerenzer (1991, 
2000), i.e., new tools provide undiscovered insights into older ideas or theories. 
Sixth, the use of Cohen’s kappa as a grouping variable was original but depended heavily 
on the presence of over-alternation bias.  Without this repeated oscillation, the respondents’ 
samples would not fall into self-forming groups.  Likewise, under alternation did not indicate a 
particular style or behavior to be used as a grouping variable.  So as a practical grouping tool, 
kappa has its flaws regardless of the alternation rate. 
And, even though this particular model was not performing as expected, finance and 
accounting personnel should reflect on the potential types of errors they might make when 
executing all aspects of their craft: from accrual estimates to financial forecasts and analyses.  




(2013), increased complexity without new information increased risk profiles, may help finance 
professionals not to go the way of the specialist, Lem Put, privy builder (see Sale, 1929). 
As a final note concerning data integrity in this study, Qualtrics data sets, PLS-SEM 
models and data uploads will be available to interested parties upon request.  The reporting of the 
analytics of this study were those items actually used for evaluation and were typically reported 









CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Conclusions 
Several conclusions from this study are evident.  First, statistical process control charts 
and true-false guessing methods do not explain much variance in type I and II error rates for all 
individuals.  Second, respondents were given a voice to explain, however awkwardly, their 
thoughts on randomness.  Initially, there was some disappointment in the quality of the 
responses; however, this sentiment changed with the realization that respondents may not have 
this capability.  Third, the use of advanced structural equation modeling, SEM-PLS, FIMIX-
PLS, and POS-PLS, offer new exploratory tools of study.  Fourth, finance and accounting must 
have general knowledge about randomness, variation, and error implications, especially given 
the high cost of both types of errors.  Providing simple average point estimates of metrics should 
not be considered an adequate standard.  The understanding of variation that business processes 
generate, and that the resulting financial statements reflect, should be common knowledge.  It is 
important to note that illusions of control or chaos are not known to some individuals and are 
much more sinister behaviors than overconfidence.  Fifth, large effect sizes, like those shown for 
segment six in the SPC POS-PLS analysis, would be needed to get the attention of the business 
community.  If an effect size of 0.25 is educationally significant, it would not be large enough to 
create development impetus.  Minimum effect sizes need to be those used for clinical trials of 
0.50 to 0.60 to attract interest.  Both the SPC and true-false POS-PLS models contained certain 





This study had a few limitations.  The presence of two endogenous variables allowed for 
a verification of generalizability within the field of accounting and finance; however, beyond this 
group, there is no claim to a broader reflection of the knowledge within other business functional 
groups or to a population at large.  This research used a Qualtrics panel, but Amazon Mechanical 
Turks or perhaps other specialized areas of finance and accounting with specific statistical 
training might have generated different results.  If extant, the additional identification of the 
attributes of the segmentation results from the POS-PLS would have augmented understanding.  
Likewise, perhaps some readers might criticize the design of the survey as either too complex or 
too simple to make a valid assessment.  Further analysis of the screened responses, speeders, or 
other non-compliant respondents could have yielded supplementary or confirmatory information. 
Future Research 
Many future research possibilities lie ahead.  Objective assessments, those allowing 
respondents to answer the presented graph or proffered true-false questions without being able to 
gauge a correct answer, would be preferred to typical Likert-scaled questionnaires.  The 
experiments in the psychology of illusion of control require priming of individuals; however, no 
attempt to induce that condition occurred in this study.  Therefore, similar assessments could and 
should be developed for future trials as a method to thwart socially-desirable responding.  A 
simpler version of the 18-string assessment could be attempted by using a 12-string SPC chart.  
Shorter strings would reduce the non-random rule count by two which would give subjects fewer 
data points to evaluate.  Likewise, an international cohort could be explored.  Qualtrics offered 
panels in the United Kingdom and India as possible large sample studies of greater than 1,000 




Since the costs of both types of errors can be large, efforts to create objective measures 
that evaluate all individuals for both illusion of control, as advocated by Fenton-O’Creevy et al. 
(2003), and illusion of chaos, as advocated by Harris and Osman (2012), should be pursued.  
Surprisingly, this effort has not been seized on by the academic community. 
Taking a reductive approach at an individual level, microphenomenology offers a path 
forward for both training subjects and, with the help of an interviewer, revealing the tacit 
knowledge that is currently unknown to them.  While Klein (1993) and others, in their research 
of recognition primed decision making, left tacit knowledge as a partial black box, 
microphenomenology might pierce the mystery of that implicit intelligence for random sequence 
perception as it has with artists and medical patients. 
The exploration of groups two, five, and six found among the respondents and cross-
referenced between the two assessments should be explored further.  Reflecting on the insights 
from these segments could provide a path to awareness of many psychological vulnerabilities 
and opportunities for personal improvement for all individuals.  Moreover, the discovery of these 
segments using these SEM-PLS techniques that perform rigorous exploratory research within a 
single software package augments any scientist’s toolbox. 
Closing Thoughts 
Two final thoughts concerning this dissertation project follow.  This study was written in 
a straightforward manner so that business personnel might read, comprehend the results, and 
draw their own implications of the facts as they were explained.  And secondly, the rigors of this 
study in both sampling and analyses should refute the tendency within the finance and 




whether inside or outside the profession, will likely criticize the lack of statistical knowledge 
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Table A1.  
Pilot Statistical Process Control Chart (SPC) Question List 
Survey Answer Error Rule Violation; 0 = no Rule Violation 




Test 6: 4 out of 5 points more than 1 standard deviation 
(StDev) from center line (CL) (same side) 




Test 1: 1 point more than 3 standard deviation from center 
line 
SPC5 Random Type1 0 
SPC6 Random Type1 0 




Test 1: 1 point more than 3 standard deviation from center 
line 




Test 8: 8 points in a row more than 1 standard deviation from 
CL (either side) 
SPC11 Random Type1 0 
SPC12 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 2: 7 points in a row on same side of center line 
SPC13 
Non-




Test 7: 14 points in a row within 1 standard deviation from 
center line (either side) 
SPC15 Random Type1 0 
SPC16 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 4: 14 points in a row alternating up and down 
SPC17 Random Type1 0 
SPC18 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 2: 7 points in a row on same side of center line 




Test 5: 2 out of 3 points more than 2 standard deviation from 
center line (same side) 
Note. Statistical process control charts answer keys which includes question number, correct 







Table A2.  
Pilot True-False (T-F) Question List 
 
Survey Answer Error Actual Question 
TF1 FALSE Type1 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 4, 32th word is "with". 
TF2 TRUE Type2 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 2, 14th word is "with". 
TF3 TRUE Type2 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 26, 20th word is "the". 
TF4 FALSE Type1 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 2, 11th word is "time". 
TF5 TRUE Type2 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 9, 6th word 
is "escape". 
TF6 FALSE Type1 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 26, 20th word is "distance". 
TF7 TRUE Type2 Lamentations 3:5, Chouraqui Bible; 4th word is "moi". 
TF8 TRUE Type2 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 4, 32th word is "room". 
TF9 FALSE Type1 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 3, 11th word is "men". 
TF10 TRUE Type2 Qohelet 1:5, Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is "son". 
TF11 FALSE Type1 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 5, 21th word is "the". 
TF12 TRUE Type2 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 2, 11th word is "from". 
TF13 FALSE Type1 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 4, 11th word 
is "importance". 
TF14 FALSE Type1 Qohelet 1:5, Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is "lieu". 
TF15 FALSE Type1 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 2, 14th word is "his". 
TF16 FALSE Type1 Lamentations 3:5, Chouraqui Bible; 4th word is "et". 
TF17 TRUE Type2 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 4, 11th word 
is "this". 
TF18 FALSE Type1 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 9, 6th word 
is "his". 
TF19 TRUE Type2 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 5, 21th word is "on". 
TF20 TRUE Type2 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 3, 11th word is "some". 
Note. The true-false answer keys include question number, correct answer, the type of error if 






Table A3.  
Pilot Desirability of Control (DC) Question List 
Number Question Coded 
1 I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.   
2 I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running government as possible.   
3 I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to do.   
4 I would prefer to be a leader than a follower.   
5 I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.   
6 I am careful to check everything on an automobile before I leave for a long trip.   
7 Others usually know what is best for me.   
8 I enjoy making my own decisions.   
9 I enjoy having control over my own destiny.   
10 I would rather someone else take over the leadership role when I’m involved in a group project. R 
11 I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.   
12 I’d rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else’s orders.   
13 I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin.   
14 When I see a problem, I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it continue.   
15 When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them.    
16 I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions off on someone else. R 
17 When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a situation where I could be hurt by another person’s mistake.   
18 I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.   
19 There are many situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to make a decision. R 
20 I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve a problem so that I don’t have to be bothered with it. R 
Note. The desirability of control question list which includes question number, question, and 







Table A4.  
Pilot Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Question List 
Number Question Coded 
1 It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.   
2 I'm not bothered by things that upset my daily routine. R 
3 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.   
4 I like a place for everything and everything in its place.   
5 I like being spontaneous. R 
6 I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. R 
7 I don't like situations that are uncertain.   
8 I hate to change my plans at the last minute.   
9 I hate to be with people that are unpredictable.   
10 I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.   
11 I enjoy the exhilaration of being put in unpredictable situations. R 
12 I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.   
Note. The personal need for structure question list which includes question number, question, 
and coding type (either straight or reverse). 
 
Table A5.  
Pilot Bipolar Characteristics Question List 
Number Anchor 1 Anchor 2 
C1 Look What I Avoided Look What I Did 
C2 Small losses with a small probability of a large gain 
Small gains with a small probability of a 
large loss 
C3 Medium losses with a medium probability of large gains 
Medium gains with a medium 
probability of large losses  
C4 Trial-and-error Tried-and-True 
C5 Follower strategy First to market, first mover strategy 
Note. The bipolar characteristics question list includes the question number and both anchors. 
 
Table A6.  
Pilot Distressed Characteristics Question List 
Number Question 
C6 
How much has participating in a financially distressed company affected your 
business perspective? (financial distress includes major reorganization, credit 
workout, rescue, bankruptcy, liquidation) 
C7 How much have particular life stresses affected your business perspective? 







Table A7.  
Pilot Demographic Question List 
Number Question 
C8 Generation:  Baby boomer, Gen X, Gen Y, Silent, Greatest 
C8 Highest level of education completed: high school, college, graduate school 
C9 Gender: male, female 








Table B1.  
Final Statistical Process Control Chart (SPC) Question List 
Survey Answer Error Rule Violation; 0 = no Rule Violation 




Test 6: 4 out of 5 points more than 1 standard deviation 
(StDev) from center line (CL) (same side) 




Test 1: 1 point more than 3 standard deviation from center 
line 
SPC5 Random Type1 0 
SPC6 Random Type1 0 




Test 1: 1 point more than 3 standard deviation from center 
line 




Test 8: 8 points in a row more than 1 standard deviation from 
CL (either side) 
SPC11 Random Type1 0 
SPC12 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 2: 7 points in a row on same side of center line 
SPC13 
Non-




Test 7: 14 points in a row within 1 standard deviation from 
center line (either side) 
SPC15 Random Type1 0 
SPC16 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 4: 14 points in a row alternating up and down 
SPC17 Random Type1 0 
SPC18 
Non-
Random Type2 Test 2: 7 points in a row on same side of center line 




Test 5: 2 out of 3 points more than 2 standard deviation from 
center line (same side) 
Note. Statistical process control charts answer keys which includes question number, correct 
answer, the type of error if incorrect, and the Nelson’s rule violation if any.  The order of the list 
was randomized.  No changes from pilot. 
 
Table B2.  
Final True-False (T-F) Question List 
Survey Answer Error Actual Question 
TF1 FALSE Type1 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 4, 32th word is "with". 




TF3 TRUE Type2 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 26, 20th word is "the". 
TF4 FALSE Type1 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 2, 11th word is "time". 
TF5 TRUE Type2 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 9, 6th word 
is "escape". 
TF6 FALSE Type1 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 26, 20th word is "distance". 
TF7 TRUE Type2 Lamentations 3:5, Chouraqui Bible; 4th word is "moi". 
TF8 TRUE Type2 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 4, 32th word is "room". 
TF9 FALSE Type1 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 3, 11th word is "men". 
TF10 TRUE Type2 Qohelet 1:5, Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is "son". 
TF11 FALSE Type1 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 5, 21th word is "the". 
TF12 TRUE Type2 Gunman's Reckoning, chapter 2, 11th word is "from". 
TF13 FALSE Type1 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 4, 11th word 
is "importance". 
TF14 FALSE Type1 Qohelet 1:5, Chouraqui Bible; 8th word is "lieu". 
TF15 FALSE Type1 The Picture of Dorian Grey, chapter 2, 14th word is "his". 
TF16 FALSE Type1 Lamentations 3:5, Chouraqui Bible; 4th word is "et". 
TF17 TRUE Type2 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 4, 11th word 
is "this". 
TF18 FALSE Type1 
The Little Price, Karen Woods' translation, chapter 9, 6th word 
is "his". 
TF19 TRUE Type2 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 5, 21th word is "on". 
TF20 TRUE Type2 Riders of the Purple Sage, chapter 3, 11th word is "some". 
Note. The true-false answer keys include question number, correct answer, the type of error if 
incorrect, and the actual question.  The order of the list was randomized.  No changes from pilot. 
 
Table B3.  
Final Desirability of Control (DC) Question List 
Number Question Coded 
1 I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.   
2 I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running government as possible.   
3 I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to do.   
4 I would prefer to be a leader than a follower.   
5 I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.   
6 I am careful to check everything on an automobile before I leave for a long trip.   
7 Others usually know what is best for me.   
8 I enjoy making my own decisions.   
9 I enjoy having control over my own destiny.   




11 I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.   
12 I’d rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else’s orders.   
13 I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin.   
14 When I see a problem, I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it continue.   
15 When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them.    
16 I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions off on someone else. R 
17 When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a situation where I could be hurt by another person’s mistake.   
18 I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.   
19 There are many situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to make a decision. R 
20 I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve a problem so that I don’t have to be bothered with it. R 
Note. The desirability of control question list which includes question number, question, and 
coding type (either straight or reverse).  No changes from pilot. 
 
 
Table B4.  
Final Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Question List 
Number Question Coded 
1 It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.   
2 I'm not bothered by things that upset my daily routine. R 
3 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.   
4 I like a place for everything and everything in its place.   
5 I like being spontaneous. R 
6 I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. R 
7 I don't like situations that are uncertain.   
8 I hate to change my plans at the last minute.   
9 I hate to be with people that are unpredictable.   
10 I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.   
11 I enjoy the exhilaration of being put in unpredictable situations. R 
12 I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.   
Note. The personal need for structure question list which includes question number, question, 









Table B5.  
Final Bipolar Characteristics Question List 
Number Anchor 1 Anchor 2 
C1 Look What I Avoided Look What I Did 
C2 Small losses with a probability of a large gain 
Small gains with a probability of a large 
loss 
C3 Medium losses with a probability of large gains 
Medium gains with a probability of 
large losses  
C4 Tried-and-True Trial-and-Error 
C5 Follower strategy First to market, first mover strategy 
Note. The bipolar characteristics question list includes the question number and both anchors.  
Changes from pilot were to remove the probability qualifiers of small and medium and reverse 
the positions of tried-and-true and trial-and-error. 
 
 
Table B6.  
Final Distressed Characteristics Question List 
Number Question 
C6 
How much has participating in a financially distressed company affected your 
business perspective? (financial distress includes major reorganization, credit 
workout, rescue, bankruptcy, liquidation) 
C7 How much have particular life stresses affected your business perspective? 
Note. The distressed characteristics question list includes the question number and question.  No 
changes from pilot. 
 
 
Table B7.  
Pilot Demographic Question List 
Number Question 
C8 Birth year 
C8 Highest level of education completed: high school, college, graduate school 
C9 Gender: male, female 
Note. The demographics question list includes the question number and question.  Birth year 







Table B8.  
Final Bipolar Characteristics Question List after Third Trial 
Number Anchor 1 Anchor 2 
C1 Look What I Avoided Look What I Did 
C2 Consistent small losses with a probability of a large gain 
Consistent small gains with a probability 
of a large loss 
C3 Consistent medium losses with a probability of large gains 
Consistent medium gains with a 
probability of large losses  
C4 Tried-and-True Trial-and-Error 
C5 Follower strategy First to market, first mover strategy 
Note. The bipolar characteristics question list includes the question number and both anchors.  
Changes from third trial were to add the qualifier of consistent to the losses to gains or gains to 






Table C1.  










C1 0.295      
C1R  0.286     
C2 0.871      
C2R  0.933     
C3 0.531      
C3R  0.560     
C4 0.610      
C4R  0.380     
C5 0.490      
C5R  0.438     
DC1   -0.335    
DC10   0.614    
DC11   -0.448    
DC12   -0.570    
DC13   -0.231    
DC14   -0.143    
DC15   -0.534    
DC16   0.757    
DC17   -0.156    
DC18   -0.542    
DC19   0.696    
DC2   -0.597    
DC20   0.721    
DC3   -0.604    
DC4   -0.425    
DC5   -0.475    
DC6   -0.362    
DC7   0.695    
DC8   -0.118    
DC9   -0.160    
PFI1    
-
0.468   
PFI10    
-
0.502   
PFI11    0.572   
PFI12    0.608   
PFI13    
-
0.633   
PFI14    0.720   
PFI2    
-
0.376   




PFI4    0.701   
PFI5    0.726   
PFI6    0.726   
PFI7    0.580   
PFI8    0.459   
PFI9    
-
0.668   
SPCType1     1.000 
SPCType2       1.000   
Note. Outer loadings greater than 0.7 exhibit convergent validity. 
 
Table C2. 











C1 -> Char Type1 0.182 0.172 0.185 0.982 0.326 
C1R -> Char Type2 0.184 0.182 0.158 1.158 0.247 
C2 -> Char Type1 0.742 0.692 0.172 4.320 0.000 
C2R -> Char Type2 0.868 0.820 0.143 6.074 0.000 
C3 -> Char Type1 -0.038 -0.043 0.221 0.173 0.863 
C3R -> Char Type2 0.025 0.022 0.196 0.129 0.897 
C4 -> Char Type1 0.291 0.274 0.192 1.520 0.129 
C4R -> Char Type2 -0.002 0.003 0.166 0.010 0.992 
C5 -> Char Type1 0.291 0.278 0.174 1.670 0.095 
C5R -> Char Type2 0.284 0.271 0.158 1.792 0.074 
Note. Outer weights test for significance and p-values.  Significant values are shown in bold. 
 
Table C3. 
Reliability Metrics for the Initial Model 
Measure Cronbach's Alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
DC 0.795 0.247 0.253 
PFI 0.454 0.521 0.371 
SPCType2 Error Rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SPCType1 Error Rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 












Reliability Metrics for the Final Model 
Measure Cronbach's Alpha Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
DC 0.852 0.894 0.629 
PFI 0.861 0.896 0.589 
SPCType2 Error Rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SPCType1 Error Rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note. Cronbach’s alpha should be a minimum value of 0.7. 
 
Table C5. 
Fornell-Larker Criteria for Discriminant Validity for the Initial Model 
Measure 
Char 





Char Type1       
Char Type2 -0.961      
DC -0.349 0.383 0.503    
PFI 0.333 -0.346 -0.781 0.609   
SPCType2 Error 0.176 -0.183 -0.224 0.219 1.000  
SPCType1 Error -0.161 0.155 0.216 -0.213 -0.690 1.000 





Fornell-Larker Criteria for Discriminant Validity for the Final Model 
Measure 
Char 





Char Type1 Error       
Char Type2 Error -0.934      
DC -0.378 0.412 0.793    
PFI 0.365 -0.371 -0.758 0.768   
SPCType2 Error 0.164 -0.171 -0.208 0.191 1.000  
SPCType1 Error -0.151 0.141 0.196 -0.174 -0.690 1.000 




Hetero-Trait Mono-Trait (HTMT) Criteria for Discriminant Validity for the Initial Model 
Measure DC PFI SPCType2 Error Rate 
PFI 0.772   
SPCType2 Error Rate 0.171 0.224  
SPCType1 Error Rate 0.166 0.216 0.690 






Hetero-Trait Mono-Trait (HTMT) Criteria for Discriminant Validity for the Final Model 
Measure DC PFI SPCType2 Error Rate 
PFI 0.874   
SPCType2 Error Rate 0.224 0.201  
SPCType1 Error Rate 0.211 0.183 0.690 
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1 -0.085 -0.093 0.032 2.628 0.009 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 -0.099 -0.101 0.033 2.995 0.003 
DC -> SPCType2 Error -0.118 -0.120 0.050 2.387 0.017 
DC -> SPCType1 Error 0.131 0.130 0.048 2.711 0.007 
PFI -> SPCType2 Error 0.065 0.068 0.051 1.289 0.198 
PFI -> SPCType1 Error -0.043 -0.046 0.049 0.888 0.375 
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  -0.107 -0.119 0.039 2.731 0.007 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2  -0.111 -0.115 0.044 2.530 0.012 
DC -> SPCType2 Error -0.044 -0.045 0.061 0.718 0.473 
DC -> SPCType1 Error 0.043 0.046 0.058 0.748 0.455 
PFI -> SPCType2 Error 0.087 0.096 0.056 1.567 0.118 
PFI -> SPCType1 Error -0.054 -0.058 0.057 0.951 0.342 
Note.  Group six was composed of respondents without under or over-alternation bias in true-
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  -0.211 -0.152 0.217 0.975 0.330 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 -0.166 -0.168 0.132 1.260 0.208 
DC -> SPCType2 Error  -0.172 -0.217 0.208 0.829 0.407 
DC -> SPCType1 Error 0.203 0.251 0.199 1.020 0.308 
PFI -> SPCType2 Error  0.106 0.094 0.211 0.504 0.615 
PFI -> SPCType1 Error -0.047 -0.025 0.189 0.247 0.805 




















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  -0.076 -0.113 0.085 0.893 0.373 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 -0.065 -0.077 0.091 0.717 0.474 
DC -> SPCType2 -0.033 -0.037 0.129 0.259 0.796 
DC -> SPCType1 0.113 0.113 0.134 0.844 0.399 
PFI -> SPCType2 0.149 0.159 0.122 1.215 0.225 
PFI -> SPCType1 -0.073 -0.086 0.133 0.545 0.586 
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  -0.267 -0.290 0.095 2.815 0.005 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 -0.294 -0.301 0.112 2.631 0.009 
DC -> SPCType2 -0.084 -0.092 0.184 0.456 0.649 
DC -> SPCType1 0.121 0.107 0.218 0.556 0.578 
PFI -> SPCType2 0.124 0.115 0.182 0.683 0.495 
PFI -> SPCType1 -0.069 -0.046 0.185 0.375 0.707 
Note.  Group three exhibited False tendencies with under-alternation on true-false assessment.  
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  0.172 0.208 0.141 1.222 0.222 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 0.183 0.202 0.136 1.349 0.178 
DC -> SPCType2 0.018 0.060 0.179 0.103 0.918 
DC -> SPCType1 0.006 -0.042 0.160 0.036 0.972 
PFI -> SPCType2 -0.233 -0.213 0.224 1.040 0.299 
PFI -> SPCType1 0.230 0.198 0.215 1.072 0.284 




















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  -0.093 -0.104 0.044 2.106 0.036 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2 -0.070 -0.080 0.047 1.500 0.134 
DC -> SPCType2 -0.074 -0.070 0.075 0.975 0.330 
DC -> SPCType1 0.129 0.128 0.073 1.777 0.076 
PFI -> SPCType2 0.140 0.148 0.068 2.062 0.040 
PFI -> SPCType1 -0.099 -0.106 0.067 1.474 0.141 
Note.  Significant values are shown in bold. 
 
Table C16. 
Fit Indexes for One- to Eight-Segment Solution (FIMIX-PLS) 
Fit Index/Segment Number 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
AIC  (Akaike's Information 
Criterion) 5,868  5,647  5,506  5,448  5,382  5,335  5,324  5,305  
AIC3  (Modified AIC with 
Factor 3) 5,876  5,664  5,532  5,483  5,426  5,388  5,386  5,376  
AIC4  (Modified AIC with 
Factor 4) 5,884  5,681  5,558  5,518  5,470  5,441  5,448  5,447  
BIC  (Bayesian Information 
Criteria) 5,907  5,731  5,635  5,621  5,600  5,597  5,631  5,657  
CAIC  (Consistent AIC) 5,915  5,748  5,661  5,656  5,644  5,650  5,693  5,728  
HQ  (Hannan Quinn Criterion) 5,883  5,679  5,555  5,514  5,465  5,434  5,441  5,439  
MDL5  (Minimum Description 
Length with Factor 5) 6,130  6,204  6,359  6,595  6,825  7,072  7,357  7,633  
LnL (LogLikelihood) (2,926) (2,807) (2,727) (2,689) (2,647) (2,614) (2,600) (2,582) 
EN  (Entropy Statistic 
(Normed))  0.496  0.658  0.514  0.707  0.643  0.652  0.544  
NFI  (Non-Fuzzy Index)  0.533  0.643  0.461  0.649  0.555  0.547  0.406  
NEC  (Normalized Entropy 
Criterion)   529  359  510  308  375  365  479  
Note.  Row minimum is optimal and shown in bold.  Preferred combinations: AIC3/CAIC, 
AIC3/BIC, AIC4/BIC.  EN should be larger than 0.50.  This solution used AIC4/BIC. 
 
Table C17. 



















2 0.712  0.288        
3 0.703  0.217  0.080       
4 0.535  0.224  0.164  0.077      
5 0.664  0.124  0.093  0.063  0.056     
6 0.549  0.153  0.144  0.056  0.050  0.048    
7 0.522  0.160  0.105  0.071  0.058  0.057  0.027   
8 0.280  0.280  0.120  0.100  0.088  0.073  0.044  0.015  























SPCType2 Error Rate 0.137 0.458 0.862 0.944 0.965 0.989 0.054 
SPCType1 Error Rate 0.097 0.463 0.803 0.869 0.960 0.993 0.046 
Note.  Segments three to six exhibit high R2. 
 
Table C19. 
Path Coefficients for Original Sample and Six POS Segments (POS-PLS) 











Char Type1 -> Type1 -0.085 -0.132 0.086 1.065 -1.002 0.155 0.016 
Char Type2 -> Type 2 -0.099 -0.147 0.034 0.997 -0.993 0.162 0.058 
DC -> Type1 0.131 0.217 0.202 -0.015 -0.142 -0.529 1.513 
DC -> Type2 -0.118 -0.202 -0.107 0.118 0.218 0.503 -1.508 
PFI -> Type1 -0.043 0.118 -0.833 -0.313 -0.079 0.454 0.716 
PFI -> Type2 0.065 -0.084 0.909 0.281 0.170 -0.484 -0.686 
Group Size 1,050  749  80  38  61  54  68  




R2 Original, by POS Segment, and Weighted (POS-PLS) 











SPCType1 Error 0.046 0.049 0.946 0.894 0.962 0.948 0.983 0.308 
SPCType2 Error 0.054 0.060 0.965 0.908 0.947 0.961 0.986 0.318 
Group Size 1,050  749  80  38  61  54  68  1,050  
















Char Type1 -> SPCType1  0.025 0.019 0.023 1.071 0.285 
Char Type2 -> SPCType2  0.058 0.055 0.020 2.937 0.003 
DC -> SPCType1 Error 1.514 1.512 0.082 18.480 0.000 
DC -> SPCType2 Error -1.508 -1.506 0.079 19.122 0.000 
PFI -> SPCType1 Error 0.714 0.707 0.072 9.949 0.000 
PFI -> SPCType2 Error -0.686 -0.676 0.072 9.516 0.000 









Fit Indexes for One- to Nine-Segment Solution (FIMIX-PLS) for True-False Model 
Fit Index/Segment Number 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
AIC 5,749  5,516  5,362  5,273  5,218  5,200  5,152  5,133  5,116  
AIC3 5,757  5,533  5,388  5,308  5,262  5,253  5,214  5,204  5,196  
AIC4 5,765  5,550  5,414  5,343  5,306  5,306  5,276  5,275  5,276  
BIC 5,788  5,601  5,491  5,446  5,436  5,463  5,459  5,484  5,513  
CAIC 5,796  5,618  5,517  5,481  5,480  5,516  5,521  5,555  5,593  
HQ 5,764  5,548  5,411  5,338  5,301  5,300  5,268  5,266  5,266  
MDL5 6,011  6,074  6,214  6,420  6,661  6,938  7,184  7,460  7,739  
LnL (2,866) (2,741) (2,655) (2,601) (2,565) (2,547) (2,514) (2,495) (2,478) 
EN 0.000  0.411  0.427  0.474  0.468  0.509  0.489  0.579  0.574  
NFI 0.000  0.450  0.443  0.439  0.413  0.423  0.389  0.455  0.436  
NEC 0  619  602  553  559  515  537  443  447  
Note.  Row minimum is optimal and shown in bold.  Preferred combinations: AIC3/CAIC, 
AIC3/BIC, AIC4/BIC.  EN should be larger than 0.50.  Segment size issues prohibited any 




R2 Original, by POS Segment, and Weighted (POS-PLS) for True-False Model 









SPCType1 Error 0.106 0.510 0.251 0.871 0.720 0.776 0.887 
SPCType2 Error 0.099 0.439 0.150 0.822 0.704 0.710 0.893 
Group Size 1,050  566  148  113  131  92  1,050  




Path Coefficients for Original Sample and Five POS Segments (POS-PLS) for True-False Model 
Relationship Original Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5 
Char Type1 -> Type1 0.078 0.271 -0.093 -0.854 0.799 0.026 
Char Type2 -> Type 2 0.041 -0.066 0.054 -0.944 0.761 0.216 
DC -> Type1 0.136 0.196 0.030 -0.098 -0.224 0.993 
DC -> Type2 -0.177 -0.282 -0.053 -0.064 0.085 -0.889 
PFI -> Type1 0.218 0.225 0.943 0.099 -0.067 -0.132 
PFI -> Type2 -0.192 -0.181 -0.868 -0.226 0.191 0.122 
Group Size 1,050  566  148  113  131  92  






Comparison of SPC and True-False Models Assignment of Respondents 
Segments TF1 TF2 TF3 TF4 TF5 Total 
SPCGroup1 453 89 65 84 58 749 
SPCGroup2 32 23 9 6 10 80 
SPCGroup3 14 3 9 7 5 38 
SPCGroup4 16 14 9 19 3 61 
SPCGroup5 23 8 9 9 5 54 
SPCGroup6 28 11 12 6 11 68 
Total 566 148 113 131 92 1,050 
Note.  The SPC group adds horizontally while the true-false groups add vertically. 
 
